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Preface
Elena Cabrio1, Serena Villata1, and AdamWyner2
1INRIA Sophia Antipolis - Mediterranee
2Department of Computing Science, University of Aberdeen
Large amounts of text are added to the Web
daily from social media, web-based commerce,
scientific papers, eGovernment consultations, and
so on. Such texts are used to make decisions in the
sense that people read the texts, carry out some in-
formal analysis, and then (in the best case) make a
decision: for example, a consumer might read the
comments on an Amazon website about a camera,
then decide which camera to buy; a voter might
read various political platforms, then vote. An an-
alyst or consumer of such corpora of text is con-
fronted by several problems. The information in
the corpora is distributed across texts and unstruc-
tured, i.e. is not formally represented or machine
readable. In addition, the argument structure - jus-
tifications for a claim and criticisms - might be im-
plicit or explicit within some document, but harder
to discern across documents. As well, the sheer
volume of information overwhelms users. Given
all these problems, extracting and reasoning with
arguments from textual corpora on the web is cur-
rently infeasible.
To address these problems, we need to develop
tools to aggregate, synthesize, structure, summa-
rize, and reason about arguments in texts. Such
tools would enable users to search for particular
topics and their justifications, trace through the ar-
gument (justifications for justifications and so on),
as well as to systematically and formally reason
about the graph of arguments. By doing so, a
user would have a better, more systematic basis
for making a decision. Clearly, deep, manual anal-
ysis of texts is time-consuming, knowledge inten-
sive, and thus unscalable. Thus, to acquire, gener-
ate, and transmit the arguments, we need scalable
machine-based or machine-supported approaches
to extract and reason with arguments. The ap-
plication of tools to mine and process arguments
would be very broad and deep given the variety of
contexts where arguments appear and the purposes
they are put to.
On the one hand, text analysis is a promising
approach to identify and extract arguments from
text, receiving attention from the natural language
processing community. For example, there are ap-
proaches on argumentation mining of legal doc-
uments, on-line debates, product reviews, news-
paper articles, court cases, scientific articles, and
other areas. On the other hand, computational
models of argumentation have made substantial
progress in providing abstract, formal models to
represent and reason over complex argumentation
graphs. The literature covers alternative models,
a range of semantics, complexity, and formal dia-
logues.
Yet, there needs to be progress not only within
each domain, but in bridging between textual and
abstract representations of argument so as to en-
able reasoning from source text. To make progress
and realize automated argumentation, a range of
interdisciplinary approaches, skills, and collab-
orations are required, covering natural language
processing technology, linguistic theories of syn-
tax, semantics, pragmatics and discourse, domain
knowledge such as law and science, computer sci-
ence techniques in artificial intelligence, argumen-
tation theory, and computational models of argu-
mentation.
To begin to address these issues, we orga-
nized the seminar Frontiers and Connections be-
tween Argumentation Theory and Natural Lan-
guage Processing, which was held July 21-25,
2014 at the University Residential Center, Berti-
noro, Italy. It was attended by 29 participants.
The papers in this CEUR Workshop Proceedings
are the outcome of the workshop, ranging over a
host of topics, empirical approaches, and theoreti-
cal frameworks.
 Argumentation for Scientific Claims in a Biomedical Research Article  
 
 
Nancy L. Green 
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Abstract  
This paper provides an analysis of some 
argumentation in a biomedical genetics 
research article as a step towards devel-
oping a corpus of articles annotated to 
support research on argumentation. We 
present a specification of several argu-
mentation schemes and inter-argument 
relationships to be annotated. 
1 Introduction 
This paper provides an analysis of some argu-
mentation in a biomedical genetics research arti-
cle (Schrauwen et al., 2012), as a step towards 
developing a corpus of articles annotated to sup-
port research on argumentation (Green, 2014). 
For each argument for a scientific claim in an 
article, we would like to annotate its premises, 
conclusion, and argumentation scheme. In addi-
tion we would like to annotate certain relation-
ships between pairs of the arguments, e.g., where 
one provides support for the premise of another. 
In order to develop an annotation system that can 
be consistently applied by different coders or by 
the same coder at different times, it is necessary 
to develop a precise specification of each argu-
mentation scheme and inter-argument relation-
ship. In this paper, we present a specification of 
several argumentation schemes and inter-
argument relationships to be annotated.  
     The main claim of (Schrauwen et al., 2012), 
summarized in its title, is that a certain variant, 
c.637+1G>T of the CABP2 gene, is a cause of 
moderate-to-severe, autosomal recessive non-
syndromic hearing loss (arNSHL). According to 
our analysis, the argumentation in the article 
serves at least four types of discourse goals. The 
first is to persuade peer reviewers that the article 
is worthy of publication. The second is to per-
suade the audience that the scientific methodolo-
gy used by the authors was sound and that the 
evidence so acquired is reliable. Arguments for 
the third type support or defend the scientific 
claims of the article. Arguments for the fourth 
type support the practice implications, i.e., the 
authors’ suggested application of the scientific 
contribution to medical practice. The planned 
corpus will be annotated for arguments of the 
third and fourth type. In the next section, we 
briefly discuss the first two types, before focus-
ing on the third and fourth types. 
2 Discourse Goals 
2.1 Novelty and Significance   
The Knowledge Claim Discourse Model 
(KCDM) (Teufel, 2010) provides a multi-level 
description of consecutive text segments of a 
scientific article in terms of the “knowledge 
claims”, or purported scientific contribution of 
the article. “The top level … formalizes the au-
thors’ high-level rhetorical goals, which serve to 
defend the new knowledge claim of an article 
against possibly hostile peer review … For in-
stance, authors must argue that their new 
knowledge claim is novel and significant, and 
sufficiently different from already existing 
knowledge claims to warrant publication” (p. 
102). According to Teufel, these arguments are 
not “directly textually expressed”, but can be 
inferred by the reader from lower-level rhetorical 
moves that “often contain meta-discourse 
phrases such as ‘In contrast to traditional ap-
proaches’. 
    In the Introduction section of (Schrauwen et 
al., 2012) the significance of the search for caus-
es of arNSHL can be inferred from text such as 
“Hearing loss is a common sensory disorder that 
 can significantly impact quality of life” (p. 636).  
An argument for novelty is given in Excerpt 1.  
 
Excerpt 1: 
“Most families segregating arNSHL typically 
have a prelingual, bilateral, severe-to-profound 
hearing loss. An exception is found with muta-
tions in TECTA … and STRC …; these mutation 
cause moderate-to-severe hearing loss … Re-
cently, we identified a locus associated with 
arNSHL on 11q12.3-11q13.3 (DFNB 93) in an 
Iranian family that also presents a similar moder-
ate-to-severe hearing loss phenotype … Here, we 
report that a mutation in CABP2 … is the cause 
of DFNB93 moderate-to-severe hearing loss and 
reveal a role for CaBP2 in the mammalian audi-
tory system.” (p. 636)  
 
By design, the KCDM does not address argu-
mentation whose identification requires under-
standing of scientific content. Thus, the KCDM 
is not concerned with characterizing the other 
uses of argumentation that we found in the genet-
ics article. 
2.2 Methodological Soundness  
The Results section of (Schrauwen et al. 2012) 
employs a narrative style reporting the sequence 
of events in the authors’ scientific investigation, 
the reasons for the actions taken during the in-
vestigation, and the results of those actions. In so 
doing, the authors provide implicit arguments for 
the soundness of their scientific methodology. 
(The Materials and Methods section of the article 
provides more details about the methodology.) 
For example, Excerpt 2 provides a reason for the 
authors’ decision to sequence a certain region of 
the genome of a certain individual (V:14).  
 
Excerpt 2: 
“The DFNB93 region contains more than 300 
annotated and hypothetical genes, and several 
genes are expressed in the mouse and human in-
ner ear. Because there are many strong candi-
dates in the region, we sequenced all genes and 
noncoding genes in this region by using a custom 
DNA capture array to identify the disease-
causing mutation in one affected individual from 
the family.” (p. 639)  
 
    This passage can be analyzed as an instance of 
a type of Practical Reasoning argument whose 
discourse goal is to justify the authors’ action 
(sequencing the DFNB93 region by using a cus-
tom DNA capture array) in order to achieve the 
authors’ goal (to identify the disease causing mu-
tation in one affected individual). In addition, as 
will be discussed in the next section, the excerpt 
contains a causal argument. 
2.3 Scientific Claims and Practice Implica-
tions 
The focus of our planned annotation efforts is on 
argumentation for scientific claims and practice 
implications. In this section we present our anal-
ysis of several examples of this type of argumen-
tation, given mostly in the Results section of 
(Schrauwen et al. 2012). In addition to the in-
stance of Practical Reasoning discussed in 2.2, 
we analyze Excerpt 2 as making the causal ar-
gument shown in Argument 1. 
 
Argument 1.  
a. Premise: Several genes in the DFNB93 region 
are expressed in the human inner ear.  
b. Premise (implicit generally accepted assump-
tion): A mutation of a gene that is expressed in a 
human tissue or system may lead to an abnormal-
ity in that tissue or system. 
c. Premise: A certain individual (identified as 
V:14) has arNSHL.  
d. Conclusion: The mutations occurring in 
DFNB93 of V:14 are strong candidates for the 
cause of V:14’s arNSHL. 
 
    Argument 1 can be represented more abstract-
ly, for purposes of annotation of similar argu-
ments in the corpus, by the following argumenta-
tion scheme. In addition to specifying the prem-
ises and conclusion, we have added a critical 
question. Critical questions associated with an 
argumentation scheme provide a way to chal-
lenge arguments instantiating the scheme (Wal-
ton et al. 2008). The use of critical questions in 
our annotation efforts is discussed in section 3. 
 
Effect to Some Cause in Candidate Set 
Premise: There is a causal pathway from G-type 
events to P-type events.  
Premise: An individual has experienced P (a P-
type event). 
Conclusion: Some G-type event experienced by 
that individual may be the cause of P. 
Critical Question: What if the set of candidates G 
does not include the actual cause of the event? 
 
   Excerpt 3 contains the argument described in 
Argument 2. 
 
 
 Excerpt 3: 
“After the identified homozygous variants were 
filtered through the 1000 Genomes Project No-
vember 2010 release and dbSNP131, 47 previ-
ously unreported variants remained…” (p. 639) 
 
Argument 2. 
a. Premise (same as 1d): The mutations occurring 
in DFNB93 of V:14 are strong candidates for the 
cause of V:14’s arNSHL. 
b. Premise (implicit generally accepted assump-
tion):  If a variant is a frequent polymorphism 
then it is not likely to be the cause of a deleteri-
ous condition. 
c. Premise: All but 47 of the homozygous vari-
ants in DFNB93 of V:14 are frequent polymor-
phisms. 
d. Conclusion: One of the remaining 47 homozy-
gous variants may be the genetic cause of V:14’s 
condition. 
 
Excerpt 4 contains the argument described in 
Argument 3. 
 
Excerpt 4: 
“… 47 previously unreported variants remained 
and included two exonic mutations, one splicing 
mutation, six nontranslated mutations, 16 inter-
genic (downstream or upstream) mutations, and 
22 intronic mutations. The two exonic variants 
included one nonsynonymous variant … in 
PFIA1 and synonymous variant … in GAL3ST3 
… The splice-site variant, c.637+1G>T … was 
located at … of CABP2 … The variants in 
PPFIA1 and CABP2 were subsequently validated 
by Sanger DNA sequencing, which only con-
firmed the splicing variant in CABP2. (p. 639). 
 
Argument 3. 
a. Premise (same as 2d): One of the remaining 47 
homozygous variants may be the genetic cause 
of V:14’s condition. 
b. Premise (implicit generally accepted assump-
tion): Only exonic or splice-site variants con-
firmed by Sanger DNA sequencing could be the 
cause of a genetic condition. 
c. Premise: Of the remaining 47 homozygous 
variants, only the c.637+1G>T splicing variant in 
CABP2 was confirmed. 
d. Conclusion: The c.637+1G>T variant in 
CABP2 may be the genetic cause of V:14’s con-
dition. 
 
Arguments 2 and 3 can be described as instances 
of the following argumentation scheme. 
Elimination of Candidates 
Premise: There exists a set of candidates C, one 
of which may be the cause of event E. 
Premise: One or more members of C can be 
eliminated as candidates. 
Conclusion: One of the remaining members of C 
may be the cause of E. 
 
    Excerpt 5 contains two arguments, described 
in Arguments 4 and 5. 
 
Excerpt 5: 
“Next, we checked the inheritance of the CABP2 
variant in the entire Sh10 family … and screened 
an additional 100 random Iranian controls to en-
sure that the variant is not a frequent polymor-
phism. The mutation was not detected in any of 
the controls, and inheritance was consistent with 
hearing loss in the family.” (p. 639). 
 
Argument 4. 
a. Premise: The c.637+1G>T variant in CABP2 
segregates with arNSHL in Sh10 (V:14’s pedi-
gree). 
b. Premise (implicit generally accepted princi-
ple): A variant may be the cause of an autosomal 
recessive condition if it segregates with the con-
dition in a pedigree, i.e., occurrence of the condi-
tion and the variant are consistent with an auto-
somal recessive inheritance pattern. 
c. Conclusion (implicit): The c.637+1G>T vari-
ant in CABP2 may be the cause of arNSHL in 
Sh10. 
 
Although Argument 4 is in some respects similar 
to Mills’ Joint Method of Agreement and Differ-
ence (described in Jenicek and Hitchcock, 2004), 
its premise (4b) provides a causal explanation 
that is not part of that type of argument. Argu-
ment 4 can be described more precisely as an 
instance of the following argumentation scheme. 
 
Causal Agreement and Difference 
Premise: There exists a set of individuals I-
present that have a feature F and property P. 
Premise:  There exists a set of individuals I-
absent that do not have feature F and property P. 
Premise: There is a plausible causal link from F 
to P that could account for the presence of P in I-
present. 
Conclusion: F may be the cause of P in I-present. 
Critical Question: Is there some other feature G 
in I-present that could account for P, or is there 
some other factor G in I-absent that could ac-
count for the absence of P?  
   Argument 5 from Excerpt 4 is as follows. 
 
Argument 5. 
a. Premise: The c.637+1G>T variant in CABP2 
is present in the arNSHL affected members of 
Sh10.  
b. Premise:  The variant does not occur in a con-
trol group. 
c. Conclusion (implicit): The c.637+1G>T vari-
ant in CABP2 may be the cause of arNSHL in 
Sh10. 
 
Argument 5 can be described as an instance of 
the following argumentation scheme, based upon 
Mills’ joint method of agreement and difference. 
Note that its first critical question is shared with 
Causal Agreement and Difference, but its second 
critical question is not needed for that argumen-
tation scheme, one of whose premises is that 
there is a causal mechanism that may account for 
the differences between I-present and I-absent. 
 
Joint Method of Agreement and Difference  
Premise: A set of individuals I-present have a 
feature F and property P. 
Premise: A set of individuals I-absent (distinct 
from I-present) do not have F and P. 
Conclusion: F may be the cause of P in I-present. 
Critical questions: 
• Is there some other feature G in I-present 
that could account for P, or is there some 
other factor G in I-absent that could account 
for the absence of P? 
• Is there a plausible causal mechanism that 
explains how F leads to P? 
 
    Excerpt 6 contains a causal argument for how 
the c.637+1G>T variant of CABP2 could lead to 
hearing loss, as shown in Argument 6. 
 
Excerpt 6:  
“… we evaluated the effect of the c.637+1G>T 
mutation on splicing … Analysis … revealed … 
indicating that the mutation of c.637+1G>T leads 
to a complete skipping of exon 6 … Skipping of 
exon 6 is expected to lead to a shifted reading 
frame and a premature truncation of the protein” 
(p. 639-0).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Argument 6. 
a. Premise: The c.637+1G>T mutation of   
CABP2 may have a deleterious effect on CaBP2 
protein during synthesis by CABP2. 
b. Premise (implicit): CaBP2 protein plays a role 
in the auditory system. 
c. Premise (implicit generally accepted princi-
ple): Damage to a protein can lead to disease of 
the tissue or biological system in which that pro-
tein plays a role. 
d. Conclusion (implicit): A c.637+1G>T muta-
tion of CABP2 may result in a disease of the au-
ditory system. 
 
Argument 6 can be described by the following 
argumentation scheme. 
 
Cause to Effect 
Premise: There is a partially known causal path-
way from events of type G to events of type P. 
Conclusion: The occurrence of a G-type event 
may result in a P-type event.  
 
Excerpt 7 contains Argument 7, which is similar 
to Argument 4 and can likewise be described as 
an instance of Causal Agreement and Difference. 
 
Excerpt 7: 
“We identified two families (Sh11 and He) with 
affected individuals who were homozygous in 
this region … Affected family members present-
ed with an audiogram similar to the affected in-
dividuals in the Sh10 family… Sanger sequenc-
ing … revealed the same c.637+1G>T mutation 
in these families.” (p. 640)  
 
Argument 7. 
a. Premise: Affected members of two families, 
Sh11 and He, have audiograms similar to those 
of affected family members of Sh10 and the 
c.637+1G>T variant in CABP2 segregates with 
hearing loss in those two families. 
b. Premise (implicit generally accepted princi-
ple): A variant may be the cause of an autosomal 
recessive condition if it segregates with the con-
dition in a pedigree. 
c. Conclusion (implicit): The c.637+1G>T vari-
ant in CABP2 may be the cause of arNSHL in 
Sh11 and He. 
 
    Perhaps because they expect it to be obvious 
to the intended audience, the authors do not ex-
plicitly state Argument 8. 
 
 
  
Argument 8. 
a. Premise (generalizing 4c, 5c, 7c): The 
c.637+1G>T variant in CABP2 may be the cause 
of arNSHL in several pedigrees. 
b. Premise (implicit generally accepted assump-
tion): A homozygous mutation known to have a 
certain effect in some families will have a similar 
effect in anyone who inherits it.  
c. Conclusion (implicit): Anyone having homo-
zygous c.637+1G>T variants of CABP2 may be 
affected by arNSHL. 
 
Such an argument could be described by the fol-
lowing argumentation scheme. 
 
Induction/Generalization 
Premise: P is true of some members S of a class 
C. 
Conclusion: P is true for all members of C. 
Critical question: What if the individuals in S are 
exceptional with respect to P? 
 
The conclusion of Argument 8 is needed as a 
premise of Argument 9 for the practice implica-
tions of the article given in Excerpt 8 (which, 
unlike the other excerpts in this paper, comes 
from the article’s Discussion section).  
 
Excerpt 8: 
“In conclusion, we identified mutations in 
CABP2 in individuals with moderate-to-severe 
hearing loss. Mutations in CABP2 cause an audi-
ometric phenotype that is seen in most families 
segregating arNSHL.  Our results suggest the 
importance of screening for mutations in CABP2, 
as well as in TECTA, in families with this milder 
audiometric phenotype.” (p. 644) 
 
Argument 9. 
a. Premise (implicit):  The reader’s goal is to 
prevent or mitigate the occurrence of arNSHL. 
b. Premise (implicit, same as 8c): Someone hav-
ing homozygous c.637+1G>T variants of CABP2 
may be affected by arNSHL. 
c. Premise (implicit): Screening may determine if 
someone has homozygous c.637+1G>T variants. 
d. Premise: (implicit) Knowing if someone has 
homozygous c.637+1G>T variants is necessary 
to prevent or mitigate the occurrence of arNSHL. 
e. Conclusion: It is desirable to screen for 
c.637+1G>T variants in CABP2.   
 
Argument 9 can be described as a form of Practi-
cal Reasoning.  
 
Practical Reasoning 
Premise: Agent’s goal is to prevent or mitigate 
the occurrence of D. 
Premise: The occurrence of G may result in D. 
Premise: Doing Act may result in Agent’s know-
ing if G. 
Premise: Knowing if G is necessary to prevent or 
mitigate D. 
Conclusion: It is desirable for Agent to do Act.  
3 Inter-Argument Relationships 
The previous section illustrates a chained rela-
tionship in Arguments 1-3, i.e., the conclusion of 
Argument i is a premise of Argument i+1. Ar-
guments 4 and 5 share the same conclusion: The 
c.637+1G>T variant in CABP2 may be the 
cause of arNSHL in Sh10. The conclusions of 
Arguments 4, 5, and 7 (The c.637+1G>T variant 
in CABP2 may be the cause of arNSHL in Sh11 
and He) in combination support the premise of 
Argument 8, whose conclusion is: Anyone hav-
ing homozygous c.637+1G>T variants of 
CABP2 may be affected by arNSHL. The conclu-
sion of Argument 8 is further supported by the 
conclusion of Argument 6: A c.637+1G>T muta-
tion of CABP2 may result in a disease of the au-
ditory system. 
    To provide an explanation for why the authors 
chose to provide various arguments, rather than 
merely observing their presence in the text, we 
must consider how the authors expect their ar-
guments to be challenged or evaluated by the 
intended audience. Note that the chain of Argu-
ments 1-3 could be challenged by posing the in-
stantiated critical question of Argument 1: What 
if the cause of V:14’s genetic condition was not 
in the set of candidates that were tested? Rather 
than directly responding to that critical question, 
the authors continue with Argument 4 whose 
claim is that the c.637+1G>T variant is the cause 
of arNSHL in V:14’s family, Sh10. In other 
words, Argument 4 makes a broader claim, a 
claim that subsumes the claim of Argument 3.  
     Argument 4 can itself be challenged by pos-
ing its critical question: Is there some other fea-
ture G in I-present that could account for P…? 
Then one could explain why the authors include 
Argument 5, in which the Sh10 family is com-
pared to a control group. 
     Argument 8 can be challenged by posing its 
critical question: What if the individuals in S are 
exceptional with respect to P? The biochemical 
argument 6 that a c.637+1G>T mutation of 
 CABP2 may result in a disease of the auditory 
system provides a response to that challenge. 
     Dialogue games have been used to model ar-
gumentation between intelligent agents (McBur-
ney and Parsons, 2009) and in human-human 
dialogue (Budzynska and Reed, 2012). A dia-
logue game could be used to represent this aspect 
of discourse structure in scientific articles. (See 
Figure 1.) We shall refer to this new game as 
SDG (Science Dialogue Game). As in the ASD 
game (Walton et al., 2008), SDG incorporates 
argumentation schemes and critical questions.  
The locutions of SDG are Argue (Author sup-
ports a claim with reasons Ri), Challenge (Read-
er requests an argument for a reason Ri given in 
the author’s argument), Pose (Reader requests an 
answer to address an instantiated critical question 
of the argumentation scheme of the author’s ar-
gument), and Reject (Author rejects a hypothesis 
given elsewhere in the text). Reflecting a writer’s 
reliance on discourse context and expected back-
ground knowledge and inferential capabilities of 
the reader, the reasons of an argument may be 
implicit in SDG. 
   The Dialogue Rules of SDG reflect weaker 
ordering constraints in text than in dialogue and 
the fact that the reader is imaginary: The permis-
sible replies of the reader to Argue are: implicit 
Challenge, implicit Pose, or silence. The permis-
sible reply of the author to Challenge or Pose is 
Argue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1. SDG structure. Arrows show conclu-
sion-to-premise support between arguments. 
Lines ending in circles show responses to critical 
questions. Conclusions of arguments 4, 5, and 7 
are aggregated into premise of argument 8. 
 
4 Discussion 
This paper described our analysis of some argu-
mentation schemes and inter-argument relation-
ships in a research article as part of our initial 
effort to create an annotation scheme. We are 
continuing to analyze representative articles as 
preparation for developing and evaluating the 
annotation scheme. Our longer term goal is to 
create a freely available corpus of open-access, 
full-text scientific articles from the biomedical 
genetics research literature, annotated to support 
research on argumentation.  
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Abstract
Despite the central role that argumentation
plays in human communication, the compu-
tational linguistics community has paid rela-
tively little attention in proposing a method-
ology for automatically identifying arguments
and their relations in texts. Argumentation
is intimately related with discourse structure,
since an argument often spans more than one
phrase, forming thus an entity with its own
coherent internal structure. Moreover, argu-
ments are linked between them either with a
support, an attack or a rebuttal relation. Those
argumentation relations are often realized via
a discourse relation. Unfortunately, most of
the discourse representation theories use trees
in order to represent discourse, a format which
is incapable of representing phenomena such
as long distance attachments and crossed de-
pendencies which are crucial for argumenta-
tion. A notable exception is Segmented Dis-
course Representation Theory (SDRT) (Asher
and Lascarides, 2003). In this paper we show
how SDRT can help identify arguments and
their relations. We use counter-argumentation
as our case study following Apothe´loz (1989)
and Amgoud and Prade (2012) showing how
the identification of the discourse structure can
greatly benefit the identification of the argu-
mentation structure.
1 Introduction
People use arguments to persuade others to adopt a
point of view or action they find beneficial to their in-
terests, or alternatively to prevent others from adopt-
ing a position or action that they find contrary to their
interests. Of course an agent may find it in her in-
terest to convince an interlocutor to adopt a position
she herself does not believe; for instance, a seller may
want to persuade a buyer that a product is worth more
than she believes it is worth. Because argumentation
involves an interaction between an arguer and an ad-
dressee, it involves game theoretic aspects: it is the
means in language for getting an agent to a position
of agreement with the position one is advocating, or
in game theoretic terms it is an equilibrium in a per-
suasion game in which the addressee adopts an optimal
action based on the conversational history and in which
the arguer adopts her conversational strategy based on
the addressee’s strategy for adopting an action (Glazer
and Rubinstein, 2004). Yet, despite its importance in
human communication and behavior and despite the
fact that textual realizations of arguments and debates
are numerous on the web, it is surprising that this area
has received very little attention by the Computational
Linguistics community.
One domain of research in Computational Linguis-
tics that is of particular interest for argumentation is
that of discourse. In a typical argumentation process,
which takes the form of a dialogue, every argument
has an internal coherence meaning that it can be repre-
sented by a discourse graph. Moreover arguments are
linked between themselves either with support, attack
or rebuttal relations which are realized once again as
discourse relations linking either the whole discourse
subgraphs representing the arguments or parts of them.
Any attempt to automatically extract the argumentation
structure from a given text cannot afford to ignore dis-
course. Our goal in this paper is to show how argumen-
tation is intimately involved with discourse structure.
We achieve this by using counter-argumentation (fol-
lowing (Apothe´loz, 1989; Amgoud and Prade, 2012))
as a case study.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In section 2 we present the current work in the so-called
argumentation mining, the subfield of computational
linguistics that deals with the automatic extraction of
the argumentation structure from texts. In section 3 we
tell a few words on discourse and in section 4 we show
how SDRT (Segmented Discourse Representatuin The-
ory, (Asher and Lascarides, 2003)) can be applied in a
case study focused on counter-argumentation. In sec-
tion 5 we present the future work and we conclude this
paper.
2 Argumentation in Computational
Linguistics
Despite its general neglect, argumentation has been
the focus of some work in Computational Linguistics.
Teufel (1999), Teufel and Moens (2002) aim at identi-
fying what they call the argumentative zones of scien-
tific articles. The zones they have used include the aim
of the paper, general scientific background, description
of the authors’ previous work, comparison with other
works, etc. They are using a naive bayes model trying
to classify each sentence into one of the predefined cat-
egories using mostly surface features (position, length,
etc) and whether the sentence contains title words or
words scoring high in terms of tf.idf .
Palau and Moens (2009) have recently attempted ar-
gumentation mining, or the identification of arguments
in a text. They assume that an argument consists of
a series of premises and a conclusion. Premises and
conclusions are represented by propositions in the text.
Of course, not all propositions in a given text are part
of an argument. In order to tackle the problem of ar-
gumentation mining the authors break it into a series
of subtasks. Initially they are interested in perform-
ing a binary classification of each proposition into ei-
ther a proposition participating in an argument or not.
Propositions that are positively classified are then sent
to a second classifier which determines whether it is a
premise or a conclusion. For both classification tasks
they use a maximum entropy model and the Araucaria
corpus1 as well as a corpus extracted from the euro-
pean court of human rights. The features they use for
the first classifier include surface features ({1, 2, 3}-
grams, punctuation, sentence and word length), POS
information (adverbs, verbs and modal auxiliaries) and
syntactic parsing. The second classifier uses again sur-
face features, POS tags for the subject and main verb,
simple rhetorical and argumentative patterns as well as
the results of the first classifier (although no structured
prediction is attempted which would probably be more
appropriate, given that the two classifiers are not inde-
pendent). Of course, once one has identified the propo-
sitions that are premises and conclusions, one does not
yet have the full arguments. In order to get them, the
authors create a simple CFG grammar which tries to
get the tree structure of arguments. The authors do not
attempt to detect the relations (e.g. support, attack, re-
buttal) that connect the arguments between each other.
The Araucaria corpus is used by Feng and Hirst
(2011) as well but their goal is not performing ar-
gumentation mining. Instead they focus on the task
of classifying arguments into argumentation schemes
(Walton et al., 2008). Araucaria arguments contain en-
thymemes annotated by human subjects which Feng
and Hirst (2011) remove. Moreover, each argument
is annotated with various argumentation schemes but
the authors keep only the ones that are annotated with
Walton’s schemes. They keep only the 5 more frequent
schemes. In total they have 393 arguments which they
classify into one of five schemes. Concerning the clas-
sification method, they use the C4.5 algorithm imple-
mented in Weka in order to perform either a one-vs-
1http://araucaria.computing.dundee.ac.
uk/
all classification or a pairwise classification. The fea-
tures they use are divided into general ones concerning
all schemes (features reflecting textual surface form) or
specific ones for each scheme (mostly cue phrases and
patterns).
Cabrio and Villata (2012a; 2012b) take a different
stance. Their goal is to use Dung’s (1995) abstract ar-
gumentation framework in order to detect a set of ac-
cepted arguments from online debates. They extract
arguments from Debatopedia2 using textual entailment
techniques. More precisely, if a sentence T entails
another sentence H then they consider that there is a
support relation between the two sentences (and thus
points of views) otherwise there is an attack relation.
They use the open source software package EDITS3 in
order to perform textual entailment. In order then to
identify the set of arguments that would be acceptable
by a an external observer the authors use Dung’s (1995)
abstract argumentation framework. In essence an argu-
ment belongs to the aforementioned set if all the argu-
ments attacking it are rejected. An argument is rejected
if at least one accepted argument attacks it.
3 Discourse
The little prior work on argumentation has ignored dis-
course structure, and we think this is a mistake. A com-
plete discourse structure of a dialogue will determine
how each interlocutor’s contribution relates to other
contributions, both her own and that of other dialogue
participants. This structure already by itself is crucial
to determining the structure of an argument—which at-
tacks are directed towards which other contributions.
Moreover, an argument is not just a sequence of attacks
but a much more complex structure. For one thing, ar-
guments contain support moves as well; a good persua-
sion strategy is to explain why one’s claims are true,
but another is to provide background that will enable
the addressee to understand one’s reasons, and yet an-
other is to provide more details about the claims them-
selves. All of these ”strategies” involve in fact rhetori-
cal moves that are different and that may be appropri-
ate in different situations. A discourse structure makes
plain these different types of moves through the use of
different discourse relations.
In effect, discourse structure has the promise to give
a much more detailed picture of the nature and struc-
ture of argumentation. At the moment, we don’t know
exactly what that picture is. But by pursuing the anal-
ysis of dialogues in terms of argument structure and
discourse structure we can find out.
4 Counter-Argumentation: A Case
Study
To illustrate our point in the previous section, we il-
lustrate how constructed examples of different sorts of
2http://debatepedia.idebate.org
3http://edits.fbk.eu
arguments given by Apothe´loz (1989) look from a dis-
course structure point of view. Apothe´loz (1989) iden-
tified four different modes of arguing against a given
argument. In this work an argument is simply a pair
C(x) : R(y) whereR represents the function of reason
and x its content and C the function of conclusion and
x its content. x and y can be either propositions, con-
clusions or enthymemes. Given the above, Apothe´loz
(1989) distinguishes between four different modes of
arguing against a given argument C(x):
1. disputing the plausibility or the truth of a reason,
that is the propositions used in y
2. disputing the completeness of the reason
3. disputing the relevance of the reason with respect
to the conclusion, and
4. disputing the argumentative orientation of the rea-
son by showing the reason presented is rather in
favor of the conclusion’s opposite.
Nonetheless, Apothe´loz (1989) completely ignores the
internal structure that the arguments have. In the fol-
lowing we analyse the different modes of counter-
argumentation that Apothe´loz (1989) provides, giving
examples found in (Amgoud and Prade, 2012). Our
goal is to show how discourse analysis can help the
field of computational linguistics not only detect re-
lations between arguments but also analyse the inter-
nal structure of an argument. In the following, we are
using the Segmented Representation Discourse Theory
(SDRT) (Asher and Lascarides, 2003). For the sake
of representation, discourse is represented as a hyper-
graph with discourse relations being the edges of the
graph and Elementary Discourse Units (EDUs) being
nodes containing only one element, while Complex
Discourse Units (CDUs) are nodes containing more
than one simple elements (Asher et al., 2011).
Disputing the plausibility of a reason
When one disputes the plausibility of a reason essen-
tially it amounts to proving that the reason is false.
Apothe´loz (1989) provides three different ways of
showing that; we illustrate them with the following ex-
amples.
(1) — [Clara will fail her exams.]1 [She did not
work hard]2
— [Clara?!]3 [She worked non-stop.]4
1
Expl.
2
Correction
pi1
3
Continuation
4
(2) — [Clara will fail her exams.]1 [She did not
work hard]2
— [No, she worked hard.]3 [Her eyes have bags
underneath them.]4
1
Expl.
2
Correction
3
Expl.∗
4
(3) — [Clara works hard]1 [because she is
ambitious.]2
— [It is not out of ambition that Clara works
hard.]3 [She is not ambitious.]4
1
Expl.
Ack.
2
Correction
3
Elab.
4
In all three examples, the second speaker does not
challenge her interlocutor concerning her conclusion
(EDU 1 in all three cases). In fact, in the example (3)
the second speaker explicitly acknowledges the content
of the conclusion (Acknowledgment(1, 3)). Instead
the second speaker’s disagreement is always with the
truth value of the reason behind the conclusion. This
takes the form of a Correction relation between the
first speaker’s EDU representing the reason (EDU 2 in
all cases) and the second speaker’s counter-argument
(EDU 3 for examples (2) and (3) and CDU pi1 for ex-
ample (1)). For the last two examples the speaker pro-
vides additional reason for her beliefs either by means
of an Elaboration relation or an Explanation∗ rela-
tion. This last relation signals an explanation of why b
said that Clara worked hard. It is an explanation of a
speech act and provides epistemic grounds for the con-
tent of the assertion. Note that in all the above exam-
ples the Correction discourse relation amounts to an
attack relation.
Disputing the completeness of a reason
In the second mode of counter-argumentation that
Apothe´loz (1989) has identified, the second speaker
does not attack the truthfulness of the reason but rather
its completeness. Here are some examples.
(4) — [Clara will fail her exams.]1 [She did not
work hard]2
— [Clara will not fail her exams.]3 [She is very
smart.]4
1
Expl.
Correction
3
Expl.
2 4
In this example, the second speaker neither affirms nei-
ther denies the reason, i.e. the fact that Clara didn’t
work hard. Instead, she is ignoring it (manifested by
the fact that no discourse relation exists between EDUs
2 and 3 or 4). Instead she corrects the conclusion of the
first speaker by providing more evidence which lead to
the contrary. Again, the Correction discourse relation
connects two arguments and serves as an attack argu-
mentative relation.
(5) — [Paul is in his office ]1 [because his car is in
the carpark.]2
— [But the car is in the carpark]3 [because it
has a mechanical problem and is undriveable.]4
pi1
Correction
pi2
1
Expl.
2 3
Expl.
4
In this case both arguments (as before) are thor-
oughly supported by an Explanation discourse re-
lation. Moreover the second speaker even explic-
itly agrees with the reason given by the first one
(Acknowledgment(2, 3)) but she disagrees with the
whole argument (note the Correction relation be-
tween the two CDUs) since she judges that the reason
is not enough and provides more evidence (EDU 4) to
back her disagreement up.
(6) — [This object is red]1 [since it looks red.]2
— [But the object is illuminated by a red
light.]3
pi1
Counterevidence
3
1
Expl.
2
Contrast
Now, this example is quite more complicated to ana-
lyze. There is a contrast between the object’s looking
red, which generates the expectation that it is red, and
the fact that the object is illuminated by a red light,
which would tend to put that expectation in doubt. But
putting the expectation into doubt also puts into doubt
the causal relation supposed by the first speaker be-
tween 1 and 2.
Disputing the relevance of a reason
In the third mode of counter-argumentation that
Apothe´loz (1989) has identified concerns the second
speaker does not attack the truthfulness or the com-
pleteness of a reason but instead its relevance. Be-
low are some examples of this mode of counter-
argumentation.
(7) — [Clara will fail her exams.]1 [She did not
work hard]2
— [Indeed, she did not work hard,]3 [but not
working hard is not a reason to necessarily fail
one’s exams.]4
pi1
Correction
1
Expl.
2
Ack.
3
Contrast
4
Here the second speaker acknowledges the reason of
the first person, as seen by the discourse relation be-
tween EDUs 2 and 3, but then shows that there is a con-
trast between this and her conclusion, disagreeing thus
with the whole argument. It is important to note once
again that in this example, as the preceding ones, the
discourse analysis enables us to clearly pinpoint which
elements of the first argument are accepted and which
are attacked by the second speaker.
(8) — [Clara will fail her exams.]1 [She did not
work hard]2
— [She will not fail her exams]3 [because she
did not work hard,]4 [but rather because of the
stress.]5
pi1
Correction
3
¬Expl.
Expl.
1
Explanation
2 4
Contrast
5
This is a very interesting example. As the discourse
analysis shows the undirected cycle that is produced
between EDUs 3, 4 and 5 enables the second speaker to
explain why she disagrees with the whole of the initial
statement.
Disputing the argumentative orientation of a
reason
In the final mode of counter-argumentation that
Apothe´loz (1989) has proposed the second speaker
does not dispute neither the reason nor the conclusion.
Instead she argues that the reason corroborates towards
the opposite of the conclusion. This can be illustrated
with the following example.
(9) — [Running a marathon is exhausting.]1 [The
whole body undergoes too much stress.]2
— [That’s precisely what makes it nice!]3
pi1
Correction
Acknowledgment
3
1
Expl.
2
5 Discussion and Future Work
In the previous section we have showed via the use
of a case study how the use of a discourse represen-
tation theory can help us represent in fine detail the
phenomena that take place during argumentation—in
this particular case, counter argumentation during a di-
alogue. In order to represent discourse we have chosen
to use the Segmented Discourse Representation Theory
(SDRT) of Asher and Lascarides (2003). This choice
was made after careful consideration of the phenomena
present during argumentation as well as the expressive
power of other discourse representation theories.
Take for example the Rhetorical Structure Theory
(RST, Mann and Thompson (1988)), which is the most
widely cited and used discourse representation theory
currently. In RST, as in SDRT, the basic units are the
same, namely EDUs.4 In RST adjacent EDUs can
be linked together with rhetorical relations in order to
form what in RST’s jargon are called spans. Spans
can be linked with rhetorical relations either with other
adjacent EDUs or adjacent spans. We keep on em-
phasizing the word “adjacent” since this constitutes in
our opinion (but see also (Peldszus and Stede, 2013))
a limitation of RST since it does not allow this the-
ory to have long distance dependencies, a crucial phe-
nomenon in argumentation. SDRT does not have this
limitation. Consider example (7). In this simple ex-
ample theCorrection relation—which, incidentally, is
the backbone of the second speaker’s attack—holds be-
tween non-adjacent EDUs. Even if the first speaker’s
argument was much longer, or if the second speaker
elaborated on the fact that Clara did not work hard (and
thus we had many EDUs intervening between pi1 and 4)
it wouldn’t influence the fact that the complex segment
pi1 would be attached to EDU 4. Such long distance
attachments are impossible with SDRT which requires
that each EDU or span is attached to an adjacent EDU
or span.
The second problem that RST has as far as the rep-
resentation of argumentative structures is concerned, is
that it cannot correctly represent rebuttals. This is prob-
lem that is also reported by Peldszus and Stede (2013)
so we are using their example, slightly modified in or-
der to illustrate this point. Consider the following dia-
logue:
(10) — [We should tear the building down.]1 [It is
full of asbestos.]2
— [It is possible to clean it up.]3
— [But that would be forbiddingly expensi-
ve!]4
The argumentation graph that results from this dia-
logue, according to the scheme proposed in (Peldszus
and Stede, 2013) is the following:
4There is a big difference as far as EDUs are concerned
between the two theories. In SDRT EDUs can be embedded
the one within the other whilst RST does not allow it.
4
1
2
3
where edges with arrows denote support relations and
edges with circles denote undercuts. The RST graph
for the above dialogue is the following:
✠
EVIDENCE
✠
EVIDENCE
1 2
❘
ANTITHESIS
3 4
As we can see, the structural properties of those two
graphs are completely different and the use of RST for
argumentative analysis does not seem to be a promis-
ing path to follow. On the other hand, SDRT neatly
follows the argumentation graph (we have used the box
representation of SDRT here) making it thus more ap-
propriate for use in argumentative analysis.
1
2
3 4Expl.
Correction Correction
At this point we would like to say a few words on
the computational extraction of discourse structures.
Most of the published work currently is using the RST
framework. This is due to two facts. Firstly there are
more annotated data available for RST and secondly
the problem is computationally less demanding since
decisions are always made locally (attachments can be
either left or right of a given span) which renders this
framework more simple and thus more attractive to re-
searchers. Of course, this implies that all long distance
attachements are completely lost, an aspect which is
crucial, as we have seen, for argumentation.
Muller et al. (2012) have recently attempted extrac-
tion of SDRT structures using data from the ANNODIS
corpus (Afantenos et al., 2012), annotated with SDRT
structures, with state of the art results. The authors at-
tack the problem of predicting SDRT discourse struc-
tures by making some simplifications to the objects that
they need to predict, namely they eliminate CDUs by
making the assumption that, semantically speaking, at-
tachment to a CDU amounts to attaching to its head—
that is the uppermost and leftmost EDU. They have thus
structures reminiscent of dependency graphs in syntac-
tic analysis.
The authors perform structured prediction on the de-
pendency graphs they produced which can be broken
down into two steps. Initially they learn local prob-
ability distributions for attaching and labeling EDUs,
based on naive bayes and logistic regression models.
They effectively thus create a complete graph where
each node represents an EDU and each arc a probabil-
ity of attachment. The authors then move on to the de-
coding phase where the goal is to extract the graph that
approaches the reference object. They use two decod-
ing approaches based on A∗ and Maximum Spanning
Tree (MST) algorithms.
Closing this paper we would like to state that one of
the main reasons that extraction of argumentative struc-
tures has not been more widely explored by the com-
putational linguistics community is due to the fact that
few annotated corpora exist. We believe that a project
with the goal of jointly annotating argumentative and
discourse structures is crucial for the advancement of
this field, as well as other fields such as automatic sum-
marization (Afantenos et al., 2008), question answer-
ing, etc.
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Abstract
Argument extraction techniques can likely
improve legal information retrieval. Any
effort to achieve that goal should take
into account key features of legal reason-
ing such as the importance of legal rules
and concepts, support and attack relations
among claims, and citation of authoritative
sources. Annotation types reflecting these
key features will help identify the roles of
textual elements in retrieved legal cases in
order to better inform assessments of rele-
vance for users’ queries. As a result, legal
argument models and argument schemes
will likely play a central part in the text
annotation type system.
1 Introduction
With improved prospects for automatically ex-
tracting arguments from text, we are investigat-
ing whether and how argument extraction can im-
prove legal information retrieval (IR). An immedi-
ate question in that regard is the role that argument
models and argument schemes will play in achiev-
ing this goal.
For some time, researchers in Artificial Intelli-
gence and Law have developed argument models,
formal and dialectical process models to describe
arguments and their relations. They have also
implemented these models in computer programs
that construct legal arguments. Some of these
models employ argument schemes to provide se-
mantics and describe reasonable arguments. Each
scheme corresponds to a typical domain-specific
inference sanctioned by the argument, a kind of
prima facie reason for believing the argument’s
conclusion. See (Prakken, 2005, p. 234).
By and large, however, these argument models
and schemes and their computational implementa-
tions have not had much of a practical effect on
legal practice. A primary reason for this is the
well-known bottleneck in representing knowledge
from the legal texts (e.g., statutes, regulations, and
cases) that play such an important role in legal
practice in a form so that the the computational
implementations can reason with them.
Meanwhile, legal information retrieval systems
have proven to be highly functional. They pro-
vide legal practitioners with convenient access
to millions of legal texts without relying on ar-
gument models or schemes, relying instead on
Bayesian statistical inference based on term fre-
quency. Users of legal information systems can
submit queries in the form of a natural language
description of a desired fact pattern and retrieve
numerous relevant cases.
Useful as they are, however, legal information
retrieval systems do not provide all of the func-
tionality that practitioners could employ. What
IR system users often want “is not merely IR,
but AR”, that is, “argument retrieval: not merely
sentences with highlighted terms, but arguments
and argument-related information. For example,
users want to know what legal or factual issues the
court decided, what evidence it considered rele-
vant, what outcomes it reached, and what reasons
it gave.” (Ashley and Walker, 2013a).
Recently, IBM announced its Debater project,
an argument construction engine which, given a
corpus of unstructured text like Wikipedia, can au-
tomatically construct a set of relevant pro/con ar-
guments phrased in natural language. Built upon
the foundation of IBM’s Jeopardy-game-winning
Watson question answering system, the advent of
Debater raises some interesting related questions.
A central hypothesis of the Watson project was
to answer questions based on shallow syntactic
knowledge and its implied semantics. This was
preferred to formally represented deep semantic
knowledge, the acquisition of which is difficult
and expensive (Fan et al., 2012). If Debater is
applied to legal domains (See, e.g.,(Beck, 2014)),
one wonders to what extent the same will be true
of Debater. In particular, to what extent will ex-
plicit argumentation models and their schemes for
the legal domain be necessary or useful for the ef-
fort to extract legal arguments? And, can tech-
niques in Debater be adapted to improve legal IR?
2 Related Work
The seminal work on extracting arguments and
argument-related information from legal case de-
cisions is (Mochales and Moens, 2011). Opera-
tionally, the authors defined an argument as “a set
of propositions, all of which are premises except,
at most, one, which is a conclusion. Any argument
follows an argumentation scheme. . . .” Using ma-
chine learning based on manually classified sen-
tences from the Araucaria corpus, including court
reports, they achieved good performance on clas-
sifying sentences as propositions in arguments or
not and classifying argumentative propositions as
premises or conclusions. Given a limited set of
documents, their manually-constructed rule-based
argument grammar also generated argument tree
structures (Mochales and Moens, 2011).
In identifying argumentative propositions,
Mochales and Moens achieved accuracies of 73%
and 80% on two corpora, employing domain-
general features (including, e.g., each word, pairs
of words, pairs and triples of successive words,
parts of speech including adverbs, verbs, modal
auxiliaries, punctuation, keywords indicating
argumentation, parse tree depth and number of
subclauses, and certain text statistics.) For classi-
fying argumentative propositions as premises or
conclusions, their features included the sentence’s
length and position in the document, tense and
type of main verb, previous and successive
sentences’ categories, a preprocessing classifi-
cation as argumentative or not, and the type of
rhetorical patterns occurring in the sentence and
surrounding sentences (i.e., Support, Against,
Conclusion, Other or None). Additional features,
more particular to the legal domain included
whether the sentence referred to or defined a legal
article, the presence of certain argumentative
patterns (e.g. “see”, “mutatis mutandis”, “having
reached this conclusion”, “by a majority”) and
whether the agent of the sentence is the plaintiff,
the defendant, the court or other (Mochales and
Moens, 2011).
Factors, stereotypical fact patterns that
strengthen or weaken a side’s argument in a legal
claim, have been identified in text automatically.
Using a HYPO-style CBR program and an IR
system relevance feedback module, the SPIRE
program retrieved legal cases from a text corpus
and highlighted passages relevant to bankruptcy
law factors (Daniels and Rissland, 1997). The
SMILE+IBP program learned to classify case
summaries in terms of applicable trade secret
law factors (Ashley and Bru¨ninghaus, 2009),
analyzed automatically classified squibs of new
cases, predicted outcomes, and explained the
predictions. (Wyner and Peters, 2010) presents a
scheme for annotating 39 trade secret case texts
with GATE in terms of finer grained components
(i.e., factoroids) of a selection of factors.
Using an argument model to assist in represent-
ing cases for conceptual legal information retrieval
was explored in (Dick and Hirst, 1991). More re-
cently, other researchers have addressed automatic
semantic processing of case decision texts for le-
gal IR, achieving some success in automatically:
• assigning rhetorical roles to case sentences
based on 200 manually annotated Indian de-
cisions (Saravanan and Ravindran, 2010),
• categorizing legal cases by abstract West-
law categories (e.g., bankruptcy, finance and
banking) (Thompson, 2001) or general top-
ics (e.g., exceptional services pension, retire-
ment) (Gonc¸alves and Quaresma, 2005),
• extracting treatment history (e.g., “affirmed”,
“reversed in part”) (Jackson et al., 2003),
• determining the role of a sentence in the legal
case (e.g., as describing the applicable law or
the facts) (Hachey and Grover, 2006),
• extracting offenses raised and legal principles
applied from criminal cases to generate sum-
maries (Uyttendaele et al., 1998),
• extracting case holdings (McCarty, 2007),
and
• extracting argument schemes from the Arau-
caria corpus such as argument from example
and argument from cause to effect (Feng and
Hirst, 2011).
We aim to develop and evaluate an integrated
approach using both semantic and pragmatic (con-
textual) information to retrieve arguments from le-
gal texts in order to improve legal information re-
trieval. We are working with an underlying ar-
gumentation model and its schemes, the Default
Logic Framework (DLF), and a corpus of U.S.
Federal Claims Court cases (Walker et al., 2011;
Walker et al., 2014; Ashley and Walker, 2013a).
Like (Mochales and Moens, 2011) and (Sergeant,
2013), we plan to:
1. Train an annotator to automatically identify
propositions in unseen legal case texts,
2. Distinguish argumentative from non-
argumentative propositions and classify them
as premises or conclusions,
3. Employ rule-based or machine learning mod-
els to construct argument trees from unseen
cases based on a manually annotated training
corpus, but also to
4. Use argument trees to improve legal informa-
tion retrieval reflecting the uses of proposi-
tions in arguments.
Before sketching our approach for the legal
domain, however, we note that IBM appears to
have developed more domain independent tech-
niques for identifying propositions in documents
and classifying them as premises in its Debater
system.1
On any topic, the Debater’s task is to “detect
relevant claims” and return its “top predictions for
pro claims and con claims.” On inputting the topic,
“The sale of violent videogames to minors should
be banned,” for example, Debater:
(1) scanned 4 million Wikipedia articles,
(2) returned the 10 most relevant articles,
(3) scanned the 3000 sentences in those 10 arti-
cles,
(4) detected those sentences that contained
“candidate claims”,
(5) “identified borders of candidate claims”,
(6) “assessed pro and con polarity of candidate
claims”,
1See, e.g., http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/
the-exchange/ibm-unveils-a-computer-
than-can-argue-181228620.html. A demo ap-
pears at the 45 minute mark: http://io9.com/ibms-
watson-can-now-debate-its-opponents-
1571837847.
(7) “constructed a demo speech with top claim
predictions”, and
(8) was then “ready to deliver!”
Figure 1 shows an argument diagram con-
structed manually from the video recording of De-
bater’s oral output for the example topic.
3 Key Elements of Legal Argument
Debater’s argument regarding banning violent
video games is meaningful but compare it to the
legal argument concerning a similar topic in Fig-
ure 2. The Court in Video Software Dealers As-
soc. v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F. 3d 950 (9th
Cir. 2009), addressed the issue of whether Cali-
fornia (CA ) Civil Code sections 1746-1746.5 (the
“Act”), which restrict sale or rental of “violent
video games” to minors, were unconstitutional un-
der the 1st and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Con-
stitution. The Court held the Act unconstitutional.
As a presumptively invalid content-based restric-
tion on speech, the Act is subject to strict scrutiny
and the State has not demonstrated a compelling
interest.
In particular, the Court held that CA had not
demonstrated a compelling government interest
that “the sale of violent video games to minors
should be banned.” Figure 2 shows excerpts from
the portion of the opinion in which the Court jus-
tifies this conclusion. The nodes contain propo-
sitions from that portion and the arcs reflect the
explicit or implied relations among those proposi-
tions based on a fair reading of the text.
The callout boxes in Figure 2 highlight some
key features of legal argument illustrated in the
Court’s argument:
1. Legal rules and concepts govern a court’s de-
cision of an issue.
2. Standards of proof govern a court’s assess-
ment of evidence.
3. Claims have support / attack relations.
4. Authorities are cited (e.g., cases, statutes).
5. Attribution information signals or affects
judgments about belief in an argument (e.g.,
“the State relies”).
6. Candidate claims in a legal document have
different plausibility.
The	  sale	  of	  violent	  videogames	  to	  minors	  should	  be	  banned.	  
Pro:	  	  Exposure	  to	  violent	  
videogames	  results	  in	  increased	  
physiological	  arousal,	  aggression-­‐
related	  thoughts	  and	  feelings,	  as	  
well	  as	  decreased	  pro-­‐social	  
behavior.	  
Con:	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  
note	  the	  following	  claims	  that	  oppose	  
the	  topic.	  Violence	  in	  videogames	  is	  
not	  causally	  linked	  with	  aggressive	  
tendencies.	  	  
Pro:	  In	  addiAon	  these	  violent	  games	  or	  
lyrics	  actually	  cause	  adolescents	  to	  
commit	  acts	  of	  real	  life	  aggression.	  
Pro:	  Finally,	  violent	  video	  games	  can	  
increase	  children’s	  aggression.	  
Con:	  In	  addiAon,	  most	  children	  who	  play	  
violent	  videogames	  do	  not	  have	  
problems	  
Con:	  Finally,	  video	  game	  play	  is	  part	  of	  an	  
adolescent	  boy’s	  normal	  social	  seDng.	  
Figure 1: Argument Diagram of IBM Debater’s Output for Violent Video Games Topic (root node)
Although the argument diagrams in Figures 1
and 2 address nearly the same topic and share sim-
ilar propositions, the former obviously lacks these
features that would be important in legal argument
(and, as argued later, important in using extracted
arguments to improve legal IR). Of course, on one
level this is not surprising; the Debater argument
is not and does not purport to be a legal argument.
On the other hand, given the possibility of ap-
plying Debater to legal applications and argumen-
tation, it would seem essential that it be able to
extract such key information. In that case, the
question is the extent to which explicit argument
models and argument schemes of legal reasoning
would be useful in order to assist with the extrac-
tion of the concepts, relationships, and informa-
tion enumerated above and illustrated in Figure 2.
4 Default-Logic Framework
Vern Walker’s Default Logic Framework (DLF)
is an argument model plus schemes for evidence-
based legal arguments concerning compliance
with legal rules. At the Research Laboratory for
Law, Logic and Technology (LLT Lab) at Hofs-
tra University, researchers have applied the DLF to
model legal decisions by Court of Federal Claims
“Special Masters” concerning whether claimants’
compensation claims comply with the require-
ments of a federal statute establishing the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. Under the
Act, a claimant may obtain compensation if and
only if the vaccine caused the injury.
In order to establish causation under the rule
of Althen v. Secr. of Health and Human Ser-
vices, 418 F.3d 1274 (Fed.Cir. 2005), the peti-
tioner must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that: (1) a “medical theory causally con-
nects” the type of vaccine with the type of injury,
(2) there was a “logical sequence of cause and ef-
fect” between the particular vaccination and the
particular injury, and (3) a “proximate temporal
relationship” existed between the vaccination and
the injury. Walker’s corpus comprises all deci-
sions in a 2-year period applying the Althen test of
causation-in-fact (35 decision texts, 15-40 pages
per decision). In these cases, the Special Masters
decide which evidence is relevant to which issues
of fact, evaluate the plausibility of evidence in the
legal record, organize evidence and draw reason-
able inferences, and make findings of fact.
The DLF model of a single case “integrates nu-
merous units of reasoning” each “consisting of one
1.	  rule	  and	  
legal	  concepts	  	  
2.	  standard	  
of	  proof	  
6.	  plausibility	  
5.	  a8ribu9on	  
info	  
3.	  support	  /	  
a8ack	  rela9ons	  
Figure 2: Diagram Representing Realistic Legal Argument Involving Violent Video Games Topic
conclusion and one or more immediately support-
ing reasons (premises)” and employing four types
of connectives (min (and), max (or), evidence fac-
tors, and rebut) (Walker et al., 2014). For example,
Figure 3 shows an argument diagram representing
the excerpt of the the DLF model of the special
master’s finding in the case of Cusati v. Secretary
of Health and Human Services, No. 99-0492V
(Office of Special Masters, United States Court
of Federal Claims, September 22, 2005) concern-
ing whether the first Althen condition for showing
causation-in-fact is satisfied.
The main point is that the DLF model of a le-
gal argument and its argument schemes represent
the above-enumerated key features of legal argu-
ment. As illustrated in the callout boxes of Figure
3, the model indicates: (1) the 1st Althen rule and
causation-in-fact concept that govern the decision
of the causation issue, (2) the preponderance of ev-
idence standard of proof governing the court’s as-
sessment, (3) support relations among the proposi-
tions, the Special Master having recorded no coun-
terarguments, (4) citation to the statute, 42 USC
300aa-11(c)(1)(C)(ii)), and to the Althen and Shy-
face case authorities, (5) some attribution informa-
tion that signals judgments about the Special Mas-
ter’s belief in an argument (e.g., “Dr. Kinsbourne
and Dr. Kohrman agree”), and (6) four factors that
increase plausibility of the claim of causation.
5 Legal Argument and Legal IR
Legal decisions contain propositions and argu-
ments how to “prove” them. Prior cases provide
examples of how to make particular arguments in
support of similar hypotheses and of kinds of ar-
guments that have succeeded, or failed, in the past.
Consider a simple query discussed in (Ashley and
Walker, 2013a): Q1: “MMR vaccine can cause in-
tractable seizure disorder and death.”
An attorney/user in a new case where an injury
followed an MMR vaccination might employ this
query to search for cases where such propositions
had been addressed. Relevant cases would add
confidence that the propositions and accompany-
OR	  [2	  of	  2]	  :	  OFF-­‐TABLE	  
INJURY:	  The	  "causa=on-­‐
in-­‐fact"	  condi=on	  is	  
sa=sﬁed	  (Althen,	  418	  F.
3d	  at	  1278,	  1281).	  	  
AND	  [1	  of	  3]	  :	  (1)	  
A	  “medical	  
theory	  causally	  
connect[s]”	  the	  
vaccina7on	  on	  
11-­‐5-­‐96	  and	  an	  
intractable	  
seizure	  disorder	  
and	  death	  
(Althen,	  418	  F.3d	  
at	  1278).	  	  
AND	  [1	  of	  2]	  :	  The	  injury	  of	  
Eric	  Fernandez	  "was	  [or	  
were]	  caused	  by"	  the	  MMR	  
vaccine	  received	  in	  the	  
vaccina=on	  on	  November	  
5,	  1996	  (42	  USC	  
300aa-­‐11(c)(1)(C)(ii)).	  	  	  
the	  MMR	  vaccine	  was	  "not	  only	  a	  
but-­‐for	  cause"	  of	  an	  intractable	  
seizure	  disorder	  and	  death,	  "but	  
also	  a	  substan=al	  factor	  in	  
bringing	  about"	  an	  intractable	  
seizure	  disorder	  and	  death	  
(Shyface,	  165	  F.3d	  at	  1352-­‐53;	  
Althen,	  418	  F.3d	  at	  1278).	  	  
"MMR	  vaccine	  
causes	  fever"	  
and	  "fever	  
causes	  
seizures."	  "Ms.	  
Cusa7	  has	  
provided	  more	  
than	  
preponderant	  
evidence".	  	  
FACTOR	  [1	  of	  4]	  :	  "MMR	  
vaccine	  causes	  fever."	  
Dr.	  Kinsbourne	  and	  Dr.	  
Kohrman	  agree	  that	  
MMR	  vaccine	  causes	  
fever.	  
FACTOR	  [2	  of	  
4]	  :"[F]ever	  causes	  
seizures."	  Dr.	  
Kinsbourne	  and	  Dr.	  
Kohrman	  agree	  that	  
fever	  causes	  seizures.	  
FACTOR	  [3	  of	  4]	  :"[A]	  
child	  who	  suﬀers	  a	  
complex	  febrile	  seizure	  
has	  a	  greater	  chance	  of	  
developing	  epilepsy.”	  
FACTOR	  [4	  of	  4]	  :	  "[T]he	  
medical	  literature	  ...	  
do[es]	  not	  assist	  the	  
special	  master	  in	  
evalua7ng	  Ms.	  Cusa7's	  
'legal	  cause'	  claim."	  
1.	  rule	  and	  
legal	  
concepts	  	  
2.	  standard	  
of	  proof	  
6.	  plausibility	  
5.	  aYribu7on	  
info	  
3.	  support	  /	  
aYack	  rela7ons	  
(no	  aYacks	  here)	   4.	  cita7on	  of	  
authori7es	  
Q1	  
Figure 3: Diagram of DLF Model of Special Master’s Finding in Cusati Case re 1st Althen Condition
ing arguments were reasonable and had been suc-
cessful.
Importantly, the cases retrieved will be more
relevant to the extent that the proposition is used in
a similar argument. That is, they will be more rel-
evant to the extent that the proposition plays roles
in the case arguments similar to the role in which
the attorney intends to use it in an argument about
the current case.
An argument diagram like that of Figure 3 can
illustrate the effect of the six key elements of le-
gal reasoning illustrated above on how relevant a
retrieved case is to a user’s query. The diagram
shows a legal argument in which the proposition
corresponding to Q1 plays a role in the Cusati case
as an evidence-based finding of the Special Mas-
ter, namely, that “MMR vaccine causes fever” and
“fever causes seizures.”
Such diagrams have a “legal rule-oriented” di-
rection (i.e., to the left in Figure 3) and an “eviden-
tiary factors-oriented” direction (i.e., to the right
in this diagram). For instance, an attorney whose
client sustained seizures after receiving the MMR
vaccine probably knows that he/she will have to
satisfy a requirement of causation. The attorney
may not know, however, what legal standard de-
fines the relevant concept of causation or what
legal authority may be cited as an authoritative
source of the standard. In that situation, retrieved
cases will likely be more relevant to the extent that
that they fill in the legal rule-oriented direction,
relative to a proposition similar to the one marked
“Q1”, with legal rules about the concept of causa-
tion and citations to their authoritative sources.
If the attorney is unsure of the kinds of evidence
that an advocate should employ in convincing a
Special Master to make the finding of fact on cau-
sation or of the relevant standard of proof for as-
sessing that evidence of causation, retrieved cases
will be more relevant to the extent that they fill in
the evidentiary factors-oriented direction, relative
to a proposition similar to the one marked “Q1”,
with evidentiary factors and an identification of
the standard of proof.
The attorney may be interested in better un-
derstanding how to improve the plausibility of a
proposition about causation as an evidence-based
finding. Cases will be more relevant to the extent
that they contain evidentiary factors that support
such a finding. An attorney interested in attack-
ing the plausibility of the evidence-based finding
might be especially interested in seeing cases in-
volving examples of evidentiary factors that attack
such a finding.
Finally, the cases will be more relevant to
the extent that the proposition similar to the one
marked “Q1” concerning MMR vaccine’s causing
injury is attributable to the Special Master as op-
posed merely to some expert witness’s statement.
6 Specifying/Determining Propositions’
Argument Roles
The importance of a proposition’s argument role
in matching retrieved cases to users’ queries raises
two questions: (1) How does the user specify the
target propositions and their argumentative roles
in which he is interested? (2) How does a pro-
gram determine the roles that propositions play in
retrieved case arguments?
An argument diagram like that of Figure 3 may
play a role in enabling users to specify the argu-
ments and propositions in which they are inter-
ested. One can imagine a user’s inputting a query
by employing a more abstract version of such a di-
agram. For instance, in the Query Input Diagram
of Figure 4, the nodes are labeled with, or refer to,
argument roles. These roles include:
Legal Rule: sentences that state a legal rule in the
abstract, without applying the rule to the par-
ticular case being litigated
Ruling/Holding: sentences that apply a legal rule
to decide issues presented in the particular
case being litigated
Evidence-Based Finding: sentences that report
a trier-of-fact’s ultimate findings regarding
facts material to the particular case being lit-
igated
Evidence-Based Reasoning: sentences that re-
port the trier-of-fact’s reasoning in assessing
the relevant evidence and reaching findings
regarding facts material to the particular case
being litigated (e.g., evidentiary factors)
Evidence: sentences that describe any type of
evidence legally produced in the particular
case being litigated, as part of the proof in-
tended to persuade the trier-of-fact of alleged
facts material to the case (e.g., oral testimony
of witnesses, including experts on technical
matters; documents, public records, deposi-
tions; objects and photographs)
Citation: sentences that credit and refer to au-
thoritative documents and sources (e.g., court
decisions (cases), statutes, regulations, gov-
ernment documents, treaties, scholarly writ-
ing, evidentiary documents)
In the “text”, “concept”, and “citation” slots of
the appropriate nodes of the query input diagram,
Figure 4, users could specify the propositions,
concepts, or citations that they know or assume
and check the targeted nodes in the directions
(rule-oriented or evidentiary-factors-oriented) or
ranges that they hope to fill through searching for
cases whose texts satisfy the diagram’s argument-
related constraints. In effect, the diagram will
guide the IR system in ranking the retrieved cases
for relevance and in highlighting their relevant
parts.
Regarding the second question, concerning how
a program will determine propositions’ argument
roles in case texts, that is the third task that
Mochales and Moens addressed with a rule-based
grammar applied to a small set of documents.
While their rules employed some features partic-
ular to legal argument, (e.g., whether a sentence
referred to a legal article) one imagines that ad-
ditional features would be needed, pertaining to
legal argument or to the regulated domain of in-
terest. These features would become the predi-
cates of additional grammar rules or be annotated
in training cases for purposes of machine learning.
The legal argument roles listed above are a first
cut at a more comprehensive enumeration of the
types of legal argument features with which to an-
notate legal case texts in an Unstructured Infor-
mation Management Architecture (UIMA) anno-
tation pipeline for purposes of extracting argument
information and improving legal IR.
UIMA, an open-source Apache framework, has
been deployed in several large-scale government-
sponsored and commercial text processing appli-
cations, most notably, IBM’s Watson question an-
swering system (Epstein et al., 2012). A UIMA
Ruling/Holding	  
	  
	  
concepts:	  causa/on	  
cita,ons:	  
	  
✔	  
Secondary	  
Legal	  Rules	  
	  
concepts:	  causa/on	  
cita,ons:	  
	  
✔	  
Primary	  Legal	  
Rules	  
	  
concepts:	  causa/on	  
cita,ons:	  
✔	  
Evidence-­‐
Based	  Finding	  
	  
	  
text:	  “MMR	  vaccine	  
can	  cause	  in-­‐	  
tractable	  seizure	  
disorder	  and	  
death.”	  
concepts:	  causa/on	  
	  
✔	  
Evidence-­‐
Based	  
Reasoning	  
	  
	  
concepts:	  
Evidence	  
	  
	  
concepts:	  
	  
Figure 4: Sample Query Input Diagram
pipeline is an assemblage of integrated text anno-
tators. The annotators are “a scalable set of coop-
erating software programs, . . . , which assign se-
mantics to some region of text” (Ferrucci, 2012),
and “analyze text and produce annotations or as-
sertions about the text” (Ferrucci et al., 2010, p.
74).
A coordinated type system serves as the basis
of communication among these annotators; a type
system embodies a formalization of the annota-
tors’ analysis input and output data (Epstein et al.,
2012, p. 3). In (Ashley and Walker, 2013b) and
(Ashley and Walker, 2013a) the authors elaborate
three additional bases for annotations, which, with
further refinement, may serve as a conceptual sub-
strate for the annotation types listed above:
1. DLF annotations, as suggested in Figure 3,
capture “(i) the applicable statutory and reg-
ulatory requirements as a tree of authoritative
rule conditions (i.e., a “rule tree”) and (ii) the
chains of reasoning in the legal decision that
connect evidentiary assertions to the special
master’s findings of fact on those rule condi-
tions (Walker et al., 2011).”
2. Annotations in terms of presuppositional in-
formation that “identifies entities (e.g., types
of vaccines or injuries), events (e.g., date of
vaccination or onset of symptoms) and re-
lations among them used in vaccine deci-
sions to state testimony about causation, as-
sessments of probative value, and findings of
fact.” (Ashley and Walker, 2013a).
3. Annotations of of argument patterns based
on: inference type (e.g., deductive or statisti-
cal), evidence type (e.g., legal precedent, pol-
icy, fact testimony), or type of weighing of
source credibility to resolve evidentiary dis-
crepancies (e.g., in terms of expert vs. expert
or of adequacy of explanation) (Walker et al.,
2014) .
If we succeed in designing a system of coordi-
nated legal annotation types and operationalizing
a UIMA annotation pipeline, we envision adding
a module to a full-text legal IR system. At re-
trieval time it would extract semantic / pragmatic
legal information from the top n cases returned by
a traditional IR search and re-rank returned cases
to reflect the user’s diagrammatically specified ar-
gument need. The module would also summa-
rize highly ranked cases and highlight argument-
related information (Ashley and Walker, 2013a).
Since the module processes the texts of cases re-
turned by the information retrieval system, no spe-
cial knowledge representation of the cases in the
IR system database is required; the knowledge
representation bottleneck will have been circum-
vented.
7 Conclusion
According to Wittgenstein, meaning lies in the
way knowledge is used. Legal argument models
and argument schemes can specify roles for legal
propositions to play (and, interestingly, Stephen
Toulmin was a student of Wittgenstein.) Thus, re-
searchers can enable machines to search for and
use legal knowledge intelligently in order, among
other things, to improve legal information re-
trieval.
Although IBM Debater may identify argu-
ment propositions (e.g., claims), legal argument
schemes could help it to address legal rules and
concepts, standards of proof, internal support and
attack relations, citation of statutory and case au-
thorities, attribution, and plausibility. Open ques-
tions include the extent to which legal expert
knowledge will be needed in order to operational-
ize argument schemes to extract arguments from
legal case texts.
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Abstract
In this paper, we argue that an annota-
tion scheme for argumentation mining is
a function of the task requirements and the
corpus properties. There is no one-size-
fits-all argumentation theory to be applied
to realistic data on the Web. In two anno-
tation studies, we experiment with 80 Ger-
man newspaper editorials from the Web
and about one thousand English docu-
ments from forums, comments, and blogs.
Our example topics are taken from the
educational domain.
To formalize the problem of annotating
arguments, in the first case, we apply a
Claim-Premise scheme, and in the second
case, we modify Toulmin’s scheme. We
find that the choice of the argument com-
ponents to be annotated strongly depends
on the register, the length of the document,
and inherently on the literary devices and
structures used for expressing argumenta-
tion. We hope that these findings will fa-
cilitate the creation of reliably annotated
argumentation corpora for a wide range of
tasks and corpus types and will help to
bridge the gap between argumentation the-
ories and actual application needs.
1 Introduction
Argumentation mining apparently represents an
emerging field in Natural Language Processing
(NLP) with publications appearing at mainstream
conferences, such as ACL (Cabrio and Villata,
2012; Feng and Hirst, 2011; Madnani et al., 2012)
or COLING (Stab and Gurevych, 2014; Levy et
al., 2014; Wachsmuth et al., 2014a). In particular,
there is an increasing need for tools capable of un-
derstanding argumentation on the large scale, be-
cause in the current information overload, humans
cannot feasibly process such massive amounts of
data in order to reveal argumentation. Unfortu-
nately, even current Web technologies (such as
search engines or opinion mining services) are not
suitable for such a task. This drives the research
field to the next challenge – argumentation min-
ing on the Web. The abundance of freely available
(yet unstructured, textual) data and possible appli-
cations of such tools makes this task very appeal-
ing.
Our research into argumentation mining is mo-
tivated by the information seeking perspective.
The key sources are discussions (debates) about
controversies (contentions) targeted at a particular
topic which is of the user’s interest. The scope is
not limited to a particular media type as the source
types can range from the on-line newspapers’ ed-
itorials to user-generated discourse in social me-
dia, such as blogs and forum posts, covering dif-
ferent aspects of the issues. Understanding posi-
tions and argumentation in on-line debates helps
users to form their opinions on controversial issues
and also fosters personal and group decision mak-
ing (Freeley and Steinberg, 2008, p. 9). The main
task would be to identify and extract the core ar-
gumentation (its formal aspects will be discussed
later) and present this new knowledge to users.
By utilizing argumentation mining methods, users
can be provided with the most relevant informa-
tion (arguments) regarding the controversy under
investigation.
Although argumentation mining on the Web
has already been partly outlined in the literature
(Schneider et al., 2012; Sergeant, 2013), the re-
quirements and use-case scenarios differ substan-
tially. Various tasks are being solved, most of them
depending on the domain, e.g., product reviews or
political contentions. As a result, different inter-
pretations of arguments and argumentation have
been developed in NLP, and therefore, most of
the existing researches are not directly adaptable.
controversy
Forums
Comments
Blogs
News
Argument
Figure 1: Schematic overview of argumentation
mining on the Web
Morover, not all of the related research works are
tightly connected to argumentation theories (de
Moor et al., 2004; Villalba and Saint-Dizier, 2012;
Cabrio et al., 2013b; Llewellyn et al., 2014). How-
ever, we feel that it is vital to ground NLP research
in argumentation mining in existing work on argu-
mentation.
In this article, we will particularly focus on
bridging the gap between argumentation theories
and actual application needs that has not been tar-
geted in the relevant literature. We will support
our findings by comprehensively surveying exist-
ing works and presenting results from two exten-
sive annotation studies.
Our main findings and suggestions can be sum-
marized as follows: First, the use-case of any re-
search in argumentation mining must be clearly
stated (i.e., in terms of expected outcomes). Sec-
ond, properties of the data under investigation
must be taken into account, given the variety of
genres and registers (Biber and Conrad, 2009).
Third, an appropriate argumentation model must
be chosen according to the requirements. There-
fore, we claim that it is not possible to formulate
a single argumentation mining perspective that
would be applicable to the Web data in general.
2 Relation to Argumentation Theories
Research on argumentation is widely interdis-
ciplinary, as it spreads across philosophy and
rhetoric (Aristotle and Kennedy (translator),
1991; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1991; Wal-
ton et al., 2008), informal and formal logic
(Dung, 1995; Henkemans, 2000; Stoianovici,
2009; Schneider et al., 2013; Hunter, 2013), edu-
cational research (Weinberger and Fischer, 2006;
Noroozi et al., 2013), pragmatics (Xu and Wu,
2014), psychology (Larson et al., 2004), and many
others. Given so many different perspectives on
investigating argumentation, there is a plethora
of possible interpretations of argumentation min-
ing. Thus, finding a common understanding of this
evolving field is a fundamental challenge.
For NLP research, this overwhelming amount
of related works brings many theoretical and prac-
tical issues. In particular, there is no one-size-
fits-all argumentation theory. Even argumentation
researchers disagree on any widely-accepted ulti-
mate concept. For example, Luque (2011) criti-
cizes the major existing approaches in order to es-
tablish a new theory which is later again severely
criticized by other in-field researches (Andone,
2012; Xie, 2012). Given this diversity of perspec-
tives, NLP research cannot simply adopt one par-
ticular approach without investigating its theoret-
ical background as well as its suitability for the
particular task.
2.1 What we do not tackle
Given the breath of argumentation mining just out-
lined, we would also like to discuss aspects that do
not fit into our approach to argumentation mining,
namely macro argumentation and evaluation using
formal frameworks.
First, we treat argumentation as a product (mi-
cro argumentation or monological models), not
as a process (macro argumentation or dialogical
models). While dialogical models highlight the
process of argumentation in a dialogue structure,
monological models emphasize the structure of
the argument itself (Bentahar et al., 2010, p. 215).
Therefore, we examine the relationships between
the different components of a given argument,
not a relationship that can exist between argu-
ments.1 Exploring how argumentation evolves be-
tween parties in time remains out of our scope.
Second, we do not tackle any logical reason-
ing, defeasibility of reasoning, or evaluating argu-
mentation with formal frameworks in general. Al-
though this is an established field in informal logic
(Prakken, 2010; Hunter, 2013; Hunter, 2014),
such an approach might not be suitable directly
for Web data as it assumes that argumentation is
logical (such a strong assumption cannot be guar-
1For further discussion see, e.g., (Blair, 2004; Johnson,
2000; Reed and Walton, 2003) or Micheli (2011) who sum-
marizes the distinction between the process (at a pragmatic
level) and the product (at a more textual level).
anteed). Furthermore, acceptability of arguments
also touches the fundamental problem of the target
audience of the argument, as different groups have
different perceptions. Crosswhite et al. (2004)
point out that “one of the key premises from which
the study of rhetoric proceeds is that influencing
real audiences is not simply a matter of presenting
a set of rational, deductive arguments.”
2.2 Common terminology
Let us set up a common terminology. Claim is
“the conclusion we seek to establish by our argu-
ments” (Freeley and Steinberg, 2008, p. 153) or
“the assertion put forward publicly for general ac-
ceptance” (Toulmin et al., 1984, p. 29). Premises
are “connected series of sentences, statements, or
propositions that are intended to give reasons of
some kind for the claim” (Freeley and Steinberg,
2008, p. 3).
3 Related Work
3.1 Opinion mining perspective
In existing works on argumentation mining of the
Web data, the connection is often made to opin-
ion mining (Liu, 2012). From the users’ point
of view, opinion mining applications reveal what
people think about something. The key question
which brings argumentation on the scene is why
do they think so? – in other words, explaining the
reasons behind opinions.
Villalba and Saint-Dizier (2012) approach
aspect-based sentiment of product reviews by clas-
sifying discourse relations conveying arguments
(such as justification, reformulation, illustration,
and others). They build upon Rhetorical Structure
Theory (RST) (Mann and Thompson, 1987) and
argue that rhetorical elements related to explana-
tion behave as argument supports.
For modeling argumentation in social media,
Schneider et al. (2012) suggest using Dung’s
framework (Dung, 1995) with Walton schemes
(Walton et al., 2008), but do not provide evidence
for such a decision. They admit that “It is far
from clear how an argument [...] can be trans-
formed into a formal argumentation scheme so
that it can be reasoned in an argumentation frame-
work” (Schneider et al., 2012, p. 22).
Schneider and Wyner (2012) focus on the prod-
uct reviews domain and develops a number of ar-
gumentation schemes (inspired by (Walton et al.,
2008)) based on manual inspection of their cor-
pus. Appropriateness of such an approach remains
questionable. On the one hand, Walton’s argumen-
tation schemes are claimed to be general and do-
main independent. On the other hand, evidence
from the field shows that schemes might not be
the best means for analyzing user-generated argu-
mentation. In examining real-world political ar-
gumentation from (Walton, 2005), Walton (2012)
found out that 37.1% of the arguments collected
did not fit any of the fourteen schemes they chose
so they created new schemes ad-hoc. Cabrio et al.
(2013a) select five argumentation schemes from
Walton and map these patterns to discourse rela-
tion categories in the Penn Discourse TreeBank
(PDTB) (Prasad et al., 2008), but later they define
two new schemes that they discovered in PDTB.
These findings confirm that the schemes lack cov-
erage for dealing with real argumentation in natu-
ral language texts.
3.2 Previous works on annotation
Table 1 summarizes the previous research on an-
notating argumentation. Not only it covers re-
lated work from the NLP community but also
studies from general discourse analysis (Newman
and Marshall, 1991; Walton, 2012) and road-maps
or position papers (Schneider and Wyner, 2012;
Peldszus and Stede, 2013a; Sergeant, 2013). The
heterogeneity of used argumentation models and
the domains under investigation demonstrates the
breath of the argumentation mining field. We iden-
tified the following research gaps.
• Most studies dealing with Web data use
some kind of proprietary model without re-
lation to any argumentation theory (Bal and
Saint-Dizier, 2010; Rosenthal and McKe-
own, 2012; Conrad et al., 2012; Schneider
and Wyner, 2012; Villalba and Saint-Dizier,
2012; Florou et al., 2013; Sergeant, 2013;
Wachsmuth et al., 2014b; Llewellyn et al.,
2014).
• Inter-annotation agreement (IAA) that re-
flects reliability of the annotated data is either
not reported (Feng and Hirst, 2011; Mochales
and Moens, 2011; Walton, 2012; Florou et
al., 2013; Villalba and Saint-Dizier, 2012), or
is not based on a chance-corrected measure
(Llewellyn et al., 2014).
This motivates our research into annotating Web
data relying on a model based on a theoretical
Claim
restatement = {true, false}
premises
Pre-Support
Post-Support
Pre-Attack
Post-Attack
Figure 2: Claim-Premise scheme. Note that the re-
lations (arrows) are only illustrative; they are im-
plicitly encoded in the roles of the particular argu-
ment components.
background in argumentation and reporting IAA
that would confirm suitability of the model and re-
liability of the annotated data.
4 Annotating argumentation in Web data
Up until now, we have used the terms argumenta-
tion and argument in their common meaning with-
out any particular formal definition. We will now
elaborate on annotation schemes and discuss their
suitability and reliability for the Web data.
4.1 Annotation Schemes
Because of the lack of a single general-purpose
argumentation model (cf. discussion in §1), we
present here two different schemes.2 Both are built
upon foundations in argumentation theories, but
they differ in their granularity, expression power,
and other properties.
4.1.1 Claim-Premises scheme
The Claim-Premises scheme is widely used in pre-
vious work on argumentation mining, e.g., (Palau
and Moens, 2009; Florou et al., 2013; Peldszus
and Stede, 2013b). It defines an argument as con-
sisting of a (possibly empty) set of premises and a
single claim; premises either support or attack the
claim (Besnard and Hunter, 2008). We adopted
this general scheme for the purpose of annotating
arguments in long Web documents (Kluge, 2014).
According to this adopted version of the scheme,
claims, restatements and premises are subsumed
under the term argument component; a restate-
ment of a claim is also considered as claim and is
part of the same argument. The scheme is depicted
in Figure 2.
Premises either support or attack a claim, i.e.,
there is a support or attack relation between each
2An exhaustive overview of various argumentation mod-
els, their taxonomy, and properties can be found in (Bentahar
et al., 2010).
premise and a claim. The simplest way to rep-
resent the support and attack relations is to attach
labels to adjacent argument components, which in-
dicate their argumentative role. The span of argu-
ment components is left unspecified, allowing for
argument components spanning a clause or one to
several sentences. Using the six labels claim, re-
statement, pre-claim support, post-claim support,
pre-claim attack and post-claim attack, a linear
sequence of non-nested arguments can be repre-
sented.
While graph structures where nodes stand for
argument components, and edges for support or
attack relations are a more general way to repre-
sent arguments (equivalent to, i.e., (Dung, 1995)
or (Freeman, 1991)), it is unclear which additional
benefits such a more fine-grained annotation of ar-
guments brings for the annotation of Web docu-
ments. In a pre-study performed by Kluge (2014),
the possibility to annotate nested arguments turned
out to be a drawback, rather than an advantage, be-
cause the inter-annotator agreement dropped con-
siderably.
Suitability of the scheme The main advantage
of the Claim-Premises scheme is its simplicity.
Therefore, it is particularly suited for annotating
arguments in long Web documents, such as news
articles, editorials or blog posts. Kluge (2014)
found that most documents of these text types con-
sist of three major parts: an introductory part,
summarizing the document content in one or two
paragraphs, the main part, presenting a linear se-
quence of arguments, and an optional concluding
part summarizing the main arguments.
The Claim-Premise scheme can be used to pro-
vide an overview of the claims and their sup-
porting or attacking premises presented in a long
Web document. From an information seeking per-
spective, arguments could be clustered by similar
claims or similar premises, and then ranked in the
context of a specific information need by a user.
In a similar way, this scheme could be used for
automatic summarization.
However, the Claim-Premises scheme does not
allow to distinguish between different kinds of
premises supporting the claim. Hence, fine-
grained distinctions of premises into specific fac-
tual evidence versus any kind of common ground
can not be captured.
Source Arg. Model Domain Size IAA
Newman and Marshall
(1991)
Toulmin legal domain (Peo-
ple vs. Carney, U.S.
Supreme Court)
qualitative N/A
Bal and Saint-Dizier
(2010)
proprietary socio-political newspa-
per editorials
56 documents Cohen’s κ
(0.80)
Feng and Hirst (2011) Walton
(top 5 schemes)
legal domain (Aracu-
raria corpus, 61% sub-
set annotated with Wal-
ton scheme)
≈ 400 arguments not reported
claimed to be small
Georgila et al. (2011) proprietary general discussions
(negotiations between
florists)
21 dialogues Krippendorf’s α
(0.37-0.56)
Mochales and Moens
(2011)
Claim-Premise
based on Freeman
legal domain (Aracu-
raria corpus, European
Human Rights Council)
641 documents
w/ 641 arguments
(Aracuraria)
67 documents w/
257 arguments
(EHRC)
not reported
Walton (2012) Walton
(14 schemes)
political argumentation 256 arguments not reported
Rosenthal and McKe-
own (2012)
opinionated
claim, sentence
level
blogposts, Wikipedia
discussions
4000 sentences Cohen’s κ
(0.50-0.57)
Conrad et al. (2012) proprietary
(spans of arguing
subjectivity)
editorials and blogpost
about Obama Care
84 documents Cohen’s κ
(0.68)
on 10 documents
Schneider and Wyner
(2012)
proprietary, ar-
gumentation
schemes
camera reviews N/A
(proposal/position
paper)
N/A
Schneider et al. (2012) Dung + Walton unspecified social me-
dia
N/A
(proposal/position
paper)
N/A
Villalba and Saint-
Dizier (2012)
proprietary, RST hotel reviews, hi-fi
products, political
campaign
50 documents not reported
Peldszus and Stede
(2013a)
Freeman + RST Potsdam Commentary
Corpus
N/A
(proposal/position
paper)
N/A
Florou et al. (2013) none public policy making 69 argumentative
segments / 322
non-argumentative
segments
not reported
Peldszus and Stede
(2013b)
based on Freeman not reported, artificial
documents created for
the study
23 short documents Fleiss’ κ
multiple results
Sergeant (2013) N/A Car Review Corpus
(CRC)
N/A
(proposal/position
paper)
N/A
Wachsmuth et al.
(2014b)
none hotel reviews 2100 reviews Fleiss’ κ
(0.67)
Llewellyn et al. (2014) proprietary, no ar-
gumentation the-
ory
Riot Twitter Corpus 7729 tweets only percentage
agreement reported
Stab and Gurevych
(2014)
Claim-Premise
based on Freeman
student essays 90 documents Krippendorf’s αU
(0.72)
Krippendorf’s α
(0.81)
Table 1: Previous works on annotating argumentation. IAA = Inter-annotation agreement; N/A = not
applicable.
Grounds Claim
Backing
RebuttalRefutation
Grounds
Backing
RebuttalRefutation
implicit = {true, false}
Figure 3: Extended Toulmin’s scheme. Note that
the relations (arrows) are only illustrative; they are
implicitly encoded in the roles of the particular ar-
gument components.
4.1.2 Toulmin’s scheme
The Toulmin’s model (Toulmin, 1958) is a con-
ceptual model of argumentation, in which differ-
ent components play distinct roles. In the original
form, it consists of six components: claim, data
(grounds), warrant, backing, qualifier, and rebut-
tal.
The roles of claim and grounds correspond
to the definitions introduced earlier (claim and
premises, respectively). The role of warrant is to
justify a logical inference from grounds to claim.
To assure the trustworthiness of the warrant, back-
ing provides further set of information. Qualifier
limits the degree of certainty under which the ar-
gument should be accepted and rebuttal presents
a situation in which the claim might be defeated.
For examples of arguments based on Toulmin’s
original model see, e.g., (Freeley and Steinberg,
2008, Chap. 8).
Based on our experiments during annotation
pre-studies, we propose an extension of the Toul-
min’s model by means of (1) omitting the qualifier
for stating modality, as people usually do not state
the degree of cogency, (2) omitting the warrant as
reasoning for justifying the move from grounds to
claims is not usually explained, (3) extending the
role of backing so it provides additional set of in-
formation to back-up the argument as a whole but
is not directly bound to the claim as the grounds
are, and (4) adding refutation which attacks the
rebuttal (attacking the attack). The scheme is de-
picted in Figure 3.
Suitability of the scheme As pointed out by
Bentahar et al. (2010), many argumentation sys-
tems make no distinction between their premises,
despite the fact that in arguments expressed in nat-
ural language we can typically observe premises
playing different roles. Toulmins’ scheme allows
such a distinction using the set of different com-
ponents (roles). “By identifying these roles, we
can present the arguments in a more readily un-
derstandable fashion, and also identify the various
ways in which the argument may be accepted or
attacked” (Bentahar et al., 2010, p. 216).
Toulmin’s model, as a general framework for
modeling static monological argumentation (Ben-
tahar et al., 2010), has been used in works on
annotating argumentative discourse (Newman and
Marshall, 1991; Chambliss, 1995; Simosi, 2003;
Weinberger and Fischer, 2006). However, its com-
plexity and the fact that the description of the com-
ponents is informal and sometimes ambiguous,
poses challenges for an application of the model
on real-world data, especially user-generated dis-
course on the Web. Moreover, some of the com-
ponents are usually left implicit in argumentation,
such as the warrant or even the claim (Newman
and Marshall, 1991).
5 Preliminary results of annotation
studies
In order to examine the proposed approaches, we
conducted two extensive independent annotation
studies. The central controversial topics were re-
lated to education. One distinguishing feature
of educational topics is their breadth, as they at-
tract researchers, practitioners, parents, or policy-
makers. Since the detailed studies are being pub-
lished elsewhere, we summarize only the main re-
sults and outcomes in this paper.
In the first study, we used the Claim-Premises
scheme for annotating a dataset of web documents
consisting of 80 documents from six current top-
ics related to the German educational system (e.g.,
mainstreaming, staying down at school), which is
described in (Kluge, 2014). The dataset contains
(newspaper) articles, blog posts, and interviews.
It was created by Vovk (2013) who manually se-
lected documents obtained from a focused crawler
and the top 100 search engine hits (per topic).
In the second study, the annotation was split
into two stages. In the first stage, we anno-
tated 990 English comments to articles and fo-
rums posts with their argumentativeness (persua-
siveness). The source sites were identified using
a standard search engine and the content was ex-
tracted manually; we chose the documents ran-
domly without any pre-filtering. In the second
stage, we applied the extended Toulmin’s scheme
on 294 argumentative English comments to arti-
cles and forums posts and 57 English newspa-
per editorials and blog posts. The topics cover,
e.g., mainstreaming,3 single-sex schools, or home-
schooling, among others.
Measuring inter-annotator agreement For
any real large-scale annotation attempt, measuring
inter-annotator agreement (IAA) is crucial in
order to estimate the reliability of annotations
and the feasibility of the task itself. Both anno-
tation approaches share one common sub-task:
labeling spans of tokens with their corresponding
argumentation concept, the boundaries of the
spans are not known beforehand. Therefore, the
most appropriate measure here is the unitized
Krippendorf’s αU as the annotators identify and
label the units in the same text (Krippendorff,
2013). Other measures, such as Cohen’s κ or
Fleiss’ pi, expect the units (boundaries of the
argument component) to be known beforehand,
which is not the case here.
5.1 Outcomes of annotating with
Claim-Premises scheme
During an annotation study of 6 weeks, three
annotators (one inexperienced annotator and two
experts) annotated 80 documents belonging to
six topics. On average, each annotator needed
23 hours to annotate the 3863 sentences. The
annotators marked 5126 argument components
(53% premises, 47% claims) and 2349 arguments,
which is 2.2 argument components per argument.
On average, 74% of the tokens in the dataset are
covered by an argument component indicates that
the documents are in fact highly argumentative.
An average claim spans 1.1 sentences, whereas an
average premise spans 2.2 sentences.
While the IAA scores appeared to be non-
substantial, ranging from αU=34.6 (distin-
guishing all 6 annotation classes and non-
argumentative) to αU=42.4 (distinguishing be-
tween premises, claims and non-argumentative),
they are in line with previous results: Peldszus and
Stede (2013b) report αU=42.5 for their sentence-
level annotation study.
By analysing typical patterns of argument com-
ponents used in arguments, Kluge (2014) found
that almost three quarters of arguments (72.4%)
consist of one claim and one premise. In 59.5%
of these arguments, the support follows the claim,
3Discussion about benefits or disadvantages of including
children with special needs into regular classes.
Argument
Component
Comments,
Forums
Blogs Articles
Claim 0.57 0.17 0.23
Grounds 0.64 0.32 0.11
Backing 0.41 -0.16 0.28
Rebuttal 0.33 -0.02 0.00
Refutation 0.06 0.35 0.00
Table 2: IAA scores (Krippendorf’s αU ) from an-
notations using the Toulmin’s scheme.
whereas only in 11.6% of the arguments, the sup-
port precedes the claim. The corresponding pat-
terns consisting of attack and claim are signifi-
cantly less frequent: only 3.4% of the arguments
consist of a claim and an attack.
Annotated examples can be found in §A.1.
5.2 Outcomes of annotating with Toulmin’s
scheme
In the first stage, three independent annotators la-
beled 524 out of 990 documents as argumenta-
tive/persuasive on the given topic. Total size of
this dataset was 130,085 tokens (mean 131, std.
dev. 139) and 6,371 sentences (mean 6.44, std.
dev. 6.53). Agreement on the first sub-set of
this dataset of 300 documents was 0.51 (Fleiss’ pi,
three annotators per document), the second sub-set
(690 documents) was then annotated by two anno-
tators with agreement 0.59 (Cohen’s κ). This stage
took in total about 17 hours per annotator.
In the second phase that took about 33 hours
per annotator, a collection of comments and forum
posts (294 documents) was randomly chosen from
the previously labeled argumentative documents
from the previous stage together with 49 blog
posts and 8 newspaper articles. The total size of
this dataset was 345 documents, containing 87,286
tokens (mean 253.00, std. dev. 262.90) and 3,996
sentences (mean 11.58, std. dev. 11.72). Three in-
dependent annotators annotated the whole dataset
in multiple phases. After each phase, they dis-
cussed discrepancies, resolved issues and updated
the annotation guidelines. The inter-annotator
agreement was measured on the last phase con-
taining 93 comments and forum posts, 8 blogs,
and 6 articles. During the annotations, 2 articles
and 4 forum posts/comments were also discarded
as non-argumentative.
Agreement (Krippendorf’s αU ) varies signifi-
cantly given different argumentation components
and registers, as shown in Table 2. Given these
results, we formulate the following conclusions.
This scheme seems to fit well short documents
(forum posts and comments) as they tend to bring
up one central claim with a support (grounds).
Its suitability for longer documents (blogposts and
editorials) is doubtful. We examined the annota-
tion errors and found that in well-structured doc-
uments, the annotators were able to identify the
concepts reliably. However, if the discussion of
the controversy is complex (many sub-aspects are
discussed) or follows a dialogical manner, appli-
cation the Toulmin’s scheme is all but straightfor-
ward.
Furthermore, the distinction between grounds
and backing also allows to capture different kinds
of evidence. Authors purposely use grounds to ex-
plicitly support their claim, while backing mostly
serves as an additional information (i.e., author’s
personal experience, referring to studies, etc.) and
the argument can be still acceptable without it.
However, boundaries between these two compo-
nents are still fuzzy and caused many disagree-
ments.
We show few annotation examples (as agreed
by all annotators after the study) in §A.2.
6 Observations
In this section, we would like to summarize some
important findings from our annotation studies.
6.1 Data heterogeneity
Variety or registers There exist many on-line
registers that carry argumentation to topics un-
der investigation, such as newspaper reports (i.e.,
events), editorials (opinions), interviews (single
party, multiple parties), blogposts,4 comments to
articles and blogs (threaded allowing explicit dis-
cussion, linear with implicit discussion by quoting
and referencing), discussion forums, Twitter, etc.
Short versus long documents Different docu-
ment lengths affect the style of argumentation.
Short documents (i.e., Tweets in the extreme case)
have to focus on the core of the argument. By con-
trast, long documents, such as blog posts or edito-
rials, may elaborate various aspects of the topic
and usually employ many literary devices, such as
4In contrast to traditional publisher, bloggers do not have
to comply with strict guidelines or the use of formal language
(Santos et al., 2012).
narratives, quotations from sources, or direct and
indirect speech.
Well structured newspaper articles versus
poorly structured user-generated content
Producing a well-understandable argument is
actually a human skill that can be acquired by
learning; many textbooks are available on that
topic, e.g., (Sinnott-Armstrong and Fogelin, 2009;
Weston, 2008; Schiappa and Nordin, 2013).
Thus, it is very likely that, for example, trained
journalists in editorials and lay people in social
media will produce very different argumentation,
in terms of structure, language, etc.
6.2 Properties of argumentation in
user-generated discourse
Non-argumentative texts Distinguishing argu-
mentative from non-argumentative discourse is a
necessary step that has to be undertaken before an-
notating argument components. While in newspa-
per editorials some parts (such as paragraphs) may
be ignored during argument annotation (Kluge,
2014), in comments and forum posts we had to
perform an additional step to filter documents that
do not convey any argumentation or persuasion
(cf. §5.2 or Example 4 in §A.2).
Implicit argumentation components in Toul-
min’s model As already reported by Newman
and Marshall (1991), some argument components
are not explicitly expressed. This is mostly the
case of warrant in the original Toulmin’s model;
we also discarded this component from our exten-
sion. However, even the claim is often not stated
explicitly, as seen in example 3 (§A.2). The claim
reflects the author’s stance and can be understood
(inferred) by readers, but is left implicit.
Other rhetorical dimensions of argument All
the models for argumentation discussed so far fo-
cus solely on the logos part of the argument. How-
ever, rhetorical power of argumentation also in-
volves other dimensions, namely pathos, ethos,
and kairos (Aristotle and Kennedy (translator),
1991; Schiappa and Nordin, 2013). These have
never been tackled in computational approaches to
modeling argumentation. Furthermore, figurative
langauge, fallacies, or narratives (see example 3 in
§A.2) are prevalent in argumentation on the Web.
6.3 Recommendations
Based on the experience from the annotation stud-
ies, we would like to conclude with the follow-
ing recommendations: (1) selection of argumen-
tation model should be based on the data at hand
and the desired application; our experiments show
that Toulmin’s model is more expressive than the
Claim-Premise model but is not suitable for long
documents, (2) annotating argumentation is time-
demanding and error-prone endeavor; annotators
thus have to be provided with detailed and elab-
orated annotation guidelines and be extensively
trained (our experiments with crowdsourcing were
not successful).
7 Follow-up use cases
Understanding argumentation in user-generated
content can foster future research in many areas.
Here we present two concrete applications.
7.1 Understanding argumentative discourse
in education
Computer-supported argumentation has been a
very active research field, as shown by Scheuer
et al. (2010) in their recent survey of vari-
ous models and argumentation formalisms from
the educational perspective. Many studies on
computer-supported collaboration and argumenta-
tion (Noroozi et al., 2013; Weinberger and Fischer,
2006; Stegmann et al., 2007) can directly bene-
fit from NLP techniques for automatic argument
detection, classification, and summarization. In-
stead of relying on scripts (Dillenbourg and Hong,
2008; Scheuer et al., 2010; Fischer et al., 2013)
or explicit argument diagramming (Scheuer et al.,
2014), collaborative platforms can further provide
scholars with a summary of the whole argumen-
tation to the topic, reveal the main argumenta-
tive patterns, provide the weaknesses of other’s
arguments, as well as identify shortcomings that
need to be improved in the argumentative knowl-
edge construction. Automatic analysis of micro-
arguments can also help to overcome the existing
trade-off between freedom (free-text option) and
guidance (scripts) (Dillenbourg and Hong, 2008).
7.2 Automatic summarization of
argumentative discourse
When summarizing argumentative discourse,
knowledge of the underlying structure of the ar-
gument is a valuable source. Previous work in this
area includes, e.g., opinion-based summarization
of blogposts (a pilot task in TAC 20085). Carenini
and Cheung (2008) compared extractive and
abstractive summaries in controversial documents
and found out that a high degree of controver-
siality improved performance of their system.
Similarly, presenting argumentation in a con-
densed form (the large concepts of the argument
are compressed or summarized) may improve
argument comprehension. This approach would
mainly utilize tools for document compression
(Qian and Liu, 2013).
8 Conclusions
In this article, we formulated our view on argu-
mentation mining on the Web and identified var-
ious use-case scenarios and expected outcomes.
We thoroughly reviewed related work with focus
on Web data and annotation approaches. We pro-
posed two different annotation schemes based on
their theoretical counterparts in argumentation re-
search and evaluated their suitability and reliabil-
ity for Web data in two extensive independent an-
notation studies. Finally, we outlined challenges
and gaps in current argumentation mining on the
Web.
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A Annotated examples
A.1 News articles using Claim-Premises
scheme
Example 1
[claim: ,,Die Umstellung zu G8 war schwierig“,
sagt Diana. ] [support: In den Sommerferien nach
dem Sitzenbleiben holte sie das nach, was ihr die
G8er voraus hatten: Lateinvokabeln, Stochastik,
Grammatik. ,,Den Vorteil, durch das Wiederholen
den Stoff noch mal zu machen, hatte ich nicht.“ ]
[claim: “The change [to G8] was difficult,” says
Diana. ] [support: (Since) After staying down,
she had to catch up with the G8 students during
her summer holiday, studying Latin vocabulary,
5http://www.nist.gov/tac/publications/
2008/papers.html
stochastics, and grammar. “I did not have the
advantage of reviewing previous material.” ]
Example 2
[claim: Lehrer wird man, weil das ein
sicherer Beruf ist. ] [support: So denken
noch immer viele junge Leute, die sich fu¨r
eine Pa¨dagogenlaufbahn entscheiden. Gut acht
von zehn Erstsemestern, die 2009 mit einem
Lehramtsstudium anfingen, war dieser Aspekt
ihres ku¨nftigen Berufs wichtig oder sogar sehr
wichtig. Keine andere Studentengruppe, die
die Hochschul-Informations-System GmbH HIS
befragte, legt so viel Wert auf Sicherheit. ]
[claim: People become teachers because it is a
safe job. ] [support: This is what more and more
young people who decide to become a teacher
think. Well over eight of 10 freshman students
who started to study to become teachers in 2009
considered this an important or very important
aspect. No other group of students interviewed by
the HIS set that much value on safeness. ]
Example 3
[claim: Fu¨r die Unis sind Doktoranden gu¨nstige
Arbeitskra¨fte. ] [support: Eine Bekannte hatte
mit ihrem Doktorvater zu ka¨mpfen, der versuchte,
sie noch am Institut zu halten, als ihre Arbeit
la¨ngst fertig war. Er hatte immer neue Ausreden,
weshalb er noch keine Note geben konnte. Als
sie dann auch ohne Note einen guten Job bekam,
auerhalb der Uni, spielte sich eine Art Rosenkrieg
zwischen den beiden ab. Bis heute verlangt er von
ihr noch Nacharbeiten an der Dissertation. Sie
schuftet jetzt spa¨tabends und am Wochenende fu¨r
ihren Ex-Prof, der natu¨rlich immer nur an ihrem
Fortkommen interessiert war. ]
[claim: At university, graduate students are
cheap employees. ] [support: An acquaintance
struggled with her Ph.D. supervisor, who tried to
keep her in his group at any rate, even though
she had already completed her thesis. He pled
more and more excuses for not yet grading her
work. When she finally found a good job outside
university even without a final grade a martial
strife arose. Still today, he asks her to rework
her dissertation. Now, she is drudging for her
ex-supervisor, who always only wanted the best
for her, late in the evening or on the weekend. ]
A.2 Forum posts using extended Toulmin’s
scheme
Example 1
. . . . . . . . . .[backing: . . . . . . .I’m . .a. . . . . . . . .regular . . . . . . . . . . .education . . . . . . . . .teacher. . . .I
. . . . .have . . . . . . . . .students. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .mainstreamed . . . .into. . . . .my . . . . . .class . . . . . .every
. . . . . .year.] [grounds: My opinion is that it needs to be
done far more judiciously than it is done now- if
six exceptional children are put in my class, that
is the equivalent of putting an entire special ed
classroom into my regular class.] [grounds: I
personally feel like these kids are shortchanged-
some of them are good kids who need an adult
close by and able to give more focused attention.
In a class of 30+, this isn’t going to happen
consistently.] [grounds: And some of the
ones who come to me have legally imposed
modifications, some of which have little or no
bearing on what I teach, so I am not allowed to
handle my class in a way I think it should be
done. That impairs my efficiency as an educator.]
[grounds: Also, some have so many modifications
that for all intents and purposes they are merely
taking a special ed class whose physical location
just happens to be in a regular classroom.] [claim:
From my point of view, mainstreaming is not a
terrible idea, but it is lamentable in its execution,
and because of that, damaging in its results.]
Comments Quite a good argument with an ex-
plicit claim, few grounds and some backing.
Example 2
tara mommy:
I agree with you too, which is why I said:
::::::::
[rebuttal:
:::::::
There
::::
are
:::::::::
obviously
::::::
cases
::::::
where
::::
this
::::
isn’t
::::::
going
::
to
::::::
work.
::::::::
Extreme
::::::::::
behavioral
::::::::
trouble,
::::
kids
::::
that
::::
just
::::::
aren’t
:::::
able
::
to
::::::
keep
:::
up
:::::
with
:::::
what
::::::
they’re
::::::::
learning
:::
in
:::::::
average
:::::::
classes,
:::::
etc.] [claim:
But on the whole, I like mainstreaming.]
Comments Only claim and rebuttal; no support-
ing grounds.
Example 3
l think as parents of the child you have to be
certain and confident that your child is ready
to mainstream. lf not, it can backfire on the
child. . . . . . . . . . .[backing: . . . . . .My. . . . . . .child . . . . .was . . .in. . . . . . . . . . . .”preschool
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .handicapped”. . . . . . .from. . . . . .age . . . . . .2-5. . . . . . . . .We . . . . . .tried. . . .to
. . . . . . . . . . . .mainstream. . . . .him . .in. . . . . . . . . . . . . .kindergarten,. . . .but. . .he. . . .had. .a. . . . .hard
. . . . .time . . . . . . . . . .adjusting.. . . .So . . .the. . . . . . . .school . . .got. . . . .him. .a . . . .one . . .on. . . .one
. . . .para. . . . .and . .it . . . . . . .helped. .a. . . .bit.. .2. . . . . . . .grades . . . . . .later, . . .he . . . .still. . . .has
.a. . . .one. . . .on . . . .one. . . . .aide . . . .but . . . . . .doing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EXCELLENT.]
Our goal is for him to not have a one on one by
middle school. We took him off meds and we have
a strong behavior plan, he sees therapists, and it is
hourly teaching and redirecting with him. Truth be
told College may not be in his future, but we will
do everything in our power to try to get him there.
Comments The claim is implicit, the author is
slightly against mainstreaming. Mainly story-
telling, which is not considered as grounds but as
backing. The typos (using ‘l’ instead of ‘I’) are
kept uncorrected.
Example 4
My lo has mild autism, he has only just been di-
agnosed, he is delayed in some areas (but not oth-
ers), he goes to ms school, and has some one to
one (this should increase now, I hope). There is
one TA and a full time TA who supports another
child with autism. It’s a smallish school.
He isn’t disruptive (well he sometimes doesn’t do
as asked and can be a little akward), he has never
been aggressive in anyway, he is very happy.
I am worried about his future (high school)after
reading this.
Sarah x
Comments Not an argumentative/persuasive
text.
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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze and discuss ap-
proaches to argumentation mining from
the discourse structure perspective. We
chose persuasive essays and scientific ar-
ticles as our example domains. By an-
alyzing several example arguments and
providing an overview of previous work
on argumentation mining, we derive im-
portant tasks that are currently not ad-
dressed by existing argumentation mining
systems, most importantly, the identifica-
tion of argumentation structures. We dis-
cuss the relation of this task to automated
discourse analysis and describe prelimi-
nary results of two annotation studies fo-
cusing on the annotation of argumentation
structure. Based on our findings, we derive
three challenges for encouraging future re-
search on argumentation mining.
1 Introduction
Argumentation mining is a recent research area
which promises novel opportunities not only for
information retrieval, educational applications or
automated assessment tools but also aims at im-
proving current legal information systems or pol-
icy modeling platforms. It focuses on automat-
ically identifying and evaluating arguments in
text documents and includes a variety of sub-
tasks like identifying argument components, find-
ing accepted arguments and discovering argumen-
tation structures. Researchers have already inves-
tigated argumentation mining in several domains.
For instance, Teufel (1999) aims at identifying
rhetorical roles of sentences in scientific articles
and Mochales-Palau and Moens (2011) identify
arguments in legal documents. Also, Feng and
Hirst (2011) investigated argumentation schemes
in newspapers and court cases and Florou et al.
(2013) applied argumentation mining in policy
modeling.
However, current approaches mainly focus on
the identification of arguments and their compo-
nents and largely neglect the identification of ar-
gumentation structures although an argument con-
sists not only of a set of propositions but also ex-
hibits a certain structure constituted by argumenta-
tive relations (Peldszus and Stede, 2013; Sergeant,
2013). We argue in this paper that identifying ar-
gumentative relations and the argumentation struc-
ture respectively is an important task for argu-
mentation mining. First, identifying argumenta-
tive relations between argument components en-
ables the identification of additional reasons for a
given claim and thus allows the creation of valu-
able knowledge bases e.g. for establishing new
information retrieval platforms. Second, it is im-
portant to recognize which premises belong to a
claim, since it is not possible to evaluate argu-
ments without knowing which premises belong to
it. Third, automatically identifying the structure of
arguments enables novel features of applications,
such as providing feedback in computer-assisted
writing (e.g., recommending reasonable usage of
discourse markers, suggesting rearrangements of
argument components) or extracting argumenta-
tion structures from scientific publications for au-
tomated summarization systems.
In this paper, we analyze several examples of
argumentative discourse from the discourse struc-
ture perspective.1 We outline existing approaches
on argumentation mining and discourse analysis
and provide an overview of our current work on
argumentation structure annotation in scientific ar-
ticles and persuasive essays. We conclude this pa-
per with a list of challenges for encouraging future
1The examples are taken from persuasive essays which
are either collected from the writing feedback section of
http://www.essayforum.com or from the corpus
compiled by Stab and Gurevych (2014)
research on argumentation mining.
2 Background
Philosophy and Logic proposed a vast amount of
argumentation theories (e.g. Toulmin (1958), Wal-
ton et al. (2008), Freeman (2011)).2 The major-
ity of these theories generally agree that an ar-
gument consists of several argument components
which can either be a premise or a claim. The sim-
plest form of an argument includes one claim that
is supported by at least one premise (figure 1).
Claim Premisesupports
Figure 1: Illustration of a simple argument
The claim3 is the central component of an ar-
gument that can either be true or false. Thus, the
claim is a statement that should not be accepted by
the reader without additional reasons. The second
component of an argument, the premise4, under-
pins the plausibility of the claim. It is usually pro-
vided by the proponent (writer) for convincing the
reader of the claim. Examples (1) and (2) illustrate
two simple arguments, each containing a claim (in
bold face) and a single premise (underlined):
(1) “It is more convenient to learn
about historical or art items online.
With Internet, people do not need to
travel long distances to have a real look
at a painting or a sculpture, which prob-
ably takes a lot of time and travel fees.”
(2) “Locker checks should be made
mandatory and done frequently be-
cause they assure security in schools,
make students healthy, and will make
students obey school policies.”
These examples illustrate that there exist argu-
ment components both on the sentence level and
on the clause level.
Argumentative relations are usually directed re-
lations between two argument components and
represent the argumentation structure. There ex-
ist different types like support or attack (Peldszus
2A review of argumentation theory is beyond the scope of
this paper. A survey can be found in Bentahar et al. (2010)
3also called conclusion (Mochales-Palau and Moens,
2009)
4sometimes called support (Besnard and Hunter, 2008) or
reason (Anne Britt and Larson, 2003)
and Stede, 2013) which indicate that the source ar-
gument component is a reason or a refutation for
the target component. For instance, in both of the
examples above, an argumentative support relation
holds from the premise to the claim. The follow-
ing example illustrates a more complex argument
including one claim and three premises:
(3) “Everybody should study abroada.
It’s an irreplaceable experience if you
learn standing on your own feetb since
you learn living without depending on
anyone elsec. But one who is living
overseas will of course struggle with
loneliness, living away from family and
friendsd.”
Figure 2 shows the structure of the argument in
(3). In this example, premiseb supports the claima
whereas premised attacks the claima.
a b c d supports 
 supports
 
attacks
 
Figure 2: Argumentation structure of example (3).
This example illustrates three important proper-
ties of argumentation structures:
1. Argumentative relations can hold between
non-adjacent sentence/clauses, e.g. the ar-
gumentative attack relation from premised to
the claima.
2. Some argumentative relations are signaled by
indicators, whereas others are not. For in-
stance, the argumentative attack relation from
premised to the claima is indicated by the dis-
course marker ‘but’, whereas the argumenta-
tive support relation from premiseb to claima
is not indicated by a discourse marker.
3. Argumentative discourse might exhibit rea-
soning chains, e.g. the chain constituted be-
tween argument components a, b, and c.
3 Argumentation Mining
Previous approaches on argumentation mining
cover several subtasks including the separation of
argumentative from non-argumentative text units
(Moens et al., 2007; Florou et al., 2013), the
classification of argument components (with dif-
ferent component classes) (Rooney et al., 2012;
Mochales-Palau and Moens, 2009; Teufel, 1999;
Feng and Hirst, 2011), and the identification
of argumentation structures (Mochales-Palau and
Moens, 2009; Wyner et al., 2010).
3.1 Separation of Argumentative from
Non-argumentative Text Units
The first step of an argumentation mining pipeline
typically focuses on the identification of argu-
mentative text units before analyzing the compo-
nents or the structure of arguments. This task
is usually considered as a binary classification
task that labels a given text unit as argumenta-
tive or non-argumentative. One of the first ap-
proaches was proposed by (Moens et al., 2007).
They focus on the identification of argumentative
text units in newspaper editorials and legal doc-
uments included in the Araucaria corpus (Reed
et al., 2008). The annotation scheme utilized in
Araucaria is based on a domain-independent ar-
gumentation theory proposed by Walton (1996).
A similar approach is reported by Florou et al.
(2013). In their experiments, they classify text
segments crawled with a focused crawler as either
containing an argument or not. They focus on the
identification of arguments in the policy model-
ing domain for facilitating decision making. For
that purpose, they utilize several discourse mark-
ers and features extracted from the tense and mood
of verbs.
Although the separation of argumentative from
non-argumentative text units is an important step
in argumentation mining, it merely enables the de-
tection of text units relevant for argumentation and
does not reveal the argumentative role of argument
components.
3.2 Classification of Argument Components
The classification of argument components aims
at identifying the argumentative role (e.g. claims
and premises) of argument components.
One of the first approaches to identify argument
components is Argumentative Zoning proposed by
(Teufel, 1999). Each sentence is classified as one
of seven rhetorical roles including e.g. claim, re-
sult or purpose using structural, lexical and syn-
tactic features. The underlying assumption of this
work is that argument components extracted from
a scientific article provide a good summary of its
content. Rooney et al. (2012) also focus on the
identification of argument components but in con-
trast to the work of Teufel (1999) their scheme is
not tailored to a particular genre. In their exper-
iments, they identify claims, premises and non-
argumentative text units in the Araucaria corpus.
Feng and Hirst (2011) also use the Araucaria cor-
pus for their experiments, but focus on the identi-
fication of argumentation schemes (Walton, 1996)
which are templates for arguments (e.g. argument
from example or argument from position to know).
Since their approach is based on features extracted
from mutual information of claims and premises,
it requires that the argument components are re-
liably identified in advance. Mochales-Palau and
Moens (2009) report several experiments for clas-
sifying argument components. They solely focus
on the legal domain and in particular on legal court
cases from the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR). They consider the classification of argu-
ment components as two consecutive steps. They
utilize a maximum entropy model for identifying
argumentative text units before identifying the ar-
gumentative role (claim and premise) of the identi-
fied components using a Support Vector Machine.
3.3 Identification of Argumentation
Structures
Currently, there are only few approaches aiming
at the identification of argumentation structures.
For instance, the approach proposed by Mochales-
Palau and Moens (2011) relies on a manually
created context-free grammar (CFG) and on the
presence of discourse markers for identifying a
tree-like structure between argument components.
However, the approach relies on the presence of
discourse markers and exploits manually created
rules. Therefore, it does not accommodate ill-
formatted arguments (Wyner et al., 2010) and is
not capable of identifying implicit argumentation
structures which are common in argumentative
discourse. Indeed, Marcu and Echihabi (2002)
found that only 26% of the evidence relations in
the RST Discourse Treebank (Carlson et al., 2001)
include discourse markers.
Another approach was presented by Cabrio and
Villata (2012). They identify relations between ar-
guments of an online debate platform for identify-
ing accepted arguments and to support the interac-
tions in online debates. In contrast to the work of
Mochales-Palau and Moens (2011), this approach
aims at identifying relations between arguments
(macro-level) and not between argument compo-
nents (micro-level).
4 Argumentation and Discourse Analysis
Discourse analysis aims at identifying discourse
relations that hold between adjacent text units with
text units being sentences, clauses or nominaliza-
tions (Webber et al., 2012). Since text units might
be argument components and discourse relations
are often closely related to argumentative rela-
tions, previous work in automated discourse anal-
ysis is highly relevant for argumentation mining.
4.1 Discourse Relations and Argumentative
Relations
Most previous work in automated discourse anal-
ysis is based on corpora annotated with general
discourse relations, most notably the Penn Dis-
course Treebank (PDTB) (Prasad et al., 2008)
and the Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) Dis-
course Treebank (Carlson et al., 2003). Whereas
RST represents the discourse structure as a tree,
the PDTB allows more general graph structure.
For the annotation of discourse relations in the
PDTB, two different types of discourse relations
were distinguished: implicit and explicit relations.
Whereas explicit discourse relations are indicated
by discourse markers, implicit discourse relations
are not indicated by discourse markers and the
identification of those relations requires more so-
phisticated methods.
Take as an example the argumentation structure
discussed in section 2.
“Everybody should study abroada. It’s
an irreplaceable experience if you learn
standing on your own feetb since you
learn living without depending on any-
one elsec. But one who is living over-
seas will of course struggle with lone-
liness, living away from family and
friendsd.”
Whereas the argument components b and c, as
well as c and d are related through the discourse
marker ‘since’ (signalling an explicit CAUSE rela-
tion) and ‘but’ (signalling an explicit CONTRAST
relation), the discourse relation JUSTIFY between
a and b is an implicit relation.
Existing approaches of discourse analysis pro-
posed different sets of discourse relations, and
there is currently no consensus in the literature
about the ‘right’ set of discourse relations. For
instance, the RST (Mann and Thompson, 1988)
uses a different set of discourse relations than the
PDTB (Prasad et al., 2008).
It is still an open question how the proposed dis-
course relations relate to argumentative relations.
Although, there are preliminary findings that indi-
cate that there are certain similarities (Cabrio et
al., 2013), approaches like RST and PDTB aim
at identifying general discourse structures and are
not tailored to argumentative discourse.
The difference of the relations is best illustrated
by the work of Biran and Rambow (2011), which
is to the best of our knowledge the only approach
that focuses on the identification of distinct argu-
mentative relations. The authors argue that exist-
ing definitions of discourse relations are only us-
able as a building block for argumentation mining
and that there are no distinct argumentative rela-
tions included in existing approaches. Therefore,
they combine 12 relations from the RST Discourse
Treebank (Carlson et al., 2001) to a single argu-
mentative support relation for identifying justifi-
cations in online discussions.
4.2 Discourse Markers and Indicators of
Argumentative Relations
There is a large body of previous research in lin-
guistics on the role of discourse markers, sig-
nalling discourse relations (e.g.‘because’, ‘there-
fore’, ‘since’, etc.) in discourse analysis. Most
previous investigations of discourse markers are
based on the PDTB (Prasad et al., 2008) and on the
RST Discourse Treebank (Carlson et al., 2003).
However, a critically discussed question in this
context is the definition of discourse markers. Are
discourse markers in the sense of indicators mark-
ing discourse relations just words like ‘because’,
‘therefore’, ‘since’? Taboada (2006) investigates
the role of discourse markers in corpora annotated
with discourse relations according to the RST. In
her discussion of related work on discourse mark-
ers in linguistics, she concludes that there are
many lexical and linguistic devices signalling dis-
course relations beyond discourse markers, such
as the mood (e.g. indicative or conjunctive) or the
modality (e.g. possibility, necessity) of a sentence.
In particular, for argumentative discourse, the
role of indicators, such as discourse markers, is not
well-understood yet, which is due to the lack of
corpora annotated with argumentation structures.
Recently, Tseronis (2011) summarized interme-
diate results of a corpus-based analysis of argu-
mentative moves, aiming at the identification of
linguistic surface cues that act as argumentative
markers. According to Tseronis (2011), any sin-
gle or complex lexical expression can act as an
argumentative marker, and it can either mark an
argumentative relation (i.e., connecting two argu-
ments or argument components) or signal a certain
argumentative role, such as a claim or a premise.
Moreover, he observed that also sequential pat-
terns of argumentative markers indicate particular
argumentative moves, for instance, first stating the
common ground (e.g., using the marker it is un-
derstandable ...) and then presenting an attack to
this common ground (e.g., using a marker such as
nevertheless).
5 Argumentation Structure Annotation
Our research in argumentation mining is mo-
tivated by the (1) information access and (2)
computer-assisted writing perspective. Currently,
we are conducting two annotation studies, focused
on analyzing argumentation structures in scientific
articles and persuasive essays. In the following
subsections we provide an overview of the (pre-
liminary) results.
5.1 Argumentation Structures in Scientific
Articles
One of the main goals of any scientific publica-
tion is to present new research results to an expert
audience. In order to emphasize the novelty and
importance of the research findings, scientists usu-
ally build up an argumentation structure that pro-
vides numerous arguments in favor of their results.
The goal of this annotation study is to automati-
cally identify those argumentation structures on a
fine-grained level in scientific publications in the
educational domain and thereby to improve infor-
mation access. A potential use case could be an
automated summarization system creating a sum-
mary of important arguments presented in a scien-
tific article.
Up to now only coarse-grained approaches like
Argumentative Zoning (Teufel et al., 2009; Li-
akata et al., 2012; Yepes et al., 2013) have been
developed for argumentation mining in scientific
publications. These approaches classify argument
components according to their argumentative con-
tribution to the document (see section 3.2) but they
do not consider any relations between the argu-
ment components. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no prior work on identifying argumenta-
tion structures on a fine-grained level in scientific
full-texts yet (see section 3.3).
Due to the lack of evaluation datasets, we are
performing an annotation study with four annota-
tors, two domain experts and two annotators who
developed the annotation guidelines. Our dataset
consists of about 20 scientific full-texts from the
educational domain. For the annotation study,
we developed our own Web-based annotation tool
(see figure 3 for a screenshot). The annotation
tool allows to label argument components directly
in the text with different colors and to add differ-
ent relations (like support or attack) between ar-
gument components. The resulting argumentation
structure is visualized as a graph (see figure 3).
Next, we plan to develop weakly supervised
machine learning methods to automatically anno-
tate scientific publications with argument compo-
nents and the relations between them. The first
step will be to distinguish non-argumentative parts
(for example descriptions of the document struc-
ture) from argumentative parts (see section 3.1).
The second step will be to identify support and at-
tack relations between the argument components.
In particular, we will explore lexical features, such
as discourse markers (for example ‘hence’, ‘so’,
‘for that reason’, ‘but’, ‘however’, see section 4),
and semantic features, such as text similarity or
textual entailment.
5.2 Identifying Argumentation Structures for
Computer-Assisted Writing
The goal of computer-assisted writing is to pro-
vide feedback about written language in order
to improve text quality and writing skills of au-
thors respectively. Common approaches are for
instance focused on providing feedback about
spelling and grammar, whereas more sophisti-
cated approaches also provide feedback about dis-
course structures (Burstein et al., 2003), readabil-
ity (Pitler and Nenkova, 2008), style (Burstein and
Wolska, 2003) or aim at facilitating second lan-
guage writing (Chen et al., 2012; Huang et al.,
2012).
Argumentative Writing Support is a particu-
lar type of computer-assisted writing that aims at
providing feedback about argumentation and thus
postulates methods for reliably identifying argu-
ments. Besides the recognition of argument com-
ponents, the identification of the argumentation
Figure 3: Screenshot of the annotation tool for argumentation structure annotation in scientific full-
texts: The left side includes the text of a scientific article and the argument components marked with
different colors and labels (a1-a7). The graph visualization on the right side illustrates the argumentation
structure. Each node represents an argument component connected with several relations (‘support’,
‘attack’, ‘sequence’).
structure is crucial for argumentative writing sup-
port, since it would open novel possibilities for
providing formative feedback about argumenta-
tion. On the one hand, an analysis of the argu-
mentation structure would enable the recommen-
dation of more meaningful arrangements of argu-
ment components and a reasonable usage of dis-
course markers. Both have been shown to increase
argument comprehension and recall, and thus the
quality of the text (Anne Britt and Larson, 2003).
On the other hand, by identifying which premises
belong to a claim, it would be possible to advice
the author to add additional support in her/his ar-
gumentation to improve the persuasiveness.
Following this vision, we conducted an anno-
tation study with three annotators to model ar-
gument components and the argumentation struc-
ture in persuasive essays at the clause-level. The
corpus includes 90 persuasive essays which we
selected from essayforum.com. Our annotation
scheme includes three argument components (ma-
jor claim, claim and premise) and two argumen-
tative relations (support and attack). For defining
the annotation guidelines and the annotation pro-
cess we conducted a preliminary study on a cor-
pus of 14 short text snippets with five non-trained
annotators and found that information about the
topic and the author’s stance is crucial for anno-
tating arguments. According to these findings,
we defined a top-down annotation process start-
ing with the major claim and drilling-down to the
claims and the premises so that the annotators are
aware of the author’s stance and the topic before
annotating other components. Using this strategy,
we achieved an inter-rater agreement of αU =
0.725 for argument components and α = 0.81
for argumentative relations indicating that the pro-
posed scheme and annotation process successfully
guides annotators to substantial agreement. For
more details about this annotation study, we re-
fer the interested reader to (Stab and Gurevych,
2014), which includes a detailed description of the
annotation scheme, an analysis of inter-annotator
agreements on different granularities and an er-
ror analysis. The corpus as well as the annotation
guidelines are freely available to encourage future
research.6
5We used Krippendorff’s αU (Krippendorff, 2004) for
measuring the agreement since there are no predefined mar-
bles in our study and annotators had also to identify the
boundaries of argument components.
6http://www.ukp.tu-darmstadt.de/data/
argumentation-mining
6 Challenges
Existing approaches of argumentation mining
mainly focus on the identification of argument
components (section 3). Based on the examples
analyzed in section 2 and on the experience gained
in our annotation studies (section 5), we identified
the following challenges for future research in ar-
gumentation mining that have not been addressed
adequately by previous work.
Segmentation: Most of the existing approaches
are based on the sentence-level. However, for an-
alyzing arguments, a more fine-grained segmenta-
tion is needed (Sergeant, 2013). Apart from the
sentence level, in real world data argument com-
ponents exist on the clause level or can spread over
several sentences. For instance, example (4) il-
lustrates that a single sentence can contain multi-
ple argument components (claim in bold face and
premise underlined) (see also example (2) in sec-
tion 2). In example (5) the premise consists of two
sentences, because both sentences are needed to
represent and support the “different opinions” in
the claim.
(4) “Eating apples is healthy which has
to do with substrates which prevent can-
cer and other diseases.”
(5) “There are different opinions about
coffee. Some people say they need it to
stay awake. Other people think it’s un-
healthy.”
It is an open question if existing segmentation
approaches can be used for reliably identifying the
boundaries of argument components. In example
(4) we find two times the word “which”. This
makes it hard for a segmenter to split the sentence
correctly in only two parts. On the other hand,
the combination of sentences (example (5)) also
requires more elaborated techniques that are able
to identify sentences that are related and only form
in combination the support of a particular claim.
Context Dependence: The context is crucial
for identifying arguments, their components and
argumentation structures. As illustrated by Stab
and Gurevych (2014), it is even a hard task for hu-
man annotators to distinguish claims and premises
without being aware of the context. For instance,
the following three argument components consti-
tute a reasoning chain in which c is a premise for
b and b a premise for a:
(6) “Random locker checks should be
made obligatory.a Locker checks help
students stay both physically and men-
tally healthy.b It discourages students
from bringing firearms and especially
drugs.c”
In this argumentation structure, a can be clas-
sified as a claim. However, without being aware
of the argument component a, b becomes a claim
which is supported by premise c. The same situa-
tion can be found in example (3) in section 2. If we
look at the argument components b and c in isola-
tion, we can classify b as claim. However, looking
at the whole example, the argument component a
is the claim, supported by the premise b. The same
holds for the argument components c and a which
would be connected by a support relation if they
are considered in isolation. Both examples illus-
trate that the context is crucial for classifying ar-
gument components as claims or premises and for
identifying the argumentation structure. Although,
Stab and Gurevych (2014) proposed an annotation
process that facilitates these decisions in manual
annotation studies of persuasive essays, it is still
an open issue how to model the context in order to
improve the performance of automatic argumenta-
tion mining methods.
Ambiguity of Argumentation Structures:
The most important challenge for identifying argu-
mentation structures is ambiguity, since there are
often several possible interpretations of argumen-
tation structures which makes it hard or even im-
possible to identify one correct interpretation. In
previous examples, we have already seen that the
classification of argument components depends on
the context and the considered argument compo-
nents respectively. However, even if we consider
all components of an argument, there might be
several reasonable interpretations of its structure.
For instance, the structure of example (6) can be
interpreted in three different ways (figure 4). In the
first interpretation, the argument component c sup-
ports argument component b and argument com-
ponent b supports argument component a, whereas
in the second interpretation argument components
b and c both support argument component a. The
third interpretation contains all possible argumen-
tative relations from the first and second interpre-
tation combined, and thus represents a graph struc-
ture (in contrast to a tree structure).
The ambiguity of argumentation structures rep-
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Figure 4: Several interpretations of the argumen-
tation structure of example (6).
resents a major challenge for argument anno-
tation studies and consequently the creation of
reliable gold standards for argumentation min-
ing. In all annotation studies we know, exactly
one annotation is considered to be correct which
means that other possibly correct interpretations
are considered as incorrect and therefore down-
grade the results for the inter annotator agree-
ment and the performance of automatic classi-
fiers. Consequently, it might be interesting to
explore different evaluation methods. For in-
stance, evaluation schemes used in automatic text
summarization could be considered as an alterna-
tive. In text summarization, inter annotator agree-
ment for human-generated summaries is particu-
larly low, and hence, each human-generated sum-
mary is considered valid for evaluating an auto-
matic summarization system (Nenkova and McK-
eown, 2012).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that existing approaches
to argumentation mining mainly focus on the iden-
tification of argument components and largely ne-
glect the identification of argumentation struc-
tures, although this task is crucial for many
promising applications, e.g., for building novel ar-
gument related knowledge bases. By examining
several examples, we derived characteristic prop-
erties of argumentation structures. We discussed
the relation of discourse analysis and argumen-
tation structure and showed that previous works
in discourse analysis are not capable of identify-
ing argumentation structures, because discourse
relations do not cover all argumentative relations
and are limited to relations between adjacent text
units. Based on our observations, we derived three
challenges for encouraging future research, i.e.,
(i) identifying the boundaries of argument compo-
nents, (ii) modeling the context of argument com-
ponents and argumentative relations, and (iii) ad-
dressing the problem of ambiguous argumentation
structures. In particular, the ambiguity of argu-
mentation structure poses an important issue for
future work.
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Abstract
In argumentative political speech, the way
an issue is framed may indicate the un-
stated assumptions of the argument and
hence the ideological position of the
speaker. Our goal is to use and extend our
prior work on discourse parsing and the
identification of argumentation schemes to
identify specific instances of issue framing
and, more generally, ideological positions
as they are expressed in text. We are us-
ing annotated historical and contemporary
proceedings of the British, Canadian, and
Dutch parliaments, looking in particular at
speech on the topic of immigration.
1 Introduction
A key aspect of any argument is the unstated as-
sumptions and beliefs that underlie it. At bot-
tom, all naturally occurring arguments are en-
thymematic. Our research in argumentation has
the long-term goal of identifying these unstated
elements, both at the micro level — the spe-
cific unstated premises of an argument — and
at the macro level — the belief system or ide-
ology within which the entire argument is con-
structed, which may in turn contribute to its un-
stated premises (and also to any unstated conclu-
sions).
Our past research has concerned analysis of ar-
gumentation, and the related issue of determining
the rhetorical structure of discourse, at the micro
level. In this paper, we briefly describe this work.
We then describe our present and planned research
on ideology-based argumentation, including, in
particular, the identification of specific kinds of is-
sue framing and their role in ideological disagree-
ment.
Our research is part of the project Digging Into
Linked Parliamentary Data (“Dilipad”), an inter-
disciplinary tri-national project that is collecting
and richly annotating historical and contemporary
parliamentary proceedings of the U.K., Canada,
and the Netherlands for use in studies in political
science, political history, and other areas of social
science and linguistics.1 The project includes two
case studies on the identification of ideology, ideo-
logical frameworks, and argumentation in the data,
which we will describe below.
2 Argumentation analysis
The context for our initial research on argumenta-
tion (presented in detail by Feng and Hirst (2011))
was the early work of Mochales and Moens (2008;
2009a; 2009b), who focused on automatic detec-
tion of arguments in legal texts. With each sen-
tence represented as a vector of shallow features,
they trained a multinomial naı¨ve Bayes classifier
and a maximum entropy model on the Araucaria
corpus. In their follow-up work, they trained a
support vector machine to further classify each
argumentative clause into a premise or a conclu-
sion. In addition, they developed a context-free
grammar for argumentation structure parsing. Our
work is “downstream” from that of Mochales and
Moens. Assuming the eventual success of their, or
others’, research program on detecting and classi-
fying the components of an argument, we sought
to determine how the pieces fit together as an in-
stance of an argumentation scheme. This, in turn,
would be used, in future work, to understand the
argument and recover the unstated assumptions.
Figure 1 shows the structure of a complete posited
system, with our work addressing the part inside
the red dashed line.
Of Walton’s set of 65 argumentation schemes
(Walton et al., 2008), we focused on the five that
are most frequent in the Araucaria dataset (Reed
and Rowe, 2004; Rowe and Reed, 2008): ar-
1For more details of the project, including the other partic-
ipating institutions and researchers, see http://dilipad.
history.ac.uk
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Figure 1: Overall framework of our research on
argumentation schemes.
gument from example, argument from cause to
effect, practical reasoning, argument from con-
sequences, and argument from verbal classifica-
tion. Casting the problem as one of text classifica-
tion, we built a pruned C4.5 decision tree (Quin-
lan, 1993) for both one-against-others classifica-
tion of each scheme and for pairwise classification
of each possible pairing of schemes. We used a
variety of textual features, some of them specific
to a particular argument scheme and others iden-
tical across schemes. They ranged from specific
keywords and phrases to word-pair similarity be-
tween the premise and the conclusion, the starting
point of the premise or conclusion in its sentence,
and various syntactic dependency relations. Addi-
tionally, we used one feature that cannot at present
be automatically derived from text, but which we
assume may be determined by cues such as dis-
course relations: whether the argument is linked
or convergent; that is, whether or all just one of
the premises suffice for the conclusion.
Using Araucaria for both training and testing,
we achieved high accuracy in one-against-others
classification for argument from example and
practical reasoning: 90.6% and 90.8% (baseline is
50%). The accuracy of classification of argument
from cause to effect was just over 70%. However,
with the other two schemes (argument from conse-
quences and argument from verbal classification),
accuracy was only in the low 60s. This is probably
due at least partly to the fact that these schemes do
not have such obvious cue phrases or patterns as
the other three schemes, and therefore may require
more world knowledge, and also because the avail-
able training data for each in Araucaria was rela-
tively small (44 and 41 instances, respectively). In
pairwise classification, we were able to correctly
differentiate between most of the scheme pairs,
with accuracies as high as 98% (baseline is again
50%). Performance was poor (64.0%) only for ar-
gument from consequences against argument from
verbal classification — perhaps not coincidentally
the two schemes for which performance was poor-
est in the one-against-others task.
3 Discourse analysis for argumentation
analysis
The rhetorical or discourse structure of an argu-
mentative text contributes to (or is, in part, de-
termined by) the structure of the argument that
it expresses. Consequently, much of our recent
work has focused on discourse parsing, that is,
determining the hierarchical rhetorical structure of
the text: the logical relationships between sen-
tences. Following the tenets of Rhetorical Struc-
ture Theory (RST) (Mann and Thompson, 1988),
this is a tree structure that covers the text whose
leaves are the elementary discourse units (EDUs)
of text (roughly speaking, clauses and clause-like
constituents) and whose edges are the RST rela-
tions that hold between EDUs or spans of related
text. The set of relations include many that are
pertinent to the structure of argumentation, such
as CONTRAST, CAUSE, SUMMARY and ENABLE-
MENT. Also, as we noted above, an analysis of
discourse structure may help us to discriminate
convergent from linked arguments. So while an
RST structure is not an argumentation structure
per se, it clearly contains information that con-
tributes to building an argumentation structure.
Our research on discourse parsing has three
facets: improving the initial segmentation of text
into EDUs (Feng and Hirst, 2014b); improving
the parsing itself by using rich linguistic fea-
tures (Feng and Hirst, 2012); and technically im-
proving the parser both in accuracy and in effi-
ciency by separating the parsing of intra-sentence
and multi-sentence structures into separate pro-
cesses (following Joty et al. (2013)), and adding a
post-editing pass to each process (Feng and Hirst,
2014a). Bringing the improvements together, and
training and testing in the RST Discourse Tree-
bank (Carlson et al., 2001), we achieved an F1
score of 92.6% on discourse segmentation, and an
accuracy of 58.2% (against a baseline of 29.6%)2
on recognizing discourse relations on a gold-
standard segmentation.
Our next task will be to combine our discourse
parser with our earlier work on identifying argu-
mentation schemes. We will augment our classi-
fier with new features derived from the discourse
structure in order to improve its accuracy. We will
also use discourse structure features to improve
the upstream classification that feeds into the ar-
gumentation scheme classifier, and to begin the
task of further downstream analysis. In particu-
lar, this will include analysis of arguments to de-
termine the underlying ideology of a text.
4 Ideology and issue framing
Social scientists usually define ideology as a be-
lief system: “a configuration of ideas and attitudes
in which the elements are bound together by some
form of constraint or functional interdependence”
(Converse, 1964, p. 207). The left / right polit-
ical divide is a systematic and enduring ideolog-
ical cleavage that divides “the world of political
thought and action” in democratic countries (Bob-
bio, 1996). Systematic left / right differences ap-
pear in the voting records of politicians in legisla-
tive assemblies (Hix et al., 2006), in the election
platforms of political parties (Budge et al., 2001;
Klingemann et al., 2006), and in the patterns of
public opinion (Jost, 2006). The left / right divide
is so pervasive and enduring that many now won-
der whether these political differences are mani-
festations of deeply rooted, and perhaps heritable,
psychological traits (Alford et al., 2005; Carney
et al., 2008; Haidt, 2012).
Several computational studies have looked at
the question of whether a political speaker’s ide-
ological position on the left / right spectrum can
2This is the majority baseline of always labeling the re-
sulting subtree with the relation ELABORATION with the cur-
rent span as the nucleus and the next span as the satellite.
be determined just from a quantitative analysis of
the vocabulary that they use — both from the way
they talk about particular topics and (in some con-
texts) from the topics that they tend to talk about
(Lin et al., 2006; Mullen and Malouf, 2006; Yu
et al., 2008; Diermeier et al., 2012; Zirn, 2014).
Typically, these studies attempt to induce a clas-
sifier from word-frequency vectors. Results have
been mixed; for example, extreme positions in the
U.S. Congress can be distinguished from those of
the other side — sometimes by the use of topic-
dependent shibboleths such as gay (liberal Demo-
crat) or homosexual (conservative Republican) —
but more-moderate positions cannot be (Yu et al.,
2008).
In our earlier work (Hirst et al., 2010; Hirst
et al., 2014), we showed that the U.S. results do
not apply to the Canadian Parliament. On one
hand, we were able to classify party membership
more reliably overall than the U.S. research did,
but on the other hand we also showed that dis-
tinctions in the vocabulary of the speakers de-
pend far more upon whether their party was in
government or in opposition than upon their ide-
ological position. The differences reflect primar-
ily defence (government) and attack (opposition),
a feature inherent to parliamentary governments
in general, and especially to the Canadian parlia-
ment where party discipline is particularly strict
(Savoie, 1999). When we applied classification
methods based on word-frequency to the proceed-
ings of the European Parliament, in which the
factor of government–opposition status is absent,
we achieved a more-accurate ideological classi-
fication of speakers from the five major parties
across the left / right spectrum (Hirst et al., 2014).
This confounding role of institutions on left / right
differences align with what others have recently
uncovered in cross-national analysis of legislative
voting patterns (Hix and Noury, 2013).
Casual observers of politics recognize left /
right differences when they see them, but even ex-
perts struggle to define these terms. The root of
the problem is the effort to define left and right by
reducing each side to a single idea or “essential
core”. The morphology of left and right is incon-
sistent with such a specification. Rather, left and
right describe “family resemblances” between the
systems of political ideas that actors on each side
advance on the questions of political disagreement
(Cochrane, 2014). Although no single idea de-
fines the left or the right, ideas are more or less
central to one of these resemblances to the ex-
tent that they are more common among the be-
lief systems of actors that are inside each category
than they are among the beliefs systems of actors
that are outside each category. From this van-
tage point, the central ideas on the political left are
commitments to equality, pacifism, and, more re-
cently, the environment. The distinguishing ideas
on the right are support for capitalist economic or-
thodoxy, law and order, and patriotic militarism
(Cochrane, 2014). The differences between polit-
ical parties in their support for these ideas explain
more than two-thirds of the variation in how cit-
izens and experts position the parties on a left /
right dimension (Cochrane, 2014).
The “content” of a belief system is the set of
preferences that an actor harbours about political
issues. The “structure” of a belief system is the
way in which an actor puts different political is-
sues together into bundles of constrained prefer-
ences. Actors that think about politics from the
vantage point of altogether different ideas not only
disagree in their positions on issues, they also dis-
agree in their views of how different issues fit to-
gether logically in the political world around them.
Thus, the content and the structure of belief sys-
tems varies on the left and the right (Cochrane,
2013).
Because of these differences, individuals from
different ideological positions will often frame
things differently in argumentation on any partic-
ular issue. For example, on the issue of how much
immigration should be allowed into their country,
one person might frame the argument as one of
economic benefit or detriment, a second person as
one of the benefits or problems of multicultural-
ism, and a third person as one of social justice.3
These differences will be reflected in the vocabu-
lary that each of these people uses, which accounts
for the results presented above on identifying ide-
ology based on vocabulary alone; in the absence
of confounding factors, as we saw most clearly in
the case of the European Parliament, vocabulary is
a strong indicator all by itself.
So we see that the framing of an issue by a
speaker in an argumentative text is not, ultimately,
a linguistic entity; it’s an ideological viewpoint or
perspective: a set of beliefs, assumptions and pre-
3Immigration is in fact the particular topic on which we
will conduct our case study on the framing of arguments; see
section 5 below.
compiled arguments.4 Nonetheless, for automatic
text analysis, quantifiable semantic characteristics
of the speaker’s presentation of a position are in-
dicators or proxies of the framing, which can then
be interpreted qualitatively (by a human). In a sim-
ple analysis, this might be a statistical analysis of
the key concepts of the text, as denoted by con-
tent words, significant collocations of words, and
syntactic structures, much as in the simple text-
classification–based ideology studies mentioned
above, or a topic-model–based analysis, as in the
work of Nguyen et al. (2013).
In our research, however, we are also propos-
ing a novel, more-sophisticated analysis in which
we also look at the actual argumentation structures
and discourse relationships of the text and how
the concepts adduced by the lower-level linguis-
tic components are used in these structures. We
will describe these proposals in the next section.
5 Argumentation and issue framing in
parliamentary speech
Left / right speech is a subset of ideological speech
more generally. Ideological speech is a subset
of political speech more generally. As we noted
above, previous analyses of political speech at-
tempt to induce left / right classifiers from anal-
yses of vocabulary across all of the many top-
ics of discussion in a dataset. But this ap-
proach disregards the results of an extensive body
of political science research that analyzes left /
right ideological disagreement in legislative vot-
ing records (Poole and Rosenthal, 2007; Hix and
Noury, 2013), party election manifestos (Budge
et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006), and opin-
ions (Jost, 2006). A key finding from these studies
concerns the varying centrality of specific actors,
ideas, and topics to left / right political disagree-
ment. Some actors are more central to the left or
to the right than are other actors. Some ideas are
more central to the left or to the right than are other
ideas. Left / right disagreements implicate some
political issues and not others. This provides an
informative prior for models that seek to uncover
left / right differences from the patterns of vocabu-
4A fortiori, framing is a political action: “Framing es-
sentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to se-
lect some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item de-
scribed” (Entman, 1993). But here, we focus on the linguistic
and argumentative aspects of framing.
lary and argumentation in political text. The like-
lihood that speech conveys information about left /
right argumentation is a function of the speaker
and the topic.
Thus, the goal of our work, broadly speaking, is
to develop computational models for the automatic
analysis of ideology and issue framing in politi-
cal speech that are better informed than the simple
vocabulary-based models and that draw on auto-
matic discourse parsing and automatic analysis of
argumentation as their primary mechanism. We
would like to look more narrowly and more deeply
at argumentation on specific issues by individuals
across the left / right spectrum, and develop au-
tomatic methods of analysis that will identify, or
help analysts to identify, different frames and ide-
ological positions. Our “help to” hedge reflects
the difficulty of the goal and the context of our
research as part of a much-larger project that is
building datasets and tools to assist political sci-
entists and political historians in their analyses.
The primary data for our work is the annotated
parliamentary proceedings, from the present back
to the mid-1800s or earlier, that are being pro-
duced by the Dilipad project (see section 1 above),
from which we will draw speech5 on specific top-
ics for diachronic and cross-national analysis of
argumentation and framing. Immigration is a topic
of special interest here, as it has been an important
and recurring issue since the nineteenth century in
all three participating countries. We hope to iden-
tify national and temporal differences and similar-
ities in the frames used to discuss the issue.
In our models, we will bring together, and ex-
tend, the work on discourse parsing and argu-
mentation scheme identification described in sec-
tions 2 and 3 above. Although these techniques
are far from perfect, we hypothesize that typical
political speech contains a sufficiently well-cued
discourse structure that the analyses that we can
achieve, although still quite imperfect, will be use-
fully indicative of issue framing and other ideo-
logical signals, and will be more immune to con-
founding factors, such as the attack-and-defence
dynamics of parliamentary debates, than simple
vocabulary classification. In particular, we will
use features from discourse units and rhetorical re-
5Although we refer to political and parliamentary speech
and speakers, as is conventional, we are working only with
the published textual transcriptions of the parliamentary de-
bates. We are not using audio data or any kind of automatic
speech recognition.
lations to find claims and analyze the reasoning
structure that is used to justify, support, and derive
the claims. In addition, we will take into account
how the concepts adduced by lower-level linguis-
tic components — phrases, syntactic dependency
structures — are used in the actual argumenta-
tion structures and discourse relationships of the
text. We hope to be able to recognize instances of
known frames in the text, and possibly even dis-
cover new ones. Because we will be developing
deeper and hence more tentative methods of com-
putational linguistic analysis, we do not expect to
provide a complete automated analysis of text in
the first instance, but rather to provide data that
can then be interpreted by a human analyst.
In parallel with this approach, we will also de-
velop text-classification methods for identifying
ideological positions in speech that will look be-
yond vocabulary and also take into consideration
frequent collocations and lexicalized syntactic de-
pendency structures as features. This will allow
us to include differences in the way that particular
words are used (even where speakers use the word
with the same frequency) as a feature of the clas-
sification. This will provide a new, higher base-
line against which the results of the discourse- and
argumentation-based analysis can be evaluated. It
may also provide information that can itself be a
component of that analysis. In addition, the words,
collocations, and dependency structures that are
most informative for classification will, as with
our other methods, be available for human inter-
pretation.
6 Conclusion
Our work focuses on the structure of discourse
and arguments to better understand ideological po-
sitions and issue framing through their linguistic
realizations. By applying discourse parsing and
the analysis of argumentation to parliamentary de-
bates, we hope to determine how speakers with
various ideologies argue on a range of issues. Ide-
ologies are manifested not only by the vocabu-
laries used, but also by how the differing beliefs
of political speakers lead to different framing of
issues. Ideology detection can therefore benefit
from argumentation and discourse analysis tech-
niques.
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Abstract
Argumentation Theory provides a very
powerful set of principles, ideas and mod-
els. Yet, in this paper we will show that
its fundamental principles unsatisfactorily
explain real-world human argumentation
and should be adapted. We will present
an extensive empirical study on the incom-
patibility of abstract argumentation and
human argumentative behavior, followed
by practical expansion of existing models.
1 Introduction
Argumentation Theory has developed rapidly
since Dung’s seminal work (Dung, 1995). There
has been extensive work extending Dung’s frame-
work and semantics; Value Argumentation Frame-
work (VAF) (Bench-Capon et al., 2002), Bipo-
lar Argumentation Framework (BAF) (Cayrol and
Lagasquie-Schiex, 2005) and Weighted Argumen-
tation Framework (WAF) (Dunne et al., 2011) to
name a few. All reasonable frameworks and se-
mantics rely on the same fundamental notions:
Conflict Freedom, Acceptability, Extensions from
(Dung, 1995), and expand upon them in some
way. One more notion, which was not addressed
in (Dung, 1995), Support, has been increasingly
gaining attention (Boella et al., 2010). Overall, the
same principals and ideas have prevailed for many
years.
All of these models and semantics try to pro-
vide a normative approach to argumentation, i.e,
how argumentation should work from a logical
standard. From a descriptive point of view, the
study of (Rahwan et al., 2010), where the authors
investigated the reinstatement principle in behav-
ioral experiments, is the only experimental study,
as far as we know, that tested argumentation in
the field. Nevertheless, many argumentative tools
have been developed over time; MIT’s delibrium
(Klein, 2011), Araucaria (Reed and Rowe, 2004),
ArgTrust (Tang et al., 2012) and Web-Based Intel-
ligent Collaborative System (Liu et al., 2007), that
try to provide systems where people can handle
argumentative situations in a coherent and valid
way. We believe that these argumentative tools
and others, as efficient and attractive as they might
be, have a difficult time attracting users outside the
academia due to the gap between the Argumenta-
tion Theory and the human argumentative behav-
ior, which, as previously stated, has not been ad-
dressed in the context of Argumentation Theory
thus far.
In order to further develop argumentative ap-
plications and agents, we conducted a novel em-
pirical study, with hundreds of human subjects,
showing the incompatibility between some of the
fundamental ideas, stated above, and human argu-
mentation. In an attempt to mimic and understand
the human argumentative process, these inconsis-
tencies, which appear even in the weakest argu-
mentative requirements as conflict freedom, pose
a large concern for theoreticians and practitioners
alike. Our findings indicate that the fundamental
notions are not good predictive features of peo-
ple’s actions. A possible solution is also presented
which provided better results in explaining peo-
ple’s arguments than the existing theory. This so-
lution, which we call Relevance, captures a per-
ceptual distance between arguments. That is, how
one argument affects another and how this affect
is comprehended by a reasoner. Relevance also
holds a predicatory value as shown in recent work
(Rosenfeld and Kraus, 2014).
This article’s main contribution is in showing
that the Argumentation Theory has difficulties in
explaining a big part of the human argumentative
behavior, in an extensive human study. Secondly,
the proposed notion of relevance could in turn pro-
vide the argumentation community with an addi-
tional tool to investigate the existing theory and
semantics.
2 Dung’s Fundamental Notions
Argumentation is the process of supporting claims
with grounds and defending them against attacks.
Without explicitly specifying the underlying lan-
guage (natural language, first order logic. . . ), ar-
gument structure or attack/support relations, Dung
has designed an abstract argumentation framework
(Dung, 1995). This framework, combined with
proposed semantics (reasoning rules), enables a
reasoner to cope and reach conclusions in an en-
vironment of arguments that may conflict, support
and interact with each other. These arguments may
vary in their grounds and validity.
Definition 1. A Dungian Argumentation Frame-
work (AF) is a pair < A,R >, where A is a set of
arguments and R is an attack relation over A×A.
Conflict-Free: A set of arguments S is conflict-
free if there are no arguments a and b in S such
that aRb holds.
Acceptable: An argument a ∈ A is considered ac-
ceptable w.r.t a set of arguments S iff ∀b.bRa →
∃c ∈ S.cRb.
Admissible: A set S is considered admissible iff
it is conflict-free, and each argument in S is ac-
ceptable with respect to S.
Dung also defined several semantics by which,
given an AF , one can derive the sets of arguments
that should be considered Justified (to some ex-
tent). These sets are called Extensions. The differ-
ent extenstions capture different notions of justifi-
cation where some are more strict than others.
Definition 2. An extension S ⊆ A is a set of ar-
guments that satisfies some rules of reasoning.
Complete Extension: E is a complete extension
ofA iff it is an admissible set and every acceptable
argument with respect to E belongs to E.
Preferred Extension: E is a preferred-extension
in A iff it is a maximal (with respect to set inclu-
sion) admissible set of arguments.
Stable Extension: E is a stable-extension in A
iff it is a conflict-free set that attacks every ar-
gument that does not belong in E. Formally,
∀a ∈ A\E,∃b ∈ S such that bRa.
Grounded Extension: E is the (unique) grounded
extension of A iff it is the smallest element (with
respect to the inclusion) among the complete ex-
tensions of A.
Definition 3. Similar to the attack relation R, one
can consider a separate relation S which indicates
Figure 1: An example of a Bipolar Argumenta-
tion Framework; nodes are arguments, arrows in-
dicate attacks and arrows with diagonal lines indi-
cate support.
Support (Amgoud et al., 2008). A supporting ar-
gument can also be viewed as a part of another ar-
gument internal structure. These two options only
differ in the AF structure; the reasoning outcome
is not influenced. The support relation was intro-
duced in order to better represent realistic knowl-
edge.
Let us consider the following example;
Example.
During a discussion between reporters,R1 andR2,
about the publication of information I concerning
person X , the following arguments are presented:
R1: I is important information, thus we must pub-
lish it.
R2: I concerns the personX , whereX is a private
person and we cannot publish information about a
private person without his consent.
If you were R1, what would you say next?
A. X is a minister, so X is a public person, not a
private person.
B. X has resigned, so X is no longer a minister.
C. His resignation has been refused by the chief of
the government.
D. This piece is exclusive to us; If we publish it
we can attain a great deal of appreciation from our
readers.
See Figure 1 for a graphical representation.
In this example, all mentioned semantics agree
on a single (unique) extension which consists of
all arguments except ”Resigned” (option B) and
”Private Person” (R2’s argument). Thus, all ar-
guments except ”Resigned” and ”Private person”
should be considered Justified, regardless of the
choice of semantics.
Argumentation Theory consists of many more
ideas and notions, yet the very fundamental ones
stated above are the focus of this work.
3 Real Dialogs Experiment
To get a deeper understanding of the relations be-
tween people’s behaviour in argumentation and
the stated notions, we used real argumentative
conversations from Penn Treebank Corpus (1995)
(Marcus et al., 1993) of transcribed telephone
calls and a large number of chats collected to-
ward this aim. The Penn Treebank Corpus con-
sists of transcribed phone calls on various top-
ics, among them some controversial topics such as
”Should the death penalty be implemented?” and
”Should a trial be decided by a judge or jury?”,
with which we chose to begin. We went through
all 33 dialogs on ”Capital Punishment” and 31 di-
alogs on ”Trial by Jury” to identify the arguments
used in them and cleared all irrelevant sentences
(i.e, greetings, unrelated talk etc.). The short-
est deliberation consisted of 3 arguments and the
longest one comprised of 15 arguments (a mean of
7). To these dialogs we added another 157 online
chats on ”Would you get an influenza vaccination
this winter?” collected from Israeli students, ages
ranging from 19 to 32 (mean=24), using a chat in-
terface we implemented. We constructed 3 BAFs,
similar to the one in Figure 1, using the arguments
extracted from 5 randomly selected conversations.
Each conversation which was not selected for the
BAF construction was then annotated using the ar-
guments in the BAFs. All in all, we had 64 phone
conversations and 157 online chats, totaling 221,
all of which are of argumentative nature.
Every conversation provided us with 2 argu-
ment sets A1 and A2, both subsets of A. We tested
every Ai (i = 1, 2) such that |Ai| ≥ 3 in order to
avoid almost completely trivial sets.
Participants were not expected to be aware of
all arguments in the BAF, as they were not pre-
sented to them. Thus, in testing the Admissibility
of Ai and whether Ai is a part of some Extension,
we examined both the original BAF and the re-
stricted BAF induced by A1 ∪ A2. That is, the ar-
gumentation framework in which A = A1 ∪ A2
and the attack and support relations are defined
over A1 ∪A2 ×A1 ∪A2, denoted as AF↓A1∪A2 .
3.1 Results
The first property we tested was Conflict-Freedom,
which is probably the weakest requirement of a
set of arguments. We had anticipated that all Ai
would have this property, yet only 78% of the de-
liberants used a conflict-free set Ai. Namely, that
22% of the deliberants used at least 2 conflict-
ing arguments, i.e, one attacks the other. From
a purely logical point of view, the use of con-
flicting arguments is very grating. Yet, we know
that some people try to portray themselves as bal-
anced and unbiased, and as such use contradic-
tory arguments to show that they can consider
both ends of the argument and can act as good ar-
bitrators. When we examined Acceptability, we
tested if every argument a ∈ Ai is acceptable w.r.t
Ai \ {a}. We found that 58% of the deliberants
followed this rule. Admissibility was tested ac-
cording to both the original framework and the re-
stricted framework. Merely 28% of the Ais used
are considered admissible w.r.t the original frame-
work, while more than 49% qualify when consid-
ering the restricted BAF. We can see that people
usually do not make the extra effort to ensure that
their argument-set is admissible. A possible ex-
planation can be values (norms and morals), as de-
scribed in (Bench-Capon et al., 2002). Given a set
of values, a reasoner may not recognize the attack-
ing arguments as defeating arguments as they ad-
vocate a weaker value. As such, the reasoner con-
siders his set admissible. A similar explanation is
provided in (Dunne et al., 2011), where a reasoner
can assign a small weight to the attacking argu-
ments and as such still consider his set admissi-
ble. These explanations can also partially account
for the disheartening results in the test of Exten-
sions. When examining the original framework,
less than 30% of Ais used were a part of some ex-
tension, with Preferred, Grounded and Stable per-
forming very similarly (28%, 30%, 25%). When
considering the restricted framework, 49%, 50%
and 37% of the deliberants used Ais that were
part of some extension prescribed by Preferred,
Grounded and Stable (respectively) under the re-
stricted BAF. As for Support, 27% of the argu-
ments selected were supporting arguments, i.e, ar-
guments which do not attack any other argument
in the framework. Although they cannot change
the reasoning outcomes, people naturally consider
the supporting arguments, which traditionally are
not considered ”powerful”.
To strengthen our findings we performed yet an-
other experiment. We tested the notions in a con-
trolled and structured environment, where the par-
ticipant is aware of all arguments in the frame-
work.
4 Structured Argumentative Scenarios
We collected 6 fictional scenarios, based on known
argumentative examples from the literature (Wal-
ton, 2005; Liu et al., 2007; Cayrol and Lagasquie-
Schiex, 2005; Amgoud et al., 2008; Tang et al.,
2012).
Two groups of subjects took part in this study;
the first consisted of 64 US citizens, all of whom
are workers of Amazon Mechanical Turk, ages
ranging from 19 to 69 (mean=38, s.d=13.7) with
varying demographics. The second consisted of
78 computer science B.Sc. students from Bar-Ilan
University (Israel), ages ranging from 18 to 37
(mean=25, s.d=3.7) with similar demographics.
Each subject was presented with the 6 scenar-
ios. Each scenario was presented in a short textual
dialog between 2 participants, similar to the jour-
nalists’ example above. The subject was instructed
to place himself in one of the deliberants’ roles,
given the partial conversation, and to choose the
next argument he would use from the four avail-
able arguments. We instructed the subject to con-
sider only the arguments in the dialog and the pro-
posed ones, and refrain from assuming any other
information or possible arguments in the dialog’s
context.
The following example, based on (Liu et al.,
2007), was presented to the subjects;
Example.
A couple is discussing whether or not to buy an
SUV.
Spouse number 1 (S1): ”We should buy an SUV;
it’s the right choice for us”.
Spouse number 2 (S2): ”But we can’t afford an
SUV, it’s too expensive”.
The participant was then asked to put himself in
S1’s shoes and choose the next argument to use
in the conversation. The options were: A. ”Good
car loan programs are available from a bank”, B.
”The interest rates on car loans will be high”’, C.
”SUVs are very safe, safety is very important to
us”, D. ”There are high taxes on SUVs”.
See Figure 2 for a graphical representation of the
aforementioned framework.
The distribution of selections in the above ex-
Figure 2: SUV example of BAF
ample was as follows; A.35%, B.24%, C.8%, D.
33%. There is only one (unique) extension in this
scenario which includes ”High interest” and ”high
taxes”. Especially when considering ”Taking out a
loan”, it should be considered overruled (unjusti-
fied/invalid), or at least very weak, as it is attacked
by an undisputed argument. As we can see, only
slightly over half of the subjects choose an argu-
ment from the extension, i.e, a somewhat Justified
argument.
4.1 Results
The distribution of selections, in all scenarios, sug-
gests that there could be different factors in play,
which differ from one subject to another. Thus,
there is no decisive answer to what a person would
say next. Unfortunately, testing Conflict Freedom
and Admissibility is inapplicable here. None of
the subjects was offered an argument that conflicts
with its previous one and could not choose more
than one argument to construct an admissible set.
When examining Extensions, all scenarios which
were presented to the subject are Well Founded
(that is to say, there exists no infinite sequence
a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . such that ∀i.(ai, ai+1) ∈ R).
As such, all mentioned semantics coincide - only
one extension is Grounded, Stable and Preferred.
Of the 6 scenarios, 5 had suggested 2 justified ar-
guments and 2 overruled arguments (arguments
which are not part of any extension) to the sub-
ject. In these 5 scenarios, 67.3% of the time a jus-
tified argument was selected (on average). This
result is disappointing since 50% is achieved by
randomly selecting arguments. As for Support,
49.4% of the arguments selected were supporting
arguments, i.e, arguments which do not attack any
other argument in the framework. Even more in-
teresting is that 80% of the time people chose (di-
rectly or indirectly) an argument supporting their
first argument. This phenomenon can be regarded
as a Confirmation Bias, which is recorded in many
fields (Nickerson, 1998). Confirmation bias is a
phenomenon wherein people have been shown to
actively seek and assign more weight to evidence
that confirms their beliefs, and ignore or under-
weigh evidence that could disconfirm their beliefs.
Confirmation Bias can also explain the persistence
of discredited beliefs, i.e, why people continue to
consider an argument valid/invalid despite its log-
ical argumentative status. Here it is extremely in-
teresting since the subjects only played a role and
it was not really their original argument. There is a
strong tension between the Confirmation Bias and
Extensions. In some scenarios the subject is given
a situation in which he ”already used” an overruled
argument, and therefore had a problem advocating
it by using a supporting argument.
We had anticipated that in finite and simple ar-
gumentative frameworks people would naturally
choose the ”right” arguments, yet we again see
that the argumentative principals unsatisfactorily
explain people’s argumentative selections. This is
not a complete surprise, since we have many ex-
amples in the literature where people do not ad-
here to the optimal, monolithic strategies that can
be derived analytically (Camerer, 2003).
We have shown here, in two separate experi-
ments, that a similar phenomenon occurs in the
context of argumentation - people do not choose
”ideal” arguments according to the Argumentation
Theory.
5 Relevance
It is well known that human cognition is limited, as
seen in many examples in (Faust, 1984) and oth-
ers. In chess for example, it is common to think
that a beginner can consider about 3 moves ahead
and a master about 6. If we consider the argu-
mentation process as a game (McBurney and Par-
sons, 2009), a player (an arguer) cannot fully com-
prehend all possible moves (arguments) and their
utility (justification status) before selecting a move
(argument to use) when the game (framework) is
complex. The depth and branching factor limita-
tions of the search algorithms are of course per-
sonal. For example, we would expect an educated
adult to be able to better consider her arguments
than a small child.
Definition 4. Let a,b be arguments in some AF .
Rel : A → P (A) is a personal relevance func-
tion which given argument a ∈ A (for evalua-
tion) returns a set of arguments A′ ⊆ A which
are, given the reasoner’s cognitive limitations and
knowledge, relevant to a. Using Rel, we can
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant argu-
ments w.r.t a given argument, yet we gain addi-
tional strength in incorporating the reasoner’s lim-
itation and biases.
We denote the restriction of AF to arguments
relevant to a as AF ↓Rel(a)≡< A′, R′ > where
A′ = Rel(a) and R′ = A′ ×A′ ∩R.
On AF ↓Rel(a) one can deploy any semantic of
choice.
The simplest way to instantiate the Rel is
Rel(·) = A, meaning that all arguments in the
AF are relevant to the given argument. This in-
stantiation is the way the classic frameworks ad-
dress the reasoner’s limitations, simply by saying
– there are none. As shown in (Liao and Huang,
2013), it is not necessary to discover the status of
all arguments in order to evaluate a specific argu-
ment/set of arguments. Thus, considering Rel(a)
as the maximal set of affecting arguments (argu-
ments in which their status affects the status of a)
is another natural way to consider relevance, yet
without considering cognitive limitations.
We suggest the following instantiation, which
we examined empirically.
Definition 5. Let D(a, b) be a distance function,
which given arguments a, b returns the directed
distance from argument a to b in AF ’s graph.
Given a distance measurement D we can define
an edge-relevance function as follows:
Definition 6. RelD(a) = {b|D(b, a) ≤ k} where
k is a non-negative constant.
Naturally, when setting k to 0, every argument
a is considered justified in AF↓RelD(a) (under any
semantics). k can be thought of as a depth limita-
tion for the search algorithm used by the reasoner.
Of course, if k =∞, AF↓RelD(a)= {All affecting
arguments on a}.
5.1 Empirical Testing
We used several D functions in our work on
predicting arguments given a partial conversation
(Rosenfeld and Kraus, 2014). When k = 0, as
stated above all arguments should be considered
justified. Analyzing the free-form dialogs using
Grounded semantics with k = 2 resulted in 72%
of the arguments used being part of some exten-
sion, whereas without relevance a little less than
50% was part of some extension.
Relevance provides a way to rationally justify
every argument within an AF to some extent. Un-
like VAF (Bench-Capon et al., 2002) and WAF
(Dunne et al., 2011), which rely on exogenous
knowledge about values and weights from the rea-
soner, relevance can be instantiated without any
prior knowledge on the reasoner and still offer a
better explanatory analysis of the framework.
6 Conclusions
We presented an empirical study, with over 400
human subjects and 250 annotated dialogs. Our
results, based on both free-form human deliber-
ations and structured experiments, show that the
fundamental principles of Argumentation Theory
cannot explain a large part of the human argumen-
tative behavior. Thus, Argumentation Theory, as it
stands, should not be assumed to have descriptive
or predicatory qualities when it is implemented
with people.
Our relevance notion provides a new way to
rationalize arguments without prior knowledge
about the reasoner. Relevance, as well as other
psychological and social aspects, should be ex-
plored to better fit the Argumentation Theory to
human behavior. This required step is crucial to
the integration of argumentation in different hu-
man domains.
References
Leila Amgoud, Claudette Cayrol, Marie-Christine
Lagasquie-Schiex, and Pierre Livet. 2008. On bipo-
larity in argumentation frameworks. International
Journal of Intelligent Systems, 23(10):1062–1093.
Trevor JM Bench-Capon, Sylvie Doutre, and Paul E
Dunne. 2002. Value-based argumentation frame-
works. In Artificial Intelligence.
Guido Boella, Dov M Gabbay, Leendert WN van der
Torre, and Serena Villata. 2010. Support in abstract
argumentation. In COMMA, pages 111–122.
Colin Camerer. 2003. Behavioral game theory: Exper-
iments in strategic interaction. Princeton University
Press.
Claudette Cayrol and Marie-Christine Lagasquie-
Schiex. 2005. On the acceptability of arguments
in bipolar argumentation frameworks. In Symbolic
and quantitative approaches to reasoning with un-
certainty, pages 378–389. Springer.
Phan Minh Dung. 1995. On the acceptability of ar-
guments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic
reasoning, logic programming and n-person games.
Artificial intelligence, 77(2):321–357.
Paul E Dunne, Anthony Hunter, Peter McBurney, Si-
mon Parsons, and Michael Wooldridge. 2011.
Weighted argument systems: Basic definitions, al-
gorithms, and complexity results. Artificial Intelli-
gence, 175(2):457–486.
David Faust. 1984. The limits of scientific reasoning.
U of Minnesota Press.
Mark Klein. 2011. How to harvest collective wisdom
on complex problems: An introduction to the mit
deliberatorium. Center for Collective Intelligence
working paper.
Beishui Liao and Huaxin Huang. 2013. Partial seman-
tics of argumentation: basic properties and empiri-
cal. Journal of Logic and Computation, 23(3):541–
562.
Xiaoqing Frank Liu, Samir Raorane, and Ming C Leu.
2007. A web-based intelligent collaborative system
for engineering design. In Collaborative product de-
sign and manufacturing methodologies and applica-
tions, pages 37–58. Springer.
Mitchell P Marcus, Mary Ann Marcinkiewicz, and
Beatrice Santorini. 1993. Building a large anno-
tated corpus of english: The penn treebank. Compu-
tational linguistics, 19(2):313–330.
Peter McBurney and Simon Parsons. 2009. Dialogue
games for agent argumentation. In Argumentation
in artificial intelligence, pages 261–280. Springer.
Raymond S Nickerson. 1998. Confirmation bias: A
ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of
general psychology, 2(2):175.
Iyad Rahwan, Mohammed I Madakkatel, Jean-
Franc¸ois Bonnefon, Ruqiyabi N Awan, and Sherief
Abdallah. 2010. Behavioral experiments for as-
sessing the abstract argumentation semantics of re-
instatement. Cognitive Science, 34(8):1483–1502.
Chris Reed and Glenn Rowe. 2004. Araucaria: Soft-
ware for argument analysis, diagramming and repre-
sentation. International Journal on Artificial Intelli-
gence Tools, 13(04):961–979.
Ariel Rosenfeld and Sarit Kraus. 2014. Provid-
ing arguments in discussions based on the predic-
tion of human argumentative behavior. Unpublished
manuscript.
Yuqing Tang, Elizabeth Sklar, and Simon Parsons.
2012. An argumentation engine: Argtrust. In Ninth
International Workshop on Argumentation in Multi-
agent Systems.
Douglas N Walton. 2005. Argumentation methods for
artificial intelligence in law. Springer.
Legal Argumentation Concerning Almost Identical Expressions (AIE) 
In Statutory Texts 
 
 
Michał Araszkiewicz 
Department of Legal Theory 
Jagiellonian University 
Bracka 12, 31-005 Kraków, Poland 
michal.araszkiewicz@uj.edu.pl 
Agata Łopatkiewicz 
Institute of Education 
Jagiellonian University 
Stefana Batorego 12, 31-135 Kraków, Poland 
agata.lopatkiewicz@uj.edu.pl 
 
 
 
  
 
Abstract 
This paper deals with the problem of rea-
soning with synonymic expressions in the 
domain of statutory law. It is shown that, 
even in cases of strong lexical synonymy 
(what is referred to here as ‘Almost Iden-
tical Expressions’), it is necessary to en-
gage in complicated argumentative struc-
tures in order to obtain justified conclu-
sions concerning the mutual interreplace-
ability of legal terms. This result has im-
plications for the methods adopted in re-
search on the automated analysis of the 
corpora of legal texts. 
1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the phenome-
non of legal argumentation that makes use of al-
most identical expressions extracted from statu-
tory texts. It is often the case that a lawmaker 
makes use of expressions A and B in statutory 
rules, where A and B have such a similar meaning 
that they would be presumably treated as strictly 
synonymic by a native speaker of a language. 
Therefore, a native speaker of a language would 
be inclined to assign identical consequences to 
states of affairs designated by expressions A and 
B. The similarity between the mentioned expres-
sions seems to constitute grounds for the applica-
tion of arguments based on plain meaning and 
analogy. However, there exist certain rationality 
assumptions behind the making of laws leading to 
the conclusion that, if two expressions are not 
                                                 
1 The WordNet project involves the notion of synsets: sets 
of cognitive synonyms that represent certain concepts. 
strictly identical, they should be treated as differ-
ent by the addressee of the statutory regulation. 
These two argumentative stances point out incon-
sistent solutions and, therefore, may cause diver-
gent opinions concerning the rights and obliga-
tions of addressees of the law. Therefore, the in-
vestigation of this phenomenon is important for 
the sake of legal policy matters. However, the 
analysis of argumentation encompassing almost 
identical expressions is also of crucial importance 
for the development of legal knowledge-based 
systems. Such systems should take into account 
that the relation of synonymy between linguistic 
expressions should be treated more carefully than 
in less formal contexts of discourse in order to 
avoid oversimplifications and potentially wrong 
suggestions to the user. 
2 The Notion of Synonymy 
Synonymy has always been considered one of the 
most basic semantic relations between linguistic 
expressions (for instance, Murphy 2003). The re-
lation is also useful in contemporary research on 
Natural Language Processing 1  (see also Hirst 
2004). Although synonymy is generally ac-
counted for as similarity of meaning, in special-
ised contexts, this account is insufficient because 
of notorious problems concerning the understand-
ing of notions regarding ‘similarity’ and ‘mean-
ing’. 
Due to these problems, the relation of synon-
ymy has been a subject of interest for linguistic 
philosophers. A classic contribution to the debate 
is a paper by Goodman (1949), in which he argues 
than no two non-identical words can have the 
same meaning. Instead of the theory of synonymy 
http://wordnet.princeton.edu, accessed on September 24, 
2014. 
as ‘sameness of meaning’, he advocated a theory 
of ‘likeness of meaning’, according to which two 
names of predicates may be treated as synonyms 
if their meaning is similar enough to warrant the 
thesis of their ‘sameness’, or mutual interreplace-
ability, in certain contexts of discourse. The crite-
ria used here may vary from one context to an-
other (Goodman 1949, 7). 
As with any philosophical thesis, Goodman’s 
proposal remained controversial in the literature 
of the subject (for a relatively recent contribution, 
see Heydrich 1993). The philosophical discussion 
of synonymy is deeply connected with such topics 
as analyticity and necessity. For obvious reasons, 
we cannot investigate these extremely compli-
cated issues here (see Soames 2003). However, 
we claim that Goodman’s thesis captures an im-
portant insight into the pragmatic dimensions of 
synonymy: two linguistic expressions, A and B, 
may be seen as mutually interreplaceable in the 
context of discourse C1 while they could be as-
sessed as different (and, therefore, not mutual sub-
stitutions) in the context of discourse C2. The re-
lation of synonymy depends on the context of as-
sessment regarding this relation. 
Philosophical controversies notwithstanding, 
the notion of synonymy is widely used in lexicog-
raphy, and the existence of thesauri and dictionar-
ies of synonyms is obvious evidence for the use-
fulness of this relation for language users. The 
words ‘synonym’ and ‘synonymy’ are actually 
used by the speakers of languages, and the corpora 
of conversational material are investigated in or-
der to establish their actual understanding of the 
term. Murphy (2013) notes the following accounts 
of the word ‘synonym’ as found in the analysed 
corpora: 
1) synonymy as ‘sameness’ or ‘near sameness’ 
of meaning, 
2) synonymy as the possibility of substituting 
one word for another, 
3) synonymy as the co-extensional character of 
two scientific names (in biology). 
There are more specific understandings of the 
word ‘synonym’ in computer science (Murphy 
2013, 281), but they are not relevant to the discus-
sion of the present paper. Interestingly, the rela-
tion of synonymy is also found in translational 
contexts: the words that are mutual translations in 
different languages are also seen as synonyms 
(Murphy 2013, 282). 
                                                 
2 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C1901A00002, last ac-
cessed on September 24, 2014. 
It is easy to note that the use of the term ‘syn-
onymy’ in descriptive lexicography tends to avoid 
the discussion of philosophical problems of this 
linguistic phenomenon. Generally, the people in-
terested in finding synonyms to certain words are 
interested in substitutability of these words with-
out changing their meaning (as regards both deno-
tative, connotative and social meaning, Murphy 
2013, 302). These empirical findings are compat-
ible with Goodman’s thesis referred to above.  
 
3 Almost Identical Expressions (AIE) in 
Statutory Language 
The texts of statutes consist of linguistic expres-
sions. Generally speaking, a lawmaker intends to 
indicate certain states of affairs and to assign legal 
consequences to them. The lawmaker indicates 
these states of affairs by means of linguistic ex-
pressions. The language of law shares many fea-
tures with plain language, such as  indeterminacy 
and vagueness (Bix, Endicott); however, although 
it is often presumed that statutory texts should be 
understood with regard to the ‘plain, natural 
meaning’ (Interpreting Statutes), often special, le-
gal meaning should be ascribed to the used terms 
(for a recent elaboration of this subject, see 
Araszkiewicz 2014). 
It is often the case that the lawmaker chooses 
similar, yet not identical, terms to refer to certain 
states of affairs that are assigned to legal conse-
quences. In such contexts, there is a situation of 
doubt whether the lawmaker intended to refer to 
the same, or to different (sets of) states of affairs. 
The pragmatic context of interpreting such statu-
tory language expressions is set out by the adver-
sarial character of legal proceedings. Each party is 
interested in persuading the judge to ascribe such 
meaning to a statutory term that leads to the legal 
consequences desired by this party. Consequently, 
a party to the dispute may be interested in treating 
similar expressions alike with respect to their le-
gal result; another party may be interested in strict 
differentiation between the meanings of slightly 
different expressions. 
There are different approaches to the indicated 
problem in different jurisdictions. Sometimes, 
even the lawmaker gives explicit guidelines to 
show how similar expressions should be inter-
preted. For instance, the Australian Acts Interpre-
tation Act 19012 contains a provision, 15AC, ac-
cording to which, ‘when an Act has expressed an 
idea in a particular form of words and a later Act 
appears to have expressed the same idea in a dif-
ferent form of words for the purpose of using a 
clearer style, the ideas shall not be taken to be dif-
ferent merely because different forms of words 
were used.’ 3  However, typically, the lawmaker 
will be reluctant to give the addressees of legal 
texts such explicit suggestions. Thus, the dilemma 
concerning the ascription of identical or non-iden-
tical meaning to slightly different linguistic ex-
pressions will remain an open issue. 
This dilemma is particularly visible with regard 
to the class of expressions we refer to as Almost 
Identical Expressions (AIE). By definition, the 
linguistic expressions E1 and E2 in language L be-
long to the set of AIE if and only if: 
1) they stem from the same lexical root, 
2) they are not identical from the syntactic point 
of view, 
3) they would be considered as natural mutual 
substitutions by a competent native speaker of  
language L (in a relevant context of discourse C). 
The point 3) is the most important one: AIE cre-
ate a strong inclination in the native speakers of 
the language to treat them interchangeably in the 
relevant context of discourse. But point 2) creates 
the possibility for the construction of arguments 
to the contrary. The next two sections are devoted 
to the discussion of an exemplary legal question 
encompassing the use of AIE. 
4  The Legal Research Problem 
The legal research problem that focused our atten-
tion on the argumentation concerning AIE is as 
follows: what are the legal consequences of non-
compliance of subjects of law with the require-
ment of concluding contracts and making other 
statements in writing? The Polish Civil Code (Act 
of 23 April 1964, consolidated version: Journal of 
Laws 2014.121, hereafter referred to as the PCC) 
contains approximately 100 instances of expres-
sions lexically cognate with the word ‘writing’, 
most of which are parts of provisions specifying 
requirements of the form of contracts and other 
statements. There are three types of these expres-
sions, forming a set of AIE: 
1) ‘in written form’ (PL: w formie pisemnej), 
2) ‘in writing’ (PL: na piśmie) and  
3) ‘stated in writing’ (PL: stwierdzone 
pismem). 
                                                 
3 We are grateful to Graeme Hirst for pointing out this inter-
esting regulation during the BiCi seminar on Frontiers and 
Connections between Argumentation Theory and Natural 
Language Processing in Bertinoro (July 20-24th, 2014). 
All these expressions would be treated as mu-
tual substitutions in the majority of contexts of 
discourse by a native speaker of the Polish lan-
guage; interestingly, lawyers are also often in-
clined to see these three expressions as interre-
placeable ones. However, this contention does not 
lead to any immediate answers concerning both 
the content of requirements that are expressed by 
the expressions listed above and the consequences 
of non-compliance with these requirements. 
For the sake of clarity regarding the following 
investigations, it is necessary to delineate the legal 
context concerning the ‘written form’ requirement 
in Polish civil law. The basic rules dealing with 
this issue are in art. 73 § 1 of the PCC: 
 
If the law stipulates that a legal act be made in 
written form, an act made without observing the 
stipulated form is invalid only if the law provides 
for a nullity clause. 
 
and article 74 § 1 of the PCC: 
 
The stipulation of written form without a nullity 
clause leads, if the stipulated form is not observed 
in litigation, to witness evidence or evidence in the 
form of declarations of the parties concerning the 
performance of the act being inadmissible.4 
 
The legal consequences stemming from the 
quoted rules are straightforward. If a given act 
should be made in written form and the law pre-
scribes for the pain of nullity, in the case of failure 
to fulfil the requirement, the act is not valid. Con-
versely, if the pain of nullity is not mentioned in 
the law (or in the statement of the parties), the act 
cannot be invalid in the case of non-compliance 
with the written form requirement. This conse-
quence is uncontroversial. The legal results pro-
vided by the latter of the quoted provisions are 
more nuanced: if a written form is required for an 
act and it is not complied with, the act is still valid. 
However, certain types of evidence are not admis-
sible to prove that such act has taken place. Let us 
refer to this legal consequence as the consequence 
of evidentiary difficulties. In the following anal-
yses, we will focus on this latter legal conse-
quence only. The consequence of invalidity is an 
easy topic from the point of view of argument 
4 The translations of the provisions are taken from the com-
mercial Legalis system provided by the C.H. Beck publish-
ing house, with certain modifications by the authors. 
mining and natural language processing of statu-
tory texts: an act is invalid only if there is an ex-
plicit clause providing for such consequence. In 
the absence of such a clause, the consequence of 
the failure to meet the requirement of a ‘written 
form’ should lead to evidentiary difficulties. This 
contention is, again, uncontroversial, with regard 
to the requirement of ‘written form’ as indicated 
in the latter of the quoted provisions. The question 
is, first, whether the requirements provided by the 
law should be understood identically where the 
law speaks about ‘written form’, ‘in writing’ and 
‘stated in writing’, respectively. Second, what are 
the legal consequences of the failure to meet the 
requirements referred to as ‘in writing’ and ‘stated 
in writing’? 
Let us present the existing controversy in a 
more explicit manner. Let us assume that a legal 
provision of the PCC has the following scheme: 
 
(X) Legal act X should be performed in written 
form. 
 
The quoted art. 74 § 1 of the PCC enables us to 
derive the following conclusion from (X): 
 
(X-con) If the legal act X is not performed in 
written form, then the consequence of evidentiary 
difficulties shall apply as regards the legal act X. 
 
Let us recall the expression ‘in written form’ 
forms an AIE set with the expressions ‘in writing’ 
and ‘stated in writing’. This enables us to present 
the two following schemes of provisions (actually 
often instantiated in the PCC): 
 
(Y) Legal act Y should be performed in writing. 
(Z) Legal act Z should be stated in writing. 
 
The precise formulation of the legal research 
questions goes as follows: (Q1) Is the meaning of 
X, Y and Z identical? (Q2) Is it the case that Y and 
Z lead to the formulation of Y-con and Z-con rules 
analogous to the X-con rule? 
In order to establish valuable answers to these 
questions, a corpus of judgments (>30 cases) and 
legal doctrinal works (5 sources) were examined. 
The results are reported in the following section.  
5 Analysis of Actual Arguments as 
Found in the Corpora 
The analysis of the existing material led to the fol-
lowing answers to the questions outlined above: 
Q1: undecided (there are authoritative sources that 
tend to give positive and negative answers to the 
question) and Q2: positive (but the interpretation 
of the answer depends on the chosen answer to 
Q1). 
Theoretically, several argumentation schemes 
can play their role is justifying different answers 
to Q1. For instance, the argument from plain nat-
ural meaning would support a positive answer to 
Q1. The argument would run as follows. 
 
Premise 1. Statutory terms should be inter-
preted in accordance with their plain natural 
meaning. 
Premise 2. According to plain natural mean-
ing, the expressions ‘in written form’, ‘in writing’ 
and ‘stated in writing’ should be treated as (strict) 
synonyms. 
Conclusion. The meaning of X, Y and Z is 
identical (positive answer to Q1). 
 
Let us note that this argument could be further 
backed by analogous reasoning: Premise 2 could 
be refined to relax the assumption of strict synon-
ymy in favour of the claim that, in the context if 
legal discourse, these AIE should be treated as 
carrying the same meaning (because the differ-
ences between them could be reasonably ignored). 
Actually, a refined version of this argument 
scheme was used by one of the most influential 
legal scholars in Poland, Zbigniew Radwański 
(Radwański 2002, 134). The remaining analysed 
doctrinal sources also adopt this view. Let us re-
construct his argument: 
 
Premise 1. If differences between the terms 
used by the legislator are a matter of style only, 
then the terms should be treated as (strict) syno-
nyms. 
Premise 2. ‘In written form’, ‘in writing’ and 
‘stated in writing’ are terms that differ with re-
spect to style only. 
Conclusion. The meanings of X, Y and Z are 
identical (positive answer to Q1). 
 
Let us note that a positive answer to Q1 im-
plies, as a matter of logic, a positive answer to Q2. 
However, it is also possible to formulate argu-
ments to the contrary. According to the rationality 
postulates concerning legislative process, if the 
legislator intends to indicate the same state of af-
fairs in different parts of regulation, he uses one 
and the same term. If he uses (even slightly) dif-
ferent terms instead, this means that his intent was 
to designate different states of affairs. This argu-
mentative pattern is often referred to as the prohi-
bition of synonymic interpretation: 
 
Premise 1. The terms used in the statute should 
not be assigned with an identical meaning unless 
they are syntactically identical. 
Premise 2. ‘In written form’, ‘in writing’ and 
‘stated in writing’ are not syntactically identical. 
Conclusion. The meanings of X, Y and Z are 
not identical (negative answer to Q1). 
 
Note that a negative answer to Q1 does not log-
ically imply a negative answer to Q2. A negative 
answer to Q1 consists only of holding that the 
‘written form’ requirement is something other 
than ‘in writing’ or ‘stated in writing’. Let us add 
in this connection that, uncontroversially, the 
‘written form’ requirement is satisfied only if a 
statement is manually5 undersigned by a person.  
Consequently, the controversy between a pos-
itive and negative answer to Q1 boils down to the 
set of sufficient conditions to satisfy a given re-
quirement. Undoubtedly, if a legal provision is 
based on the scheme (X) presented above, the re-
quirement is not met unless the statement encom-
passing the content of legal act X is manually un-
dersigned by a person. The question (Q3) is 
whether this sufficient condition should also be 
met for the satisfaction of requirements formu-
lated in schemes (Y) and (Z). As a matter of 
course, a positive answer to Q1 implies a positive 
answer to Q3, while a negative answer to Q1 im-
plies a negative answer to Q3. 
Interestingly, the judicial opinions reviewed in 
the research tend to adopt a rather negative answer 
to Q1 (unlike doctrinal sources quoted above). 
This may be caused by the fact that judicial au-
thorities are closer to legal practice and they do 
not intend to impose unnecessary burdens on the 
addressees of the provisions. This is particularly 
visible in the context of the interpretation of the 
following provision (art. 514 of the PCC) related 
to the institution of a claim assignment: 
 
If a claim is stated in writing, a contractual 
stipulation that assignment cannot be made with-
out the debtor's consent is effective towards the 
assignee only when the document contains a men-
tion of the stipulation unless the assignee knew of 
the stipulation at the time of assignment. 
 
                                                 
5 For the sake of brevity, we leave the problems of elec-
tronic signatures aside. 
The courts tend to adopt a negative answer to 
Q1 in this context. For instance, in the Resolution 
of 6 July 2005 (III CZP 40/05), the Supreme Court 
stated that: 
 
Stating of the claim in writing in the under-
standing of the art. 514 of the PCC is satisfied 
also in case the creditor issues a document (e.g. 
an invoice) that confirms the performance of an 
obligation and the debtor accepts the document. 
 
Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the re-
quirements for satisfying the ‘stated in writing’ re-
quirement are less severe than ‘in written form’. 
The satisfaction of the latter implies the satisfac-
tion of the former, but not the other way around. 
The reconstruction of an argument justifying 
this conclusion from the wording of the Resolu-
tion is a non-trivial task due to the highly complex 
structure of the analysed sentences. The proposal 
of the argument’s structuration would be as fol-
lows: 
 
Premise 1. There is no need to delimit the types 
of documents that may be used for the identifica-
tion and confirmation of legal facts (wrt art. 514 
of the PCC). 
Premise 2. Adoption of a positive answer to Q1 
would amount to the undue delimitation of the 
types of documents used for the identification and 
confirmation of legal facts. 
Conclusion. Q1 should be answered nega-
tively. 
 
The argument formulated by the Supreme 
Court is enthymematic, especially with regard to 
the premise 1: the court seems to assume that the 
possibility of identification and confirmation of 
legal facts is a worthwhile value, which should be 
realised at the expense of more firm protection of 
debtors. This stems from the contention of the Su-
preme Court, according to which an invoice is-
sued by the creditor but not accepted by the debtor 
would be insufficient to fulfil the condition of ‘be-
ing stated in writing’, because the protection of 
the debtor would be too weak if a broader inter-
pretation were accepted. This value judgment can 
be reconstructed from the text only by a person 
who possesses at least basic legal training. How-
ever, this does alter the conclusion that the Su-
preme Court rejects the thesis concerning the mu-
tual interreplaceability of expressions ‘in written 
form’ and ‘stated in writing’. 
 
It is worth emphasising that the same interpre-
tation has been accepted by the courts with regard 
to the interpretation of art. 511 of the PCC: 
 
If a claim is stated in writing, its assignment 
should also be stated in writing. 
 
For instance, in the Judgment of the Appellate 
Court in Katowice of 8 March 2005, I ACa 
1516/04, the negative answer to the Q1 was ad-
vanced on the basis of a literal reading of the stat-
ute: If the legislator speaks about ‘stating in writ-
ing’, this means that he does not intend to intro-
duce a requirement of ‘written form’, simply be-
cause these expressions are not identical. 
Let us note that the answer to the Q2 may re-
main positive even if Q1 is answered negatively. 
However, different situations will have to be con-
sidered as regards the satisfaction of ‘written 
form’ and ‘stated in writing’ requirements.  
6 Conclusion 
The investigations of this paper lead to the formu-
lation of the following conclusions. The peculiar-
ities of statutory text make the NLP analyses re-
lated to this material very difficult. In particular, 
such ubiquitous semantic relations as synonymy 
have to be dealt with in a non-standard manner as 
regards the statutory text. Even in the case of AIE 
that seem to be very close, or even perfect syno-
nyms in other contexts of discourse, establishing 
the interreplaceability relations between terms is 
a problematic issue. Reaching a justified conclu-
sion as regards this relation in legal contexts is a 
complicated process, also due to the fact that law-
yers disagree about the existence or non-existence 
of synonymy relations between the analysed 
terms. This process involves the reconstruction of 
legal arguments used in different authoritative 
sources. The reconstruction is not an easy task due 
to the complicated structure of sentences present 
in judicial opinions and doctrinal theories as well 
as posing hypotheses about enthymematic prem-
ises. The latter activity involves a vast amount of 
professional legal knowledge. Therefore, the cor-
pora of legal texts should be annotated by legal 
professionals (or at least legal students) in the pro-
cess of argumentation mining rather than by lay-
men in order to avoid misunderstandings gener-
ated by a lack of legal knowledge. 
Even in the case of AIE, which seem to be 
(near) synonyms on purely linguistic grounds, as 
it was shown, the discussion of their interreplace-
ability involves the use of not only linguistic ar-
guments, but also teleological arguments pos-
sessing a complicated structure. The obtained 
conclusions are contextual and perhaps defeasi-
ble, as is often the case in the context of legal dis-
course. 
The most important conclusion stemming from 
the investigations above is that, in the context of 
an NLP analysis of the corpora of legal texts (aim-
ing at the creation of intelligent databases of legal 
knowledge), one should be very cautious as re-
gards the use of any databases of synonyms. 
Moreover, the corpora of statutory texts should 
not be analysed apart from the legal doctrine and 
(most importantly) databases of legal cases. These 
sources should serve for the reconstruction of ar-
guments used to determine the meaning and scope 
of statutory expressions. 
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Abstract
In this paper, we discuss how Value-based
Argumentation can be used as a tool in
human and computer story understanding,
especially where understanding the story
requires understanding of the motives of
its characters. It is shown how arguments
about motives can be extracted from sto-
ries, and how dialogues about these argu-
ments can aid in story understanding.
1 Introduction
In this paper, a short version of which was pub-
lished as (Bex and Bench-Capon, 2014), we dis-
cuss the important connections between narra-
tives, or stories, and argumentation. We often per-
suade not by imparting facts and rules, but by pro-
viding an interesting narrative, particularly when
trying to convince others to adopt particular val-
ues and attitudes. Presentation of an argument as
a story engages our natural reaction to a story, to
attempt to understand it. Thus, the story form fos-
ters engagement, encouraging the right choices by
appealing to common values rather than by impos-
ing a rule that is to be followed.
A central concept in the research on story un-
derstanding is that of scripts (Schank and Abel-
son, 1977), coherent scenarios about common sit-
uations such as visiting a restaurant. Despite the
apparent failure of scripts to deliver the promised
advances in computational linguistics, they still
play an important part in computational and cog-
nitive approaches of story understanding (Mueller,
2004), and they are widely applied in, for exam-
ple, case-based reasoning (Gentner and Forbus,
2011), scenario-based evidence analysis (Vlek et
al., 2013) and narrative generation (Gervas et al.,
2005).
In our opinion, purely script-based approaches
to story interpretation are not suited to understand-
ing persuasive stories concerning values, such as
parables. Scripts represent the way in which we
expect typical situations to play out: the more a
story adheres to a familiar script, the more plau-
sible a story is considered to be. However, many
memorable stories such as parables depend on a
twist in the story, something which is out of the
ordinary and which challenges conventional atti-
tudes (Govier and Ayers, 2012). For example, no-
one expects a father to organise a feast for a son
who has spent all of his money on wild living (The
Prodigal Son1). Furthermore, the most interesting
stories are often those with conflicting attitudes
(Wilensky, 1982). For example, in the Prodigal
Son, the son’s older brother wants to turn away
his sibling: why welcome a sinner? The father,
however, forgives and welcomes his son. In mod-
els based on scripts, in which stories are rendered
only as causal sequences, these conflicts between
characters’ values remain largely implicit and un-
explained.
For a computational model of story understand-
ing, we need to add a more fine-grained psycho-
logical dimension to the causal narrative, in which
conflicts between characters’ attitudes and chal-
lenges to common attitudes can be modelled. This
gives us an internal perspective that allows us to
represent the deliberations of the characters in-
volved, which allows for a much more subtle anal-
ysis of character motive and attitude than we can
perform with the external causal perspective. This
in turn allows us to show how the relevant stories
can influence the audience’s attitudes or, in other
words, how these stories can persuade an audience
to adopt a different attitude.
Recently, we have proposed a model for story
understanding (Bex et al., 2014a)(Bex and Bench-
Capon, 2014), which draws from value-based
practical reasoning (Atkinson and Bench-Capon,
2007). Stories can be represented as (causal)
1Luke 15:11-32. We use the World English Bible transla-
tion available at http://www.ebible.org/
state transition diagrams, where the transitions
represent possible actions by the characters in the
story. Character motives are represented by in-
dicating which values are promoted or demoted
by the actions in the story. We can then ex-
tract practical reasoning arguments of the form I
should perform Action because it promotes Value
and I should not perform Action because it de-
motes Value from the diagram. If we also have
separate arguments denoting the characters’ at-
titudes (value orderings), we can construct an
Extended Argumentation Framework (EAF) with
values (Modgil, 2009), a set of (possibly conflict-
ing) arguments representing character choices and
attitudes. Given an EAF, we can then infer atti-
tudes given the choices made in the story. In sec-
tion 4.1 we show how a particular story interpreted
by means of an EAF can be used as an argument in
a particular dialogical context, using (Modgil and
Bench-Capon, 2008)’s extended TPI-protocol for
argumentative dialogue to argue for a change in
value preferences in a dialogical setting.
2 Motivating example: The Good
Samaritan
Stories can be a powerful vehicle of persuasion.
A story does not persuade by imparting explicit
rules, but by exposing a coherent narrative aimed
at changing or reinforcing attitudes, so that the
stories exemplify various group cultural norms.
Many folktales are of this type, as are parables,
both secular and biblical. As an example of a
well-known parable, we will consider The Good
Samaritan. Since we will be discussing this para-
ble throughout the paper, we will quote it in full.
The context is established in Luke 10:25-27:
Behold, a certain lawyer stood up and
tested him, saying, “Teacher, what shall
I do to inherit eternal life?”
He said to him, “What is written in the
law? How do you read it?”
He answered, “You shall love the Lord
your God with all your heart, with all
your soul, with all your strength, with
all your mind, [Deuteronomy 6:5]; and
your neighbour as yourself [Leviticus
19:18].”
He said to him, “You have answered cor-
rectly. Do this, and you will live.”
But he, desiring to justify himself, asked
Jesus, “Who is my neighbour?”
Thus the lawyer asks two questions. The first,
“what shall I do to inherit eternal life?”, receives
an answer justified by scriptural authority. But the
second, “Who is my neighbour?”, is met simply
by a story.
Jesus answered, “A certain man was go-
ing down from Jerusalem to Jericho,
and he fell among robbers, who both
stripped him and beat him, and departed,
leaving him half dead. By chance a
certain priest was going down that way.
When he saw him, he passed by on the
other side. In the same way a Levite
also, when he came to the place, and saw
him, passed by on the other side. But a
certain Samaritan, as he travelled, came
where he was. When he saw him, he was
moved with compassion, came to him,
and bound up his wounds, pouring on
oil and wine. He set him on his own ani-
mal, and brought him to an inn, and took
care of him. On the next day, when he
departed, he took out two denarii, and
gave them to the host, and said to him,
’Take care of him. Whatever you spend
beyond that, I will repay you when I re-
turn.’ Now which of these three do you
think seemed to be a neighbour to him
who fell among the robbers?”
He said, “He who showed mercy on
him.”
Then Jesus said to him, “Go and do like-
wise.”
This provides a very clear example of a story
being used as an argument to justify a particular
answer to a question, “Who is my neighbour?”.
However, it is not meant as a theoretical argument:
the aim is not that the lawyer should believe that
the Samaritan is his neighbour (nor, since the one
in the story is a fictional character, that all Samari-
tans are his neighbour). Nor is the lawyer intended
to set out to assist wounded travellers on the road
from Jerusalem to Jericho. Unlike practical rea-
soning proper, there is no specific situation, with
a specific choice of actions to resolve. Rather the
argument is intended to convince the lawyer (and
ultimately of course the reader) to become a dif-
ferent person, the sort of person who will enjoy
eternal life.
So how exactly does the story convince its au-
dience to change their ways? Govier and Ayers
(Govier and Ayers, 2012) have recently explored
this question in detail. They specifically address
the relation between parables and argument us-
ing the Good Samaritan as one of their examples.
They reconstruct the Good Samaritan as the fol-
lowing argument (italicised statements are said in
(Govier and Ayers, 2012) to be implicit):
1. If supposedly holy people (the priest and the
Levite) were to ignore an unknown and needy
person on a road, they would not treat that
person as a neighbour.
2. If a person who was of no special status and
did not know an unknown and needy person
on a road were to treat him with mercy and
kindness, that person would treat the needy
person as a neighbour.
So
3. What matters about being a neighbour is not
one’s status or one’s prior knowledge of a
person.
4. What matters about being a neighbour is
treating another with mercy and kindness
when that person is needy and one encoun-
ters him.
5. It is good to treat a needy stranger as a neigh-
bour if one encounters him.
Therefore
6. One should treat other people, when they are
in need and one encounters them, as one’s
neighbours with mercy and kindness.
Statements 1 and 2, which both can be said to
follow from the story in some way2, lead to con-
clusions 3 and 4. These two conclusions together
with the value judgement contained in 5 then lead
to the final conclusion 6. The addition of 5 and 6
is, in our opinion, somewhat contentious because
it transforms the argument into an argument with
a normative conclusion, advocating particular be-
haviour. This is perhaps justified by the comment
‘Go and do likewise’ made by Jesus, since this
2It is unclear why (Govier and Ayers, 2012) consider 1 to
be implicit and 2 not.
shows that the intention in telling the parable is to
affect future actions. However, we would contend
that the intention of the parable should not be of
the form in certain situations you should do this
- a norm, but rather an invitation to adopt differ-
ent attitudes, to be like the Samaritan and recog-
nise that duties between people arise from their
common humanity rather than any social or reli-
gious ties (statements 3 and 4). To enable a story
to have this effect we need a detailed account of
the reasoning of the Samaritan, the Priest and the
Levite, since otherwise we cannot articulate the
differences in attitude between the three charac-
ters, and so cannot identify the attitudes we are
being urged to abandon and adopt.
3 Understanding stories using
value-based argumentation
The computational model for story understand-
ing we propose is based on (Atkinson and Bench-
Capon, 2007)’s framework for value-based prac-
tical reasoning. We previously used this model
to capture abductive reasoning in which stories
served as explanations for particular evidence
(Bex et al., 2009). The model contains three main
elements: (i) Action-Based Alternating Transition
Systems with Values (AATS+V) for encapsulating
stories; (ii) arguments based on the Practical Rea-
soning Argumentation Scheme (PRAS), to gener-
ate arguments concerning the individual choices
a story character can make; and (iii) Value-based
Argumentation Frameworks (VAF), representing
the set of arguments and counterarguments a story
character uses to make his individual choices on
the basis of his preferences and attitudes. Because
we want to be able to explicitly reason about char-
acters’ value orderings, we use (Modgil, 2009)’s
Extended Argumentation Frameworks (EAF) in-
stead of the original VAFs. Below, we will discuss
each of these elements by means of our example.
3.1 Stories as AATS+V
Structuralist accounts of narrative argue that ac-
tions that represent transitions between states are
the basic building blocks of stories. It is for this
reason that we choose the mechanism of Action-
based Alternating Transition Systems with Values
(AATS+V) as our basic formalization method for
stories. An AATS consists of a set of states and
transitions between them, with the transitions la-
belled with joint actions, that is actions compris-
ing an action of each of the agents concerned. In
an AATS+V, the transitions are labelled with the
values that motivate the characters in the story. A
basic version of the parable of the Good Samaritan
can be rendered as the AATS+V in Figure 1.
At the beginning of the story q0, the condition
of the traveller is wounded. In q4, the traveller’s
wounds have been bandaged and he is in a sta-
ble condition. In addition to the actions taken by
the characters in the story (j1, j3, j6), we have
also included the hypothetical actions the charac-
ters could have performed: for example, the Priest
could also have helped the traveller (j2). Action
choice in parables is often more or less binary
(help or ¬help, accept or ¬accept in the Prodi-
gal Son), so modelling these extra actions does not
require much extra information besides the origi-
nal story text. The values that are promoted by
each action are included in the AATS+V: Reli-
gious Duty (+RD), Religious Law (+RL), National
Solidarity (+NS), Racial Solidarity (+RS), Com-
passion (+C), Prudence (+P), Convenience (+Cv)
and Revenge (+R). Adding the values requires
more background knowledge. For example, we
need to know that the traveller and the Levite were
of the same race, and that Samaritans were a com-
mon enemy for the Jewish people. Nowadays, this
background information can be gained from Bib-
lical texts, or from the many varied accounts on
how parables should be interpreted, but it would
have been well-known to the original audience.
The values in figure 1 are a selection that the au-
thors have heard from a variety of sources over the
years.
3.2 Arguments based on the story
The idea of arguments based on stories is that we
look for arguments that instantiate the Practical
Reasoning Argumentation Scheme (PRAS). Such
arguments are of the following form.
1. In the current circumstances R
2. We should perform action A
3. Which will result in new circumstances S
4. Which will promote some value V
Now, given an AATS+V, we can construct these
arguments for the different characters. The ba-
sic idea expressed in (Atkinson and Bench-Capon,
2007) is that the AATS+V serves as a formal
grounding for arguments that instantiate the Prac-
tical Reasoning Argumentation Scheme (PRAS),
as follows (where the line numbers in the above
PRAS scheme correspond to the line numbers in
the formal rendering below).
1. In the initial state q0 = qx ∈ Q
2. Agent i ∈ Ag should participate in joint ac-
tion jn ∈ JAg, where jin = αi
3. Such that τ(qxjn) is qy
4. Such that for some vu ∈ Avi, δ(qx, qy, vu) is
+
Here, Q is a finite, non-empty set of states,
Ag = {1, . . . , n} is a finite, non-empty set of
agents, αi defines the set of states from which ac-
tion α may be executed by agent i, τ is a partial
system transition function, which defines the state
τ(q, j) that would result from the performance of
action j in state q, Avi is a finite, non-empty set
of values for agent i and δ is a valuation function
which defines the status (promoted (+), demoted
(–) or neutral (=)) of a value ascribed to the transi-
tion between two states.
Given this mapping of PRAS on an AATS+V,
we can generate the arguments from the AATS+V,
noting that arguments for different actions attack
each other because the actions are mutually exclu-
sive, i.e., one cannot help and not help someone at
the same time. First, there are the two arguments
that might apply to the priest.
• A1: I should help the man because I have a
religious duty to do so. This will promote
Religious Duty (+RD)
• A2: I should not help the man because I risk
uncleanliness through contact with his blood.
This will promote Religious Law (+RL).
The following apply to the Levite.
• A3: I should help the man because he is a fel-
low countryman. This will promote National
Solidarity (+NS).
• A4: I should help the man because he is of
my race. This will promote Racial Solidarity
(+RS).
None of the above arguments apply to the Samar-
itan. The following arguments apply to all three
characters.
q0 
T wounded
P arrives     
j1: not help
+RL +P +Cv
q1
T wounded
L arrives     
j3: not help
+P +Cv
q3
T wounded
S arrives     
q4 
T stable
j2: help
+RD +C
j4: help
+C +NS +RS
j6: help
+C
q5
T wounded  
j5: not help
+P +Cv +R
Figure 1: AATS+V for the Good Samaritan
• A5: I should help the man because he is a
fellow human being. This will promote Com-
passion (+C).
• A6: I should not help the man because it may
be trap and I may be robbed. This will pro-
mote Prudence (+P).
• A7: I should not help the man because it will
interrupt my journey. This will promote Con-
venience (+Cv).
Finally there is an argument that applies only to
the Samaritan:
• A8: I should not help this man, because his
people have quarrelled with mine. This will
promote Revenge (+R).
All of the arguments A1-A4 relate to duties of
one sort or another, arising from religious law or
duty, or one form or another of social relationship
(nation, race). A5-A8 all arise from natural human
instincts, unconnected with any social institution.
3.3 Constructing an Argumentation
Framework
From these arguments, we can construct a Value-
based Argumentation Framework (VAF). A VAF
is based on (Dung, 1995)’s standard Argumenta-
tion Frameworks. An Argumentation Framework
AF = (Args,R), where Args is a set of argu-
ments, andR ⊆ (Args×Args) is a binary attack
relation between pair of arguments. The attack re-
lations between arguments A1-A8 are straightfor-
ward: arguments concluding help attack and are
attacked by those concluding do not help. A VAF
also contains a set of values, and a mapping that
associates a value with each argument. Further-
more, a VAF has associated audiences, each of
which represents a total ordering of these values.
The purpose of building a VAF is to find a sub-
set of the arguments which is at once conflict free
(i.e. no two arguments in the subset attack one an-
other), and collectively able to defend itself (i.e.
any attacker of an argument in the subset is itself
attacked by an argument in the subset). The max-
imal such subset is called a preferred extension,
and represents a maximal consistent position given
the arguments presented. The key feature of VAFs
is that they allow a distinction to be made between
successful attacks (defeats) and unsuccessful at-
tacks, on the basis of the values associated with
the arguments: attacks succeed only if the value
associated with the attacking argument is ranked
by the audience as equal to, or higher than, the
argument it attacks. The VAF thus accounts for
elements of subjectivity in that the arguments that
are acceptable are dependent upon the audience’s
ranking of the values involved in the scenario.
We now attempt to explain the actions of the
three characters by considering different value or-
derings, different audiences. Suppose that the
Priest puts religion before all else (i.e., Religious
Duty and Religious Law are preferred to Conve-
nience, Compassion and Prudence). He then has a
conflict between A1, which argues he should help
to promote RD, and A2, which argues he should
not help to promote RL. In the story, he chooses
to observe of the law, which applies specifically to
himself because of his special role, over the vaguer
practical obligation to serve others. This ranking
of strict observance of the law over more human
concerns is criticised elsewhere in the Gospels,
e.g. Mark 2:27 (Then Jesus said to them, “The
Sabbath was made to meet the needs of people,
and not people to meet the requirements of the
Sabbath.”).
The Levite must be supposed to act on eitherA6
or A7, overriding the specific duties of A3 and A4
as well as A5. But because we can assume to have
a type of a morally respectable man, it must be as-
sumed that we are being invited to conclude that
these preferences are acceptable in the eyes of the
current moral climate: that it is morally acceptable
for prudence and/or personal convenience to over-
ride obligations arising from country or race, let
alone from natural feelings of compassion.
The Samaritan, in contrast has no duties
prompting him help the man, and must balance
his compassion against the other natural human in-
stincts. That he helps the man (A5), can only be
explained in terms of him putting compassion be-
fore all other values, individually and in combina-
tion, and this is what we are invited to conclude is
what being a neighbour really is. The context sup-
plied in the coda quoted above invites the hearer to
adopt these value preferences, to become a person
who places compassion above creed, country and
convenience and to act in accordance with these
priorities in future.
4 Stories as arguments in a dialogical
context
In the previous section, we discussed how stories,
the characters in them and these characters’ mo-
tivations can be understood using VAFs. We can
now use the story as an argument, using exactly
this interpretation of the story. The conclusion the
audience is invited to draw from the story depends
on the context in which the story is told. In the
case of Good Samaritan, this context is provided
by the exchange between Jesus and the lawyer,
and specifically the lawyer’s question “Who is my
neighbour?”. As we have argued in section 2, the
actual question is something like “what does it
mean to love your neighbour like yourself?”, and
the answer is not the literal “The Samaritan is my
neigbour” but rather an understanding of why the
Samaritan acts as he does, which encourages one
to adopt similar attitudes to the Samaritan.
4.1 Extended Argumentation about Values
In our model, the audience of the story should
identify the value-based arguments in the story
and then reason about which values will explain
the behaviour of the Samaritan. In (Atkinson and
Bench-Capon, 2007) the value orderings them-
selves cannot be reasoned with or about, as they
are not represented in the object language. We
therefore use the machinery of (Modgil, 2009) to
represent statements about value orderings as ar-
guments in an Extended Argumentation Frame-
work (EAF). In addition to a set of arguments
Args and attacks between arguments R, EAFs
also contain a set D ⊆ (Args × R) of attacks on
attacks. The idea is that arguments about prefer-
ences attack some attack between arguments and
thus influence the preferred extension. For exam-
ple, if argument A attacks argument B and vice
versa, there are normally two preferred extensions,
{A} and {B}. However, if we add the argument
A > B (expressing that A is preferred to B),
which attacks and defeats the attack from B on
A, there is only one preferred extension namely
{A,A > B}.
In the EAF for the Samaritan there potentially
two value-preference arguments for each pair of
values, for example:
AV1 Prudence is preferred to Compassion
(P > C).
AV2 Compassion is preferred to Prudence
(C > P ).
These pairs will mutually attack, but more im-
portantly they will attack the attack from the ar-
gument motivated by the less preferred value on
arguments motivated by the other value. The com-
plete EAF for the parable will now contain all
the base arguments A1-A8 and a value prefer-
ence argument for each attack between these orig-
inal arguments. Furthermore, we introduce argu-
ments for the various characters: AC1 (Character
is a priest), AC2 (Character is a Levite) and AC3
(Character is a Samaritan). This will enable us to
eliminate arguments which do not apply to partic-
ular characters from consideration: thus AC1 will
attack A3, A4 and A8, AC2 will attack A1, A2
and A8, and AC3 will attack A1, A2, A3 and A4.
AddingAC3 to the AF that contains all characters’
arguments A1 - A8 then produces the EAF appli-
cable to just the Samaritan, as shown in Figure 2.
Similarly, we can introduce AC2 to get the EAF
applicable to the Levite and AC1 to get the EAF
applicable to the priest.
A6
not help
+P
A5
help
+C
AV1
P > C
AV2
C > P
A7
not help
+Cv
AV4
Cv > C
AV3
C > Cv
A8
not help
+R
AV5
C > R
AV6
R > C
Figure 2: EAF for the Samaritan
4.2 The dialogical argument of the Good
Samaritan
Now that we have established appropriate EAFs
for the various characters, we need to evaluate
them to explain the choices they make in the story.
Thus, in the case of the Samaritan, we need to con-
struct an admissible set containing an argument to
justify helping the traveller, and then to consider
what value preferences it contains. One method of
constructing admissible sets from Dung style AFs
is to use a dialogue game, such as the TPI (Two
Party Immediate Response) Game of (Dunne and
Bench-Capon, 2003). As was shown in (Modgil
and Bench-Capon, 2008) this can be adapted to
EAFs as follows. First, we rewrite the object level
arguments of the EAF as meta level statements.
This is a purely mechanical process: each pair of
arguments in an attack relation is replaced by four
arguments and their attack relations. Thus, for
example,A6 attacks A5 is rewritten as: A5 holds,
which is attacked by A6 defeats A5, which is at-
tacked by A6 does not hold which is attacked by
A6 holds. Note that A5 holds and A6 holds do
not directly attack one another, and so are not in
conflict. Where A5 and A6 are value based argu-
ments, we can reject A6 defeats A5 not only be-
cause we reject A6, but also because we prefer the
value of A5 to the value of A6. Thus A6 defeats
A5 is attacked by (in our example) compassion is
preferred to prudence, which is itself attacked by
prudence is preferred to compassion. Each pair of
attacking arguments is thus rewritten as a regular
AF; figure 3 shows the new, regular AF, structure
for the pair of arguments A5 and A6.
A TPI game proceeds by the proposer playing
an argument, the opponent playing an attacker, the
proposer playing an attacker of that argument and
so on, until one player cannot move. At this point a
player can back up to a choice point and play a dif-
ferent attacker. This continues until no moves are
possible (note that arguments under attack cannot
be played). At this point we will have an admis-
sible set containing the arguments played by the
last player to move. If this was the proposer is will
contain the original argument and this will have
been shown to be acceptable. Because it is the
Samaritan’s preference we are trying to determine,
we use the EAF in figure 2, rewritten as a regular
AF. The dialogue then proceeds as follows:
Samaritan: A5 holds. This is an argument
justifying what the Samaritan did in the story:
current position is {A5 holds}.
Opponent: A6 defeats A5. Opponent
chooses a way to attack A5.
Samaritan: AV2 C > P. The preference argu-
ment is played: the alternative would eventu-
ally require A5 holds to be played, but this is
under attack. Current position is {A5 holds,
C > P}.
Opponent: A7 defeats A5. Opponent cannot
play P > C, because it is under attack, and so
backs up and chooses another line of attack.
Samaritan: AV3 C > Cv. Current position is
{A5 holds, C > P, C > Cv}.
Opponent: A8 defeats A5. Again the oppo-
nent must back up since Cv > C is under at-
tack.
A5
holds
+C
A6
defeats 
A5
A6
does not 
hold A6
holds 
+P
AV2
C > P
AV1
P > C
A5
does not 
hold
A5
defeats 
A6
Figure 3: Regular AF for the A5 - A6 part if the EAF in figure 2
Samaritan: AV5 C > R. Current position is
{A5 holds, C > P, C > Cv, C > R}.
At this point the opponent must stop, since there
are no further lines of attack. The Samaritan’s po-
sition, {AC3, A5, AV2, AV3, AV5}, comprises an
argument justifying his action A5, and the three
value preferences required to defend that argument
AV2, AV3 and AV5. It is exactly this position that
the audience is being urged to adopt, since it pro-
vides the answer to the lawyer’s question “what
does it mean to love your neighbour like your-
self?”.
In our opinion, the argument that the story of the
Good Samaritan presents is accurately captured
by the above dialogue. In contrast to (Govier and
Ayers, 2012)’s traditional, more syllogistic analy-
sis of the argument presented by the story (section
2), in the case of the dialogue no explicit norm or
course of action is being advocated. This is exactly
the way it should be: instead of advocating norms,
stories (especially parables) convince by having
the audience consider a character’s motives by, as
it were, engaging in an internal dialogue with the
character.
5 Implementing our model
Generating arguments from stories and present-
ing the different possible extensions based on the
value orderings allows one to gain insight into the
point of the story: why did the characters act as
they did, and which attitudes are advocated in the
story? Whilst this is interesting as a theoretical ex-
ercise, one additional aim is to implement a system
that allows people to explore the stories and char-
acter motives in an interactive and intuitive way.
One option is to allow humans to engage in a dia-
logue akin to the ones in section 4.2, thus allowing
users to for example, interrogate an agent repre-
senting the Samaritan about his motives, and thus
gain a better understanding of the story. This can
then be used for educational purposes, for exam-
ple, schoolchildren learning about values through
stories.
For such a system, the following separate ele-
ments need to be implemented.
1. Construct initial AATS+V on the basis of a
story.
2. Include additional hypothetical transitions:
‘what could the characters have done and
why?’.
3. Generate a VAF of arguments and critiques
based on AATS+V.
4. Execute a dialogue based on the VAF.
Elements 1 and 2 have been done manually for a
few stories: the fable of the Ant and the Grasshop-
per and the Parables of the Prodigal Son and the
Good Samaritan. Ideally part of this process is
automated if we want to build a more substantial
corpus. For element 1, we can first automatically
extract the characters and events from stories, es-
pecially from fairly short and simple stories such
as fables. This is certainly not trivial but very
well possible (see e.g. (Hogenboom et al., 2011)).
However, as was discussed earlier, the values ex-
pressed by the story depend on the cultural back-
ground of the reader: the same story may have dif-
ferent interpretations. Furthermore, element 2 is
also hard to fully automate as additional hypothet-
ical transitions are often implicit in the stories, so
for elements 1 and 2 human annotation will have
to be used, based on skeleton AATS+V’s that are
constructed using event extraction.
For element 3, currently, Prolog and PHP im-
plementations3 exist (Wyner et al., 2012),(Wardeh
et al., 2013). The PHP tool is based on (Atkinson
3The PHP application can be used at
http://cgi.csc.liv.ac.uk/∼maya/ACT/. A Prolog program
that represents the AATS in Figure 1 and systematically
generates the full suite of arguments and objections based on
that structure is included in Appendix A.
and Bench-Capon, 2007) and so does not include
arguments based on look ahead.
Once the arguments are available, it becomes
possible to reason with them in a dialogue. Re-
cently a dialogue game for arguing about the mo-
tives found in fables and parables was proposed
(Bex and Bench-Capon, 2014). This protocol can
be implemented in a dialogue game execution en-
gine (Bex et al., 2014b), which allows for mixed
initiative dialogues between software agents and
humans through a simple interface (see (Bex et
al., 2013)), making it possible to reason with the
agents in a story in a similar way as shown in sec-
tion 4.2. Furthermore, users can input new, value-
based arguments about what they think the char-
acters’ choices in the story were. These arguments
can then relatively easily be inserted as a new tran-
sition in the AATS+V (cf. (Reed et al., 2010)), us-
ing the mapping given in this article. Thus, the in-
terface may also serve as a knowledge ellicitation
tool to find different interpretations of the stories.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown two important con-
nections between computational models of narra-
tive and computational models of argumentation:
how argumentation can be used to understand sto-
ries, in terms of the motives and attitudes of the
characters, and how stories can themselves be used
to present arguments, especially arguments de-
signed to persuade the audience to adopt partic-
ular attitudes. We have argued that parables can
be interpreted as arguments of this sort, and illus-
trated our views with the famous parable of the
Good Samaritan. We have identified several ad-
vantages of using stories in this way.
Using stories enables the consideration of hy-
pothetical choices, so that the choice can be made
clear and memorable, allowing us to benefit from
the vividness of the concrete, without needing to
have had any particular experience. Moreover us-
ing stories excludes irrelevant considerations: we
need not consider facts and actions not mentioned
in the story; this simplifies the construction of the
AATS, and disbars irrelevant counter arguments,
allowing for focus to be kept on the main point at
issue. Stories are intended to reinforce or change
attitudes: this is preferred to presenting a specific
set of norms, since attitudes tend to produce an
instinctive, and hence more immediate, response
and can be applied to numerous, as yet unfore-
seen, situations. Moreover, they go deeper and so
are more to be relied on. This is why soldiers are
taught the history of their regiments: the tales of
heroism and derring-do can inspire the loyalty and
camaraderie required to bind them into an effec-
tive unit in a way in which standing orders cannot
hope to do. Often there is no objective argument
for an attitude or a norm, and so we need to rely on
an emotional reaction, which is more easily pro-
duced by a story, especially one which allows the
hearers to draw the conclusion for themselves (as
does the good Samaritan parable, where the con-
clusion is stated by the addressee, not in the para-
ble itself).
Engaging in a dialogue about a story further
draws out the message of the story, and thus di-
alogue can act as an aid for story understanding.
Our model, when combined with an application
for argumentative dialogue, makes these dialogues
about stories possible. Users can engage in mean-
ingful discussions about a story not just with each
other but also with the characters in a story which,
when asked, will explain their motives and thus
clarify the point of the story. In this way, our
model comprises not just a theoretical discussion
of understanding and arguing with stories, but also
provides a first step towards a promising applica-
tions that can be used in, for example, educational
settings.
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Abstract
In existing literature, little attention has
been paid to the problems of how the un-
certainty reflected by natural language text
(e.g. verbal and linguistic uncertainty) can
be explicitly formulated in argumentation
schemes, and how argumentation schemes
enriched with various types of uncertainty
can be exploited to support argumentation
mining and evaluation. In this paper, we
focus on the first problem, and introduce
some preliminary ideas about how to clas-
sify and encompass uncertainty in argu-
mentation schemes.
1 Introduction
Mining and evaluating arguments from natural
language text (Green et al., 2014) is a relatively
new research direction with applications in sev-
eral areas ranging from legal reasoning (Palau and
Moens, 2011) to product evaluation (Wyner et al.,
2012). Argumentation schemes (Walton et al.,
2008) are commonly adopted in this context as a
first modeling tool: it is assumed that natural ar-
guments adhere to a set of paradigmatic schemes,
so that these schemes can be used both to drive
the identification of the arguments present in the
text and, after that, to support their formal rep-
resentation. As a further step, the assessment of
argument justification status requires to identify
the relations among them and to apply a formal
method, called argumentation semantics to derive
the status from these relations. For instance, the
well known1 Dung’s theory of abstract argumenta-
tion (Dung, 1995) focuses on the relation of attack
between arguments and provides a rich variety of
alternative semantics (Baroni et al., 2011) for ar-
gument evaluation on this basis.
∗Corresponding author
1Due to space limitations, we assume knowledge of
Dung’s theory in the following.
When dealing with natural language sources,
one of the challenging problems is to handle the
uncertainty of arguments. In fact, natural language
statements typically include several kinds of un-
certainty. This calls for the need to encompass
uncertainty in the formalisms which are meant to
provide a representation of natural arguments, first
of all in argumentation schemes, in order to avoid
that some useful information carried by the text
source is lost in the first modelling step.
To illustrate this problem, let us consider a sim-
ple example concerning two conflicting natural
language excerpts E1 and E2, possibly taken from
some medical publications:
E1: According to [Smith 98], drug X often
causes the side effect Y.
E2: According to recent experimental trials, it
is highly likely that drug X does not increase the
probability of the side effect Y.
In order to identify argument structures in these
texts, one may resort to specific argumentation
schemes. Referring to the classification proposed
in (Walton et al., 2008), E1 can be represented by
an argumentA1 which is an instance of the scheme
Argument from Expert Opinion, while E2 by an
argument A2 which is an instance of the scheme
Argument From Falsification.
After A1 and A2 are identified, it may be noted
that (though expressed with different linguistic nu-
ances) their conclusions are in conflict: briefly, A1
leads to the claim that X causes Y, while A2 to the
claim that X does not cause Y. As a consequence,
a mutual attack relation between A1 and A2 can
be identified. Then, the arguments and their at-
tacks can be formalized as an abstract argumen-
tation framework AF = ({A1, A2}, {(A1, A2),
(A2, A1)}) and the status of arguments in AF can
be evaluated according to a given argumentation
semantics. For instance, under grounded seman-
tics, both A1 and A2 are not accepted. It must
be noted however that such a modelling approach
(and the relevant outcome in terms of argument
evaluation) overlooks some information which is
(implicitly or explicitly) carried by the text and
that may lead, in particular, to have one of the ar-
guments prevailing over the other. For instance, as
considered in (Bex et al., 2013), one may have a
preference relation over argument schemes so that,
for instance, the scheme Argument From Falsifi-
cation is preferred to the scheme Argument from
Expert Opinion. Accordingly, A2 would be pre-
ferred to A1, and the attack relation would not be
mutual, due to the inability ofA1 to attackA2 (see
the notion of preference-dependent attack in (Bex
et al., 2013)). In this case, we would get a differ-
ent argumentation framework AF ′ = ({A1, A2},
{(A2, A1)}). Then, under grounded semantics,
A1 is rejected, while A2 is accepted.
However, a static preference relation on the
adopted scheme appears too rigid: in most cases
the preference for an argument over another one
is not simply based on their structure but, rather,
on their content. To exemplify, in this case, one
may have different opinions on the reliability of
the source [Smith 98], mentioned in E1, and of
the experimental trials mentioned in E2. More-
over, the two excerpts include several terms ex-
pressing vagueness and/or uncertainty, like of-
ten, highly likely, the probability of, that may
be taken into account in the preference ranking
of arguments. However, this is not possible in
the approach sketched above, since the argument
schemes adopted in the formalization do not en-
compass these forms of uncertainty and the rele-
vant information carried by the text is lost in the
first modelling step.
Given the pervasiveness of vagueness and un-
certainty in natural language this appears to be
a severe limitation for the use of argumentation
schemes in argument mining from texts. To over-
come this problem we envisage the study of ar-
gumentation schemes extended with uncertainty
in the context of the process sketched in Figure
1. Here argumentation schemes with uncertainty
are used to extract arguments from texts, keeping
explicit the relevant uncertainties that can then be
used in the step of argument evaluation using suit-
able abstract formalisms and semantics with un-
certainty. As to the latter step, the study of ex-
tensions of Dung’s framework with explicit un-
certainty representation is receiving increasing at-
tention in recent years (Li et al., 2011a; Thimm,
2012; Hunter, 2013a; Hunter, 2014) while, to the
best of our knowledge, lesser work has been de-
voted to encompassing uncertainty in argumenta-
tion schemes.
This long-term research goal involves several
basic questions including:
1) How the uncertainty reflected by natural lan-
guage text can be explicitly formulated in argu-
mentation schemes?
2) How argumentation schemes enriched with
various types of uncertainty can be exploited to
support argument mining and evaluation?
3) Which is (are) the most appropriate abstract
formalism(s) for the evaluation of arguments with
uncertainty?
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Figure 1: From natural language to argument eval-
uation: a schematic process
By focusing on the first question, this paper
presents some preliminary ideas for encompassing
uncertainty in argumentation schemes.
The paper is organised as follows. We review
some examples of uncertainty classifications in
natural language texts in Section 2 and analyze
the non-uniformity of uncertainty representation
in existing argumentation schemes in Section 3.
Then, in Section 4 we exemplify and discuss a pre-
liminary approach for encompassing uncertainty
in argumentation schemes. Finally, Section 5 con-
cludes the paper.
2 Classifying uncertainty types in
natural language texts
In natural language texts different types of uncer-
tainty can be identified. To give a brief account of
the richness and complexity of this topic and of the
research activities that are being carried out in this
area, we quickly recall some examples of uncer-
tainty classifications considered in the literature.
In the context of scientific discourse, de Waard
and Maat (2012) distinguish knowledge evaluation
(also called epistemic modality) from knowledge
attribution (also called evidentiality). The former
basically concerns the degree of commitment with
respect to a given statement, while the latter con-
cerns the attribution of a piece of knowledge to
a source. Accordingly, different kinds of uncer-
tainty can be identified.
For instance, according to de Waard and Maat
(2012), sources of knowledge may be distin-
guished into the following categories:
1) Explicit source of knowledge: the knowledge
evaluation can be explicitly owned by the author
(‘We therefore conclude that . . . ’) or by a named
referent (‘Vijh et al. [28] demonstrated that . . . ’).
2) Implicit source of knowledge: if there is no
explicit source named, knowledge can implicitly
still be attributed to the author (‘ these results sug-
gest . . . ’) or an external source (‘It is generally
believed that . . . ’).
3) No source of knowledge: the source of
knowledge can be absent entirely, e.g. in factual
statements, such as ‘transcription factors are the
final common pathway driving differentiation’.
Since different sources may have different de-
grees of credibility, this leads to identify a first
type of uncertainty, namely the (possibly implicit)
source uncertainty.
As to knowledge evaluation, de Waard and Maat
(2012), following Wilbur et al. (2006), distinguish
four levels of certainty in the degree of commit-
ment of a subject to a statement: 1) Doxastic (firm
belief in truth), 2) Dubitative (some doubt about
the truth exists), 3) Hypothetical (the truth value is
only proposed), and 4) Lack of knowledge.
This kind of evaluation, called uncertainty
about statements in the following, is typically ex-
pressed through suitable linguistic modifiers.
Actually linguistic modifiers have a quite
generic nature and have been the subject of spe-
cific studies by themselves: Clark (1990) pro-
vides an extensive review of experimental stud-
ies concerning the use of linguistic uncertainty ex-
pressions, such as possible, probable, likely, very
likely, highly likely, etc., and their numerical rep-
resentation. Linguistic uncertainty is pervasive
in natural language communication. On the one
hand, it can be regarded as a form of uncertainty
expression (alternative to, e.g., numerical or im-
plicit uncertainty expressions) rather than as a dis-
tinct uncertainty type. On the other hand, linguis-
tic uncertainty may be regarded as a generic type
of uncertainty, of which other more specific forms
of uncertainty are subtypes. This generic type can
be associated to those natural language statements
to which a more specific uncertainty type can not
be applied. For the sake of the preliminary analy-
sis carried out in this paper, we will adopt the latter
view.
Regan et al. (2002) distinguish between epis-
temic uncertainty (uncertainty in determinate
facts) and linguistic uncertainty (uncertainty in
language) and claims that the latter has received
by far less attention in uncertainty classifications
in the fields of ecology and biology. Linguistic
uncertainty is in turn classified into five distinct
types: vagueness, context dependence, ambigu-
ity, indeterminacy of theoretical terms, and un-
derspecificity, with vagueness being claimed to be
the most important for practical purposes. In fact,
all of them refer in some way to the problem that
some natural language expressions admit alterna-
tive interpretations. Hence this classification is fo-
cused on a specific form of uncertainty and the use
of the term linguistic uncertainty here is rather re-
stricted with respect to other works.
Taking into account the discussion above, in this
paper we consider, as a starting point, three uncer-
tainty types:
1) Source uncertainty, denoted in the following
asU1, concerning the fact that to evaluate the cred-
ibility of different statements one may take into
account the credibility of their sources;
2) Uncertainty about a statement, denoted as
U2, arising in situations where a subject making
a statement expresses a partial degree of commit-
ment to the statement itself;
3)Linguistic uncertainty or uncertainty inside
a statement, denoted as U3, namely uncertainty
generically present in natural language statements,
with no further more precise meaning specified.
For instance in the sentences “According to
[Smith 98], Drug X causes headache” and “Ac-
cording to recent experimental trials, Drug X
causes headache”, one may identify U1 since they
refer the statement “Drug X causes headache” to a
source (a paper and clinical trials, respectively).
On the other hand, the sentence “It is likely that
Drug X causes headache” provides an example of
U2 since the statement “Drug X causes headache”
is not regarded as certain.
Finally, a sentence like “Drug X sometimes
causes severe headache” provides an example of
U3.
For a more articulated example including sev-
eral uncertainty types, let us consider the follow-
ing text, taken from (Swenson, 2014): “. . . , the
Mg inhibition of the actin-activated ATPase activ-
ity observed in class II myosins is likely the re-
sult of Mg-dependent alterations in actin binding.
Overall, our results suggest that Mg reduces the
ADP release rate constant and rate of attachment
to actin in both high and low duty ratio myosins. ”
Here, some expressions (likely and suggest that)
indicate a partial commitment of authors to the
corresponding statements (U2), and the knowl-
edge source is made explicit by the citation of
(Swenson, 2014) (U1). Further, the vague terms
(high and low) correspond to a form of generic
linguistic uncertainty inside the relevant statement
(U3).
3 Non-uniformity of uncertainty
representation in existing schemes
Given that uncertainty pervades natural language
texts and argumentation schemes appear as suit-
able formal tool for argumentation mining from
texts, the question of how to capture uncertainty in
argumentation schemes naturally arises. This ap-
pears to be an open research question, as the state-
of-the-art formulation of argumentation schemes
(Walton et al., 2008) does not consider uncertainty
explicitly, and, more critically, does not seem to
deal with uncertainty in a systematic way, though
somehow recognizing its presence. To exemplify
this problem let us compare two argumentation
schemes2 from (Walton et al., 2008).
The first scheme we consider, called Argument
from Position to Know (APK), is defined as fol-
lows:
Major Premise: Source a is in a position to
know about things in a certain subject
domain S containing proposition A.
Minor Premise: a asserts that A (in domain S)
is true (false).
Conclusion: A is true (false).
CQ1: Is a in a position to know whether A is
2Recall that an argument scheme basically consists of a
set of premises, a conclusion defeasibly derivable from the
premises according to the scheme, and a set of critical ques-
tions (CQs) that can be used to challenge arguments built on
the basis of the scheme.
true (false)?
CQ2: Is a an honest (trustworthy, reliable)
source?
CQ3: Did a assert that A is true?
In this scheme, no explicit uncertainty is in-
cluded, but the critical questions correspond to
several forms of uncertainty that may affect it.
The second scheme, called Argument from
Cause to Effect (ACE), is defined as follows:
Major Premise: Generally, if A occurs, then B
will (might) occur.
Minor Premise: In this case, A occurs (might
occur).
Conclusion: Therefore, in this case, B will
(might) occur.
CQ1: How strong is the causal generalization?
CQ2: Is the evidence cited (if there is any)
strong enough to warrant the casual
generalization?
CQ3: Are there other causal factors that could
interfere with the production of the effect in
the given case?
In this case, in addition to the implicit uncer-
tainty corresponding to critical questions, explicit
expressions of uncertainty are included, namely
the modifier Generally and the might specifica-
tions in the parentheses.
Clearly the representation of uncertainty in the
two schemes is not uniform (since the second
scheme encompasses explicit uncertainty in the
premises and the conclusion, while the first does
not) but it is not clear whether this non-uniformity
is based on some underlying difference between
the schemes or is just accidental in the natural
language formulation of the schemes. Indeed, it
seems possible to reformulate these schemes in a
dual manner (adding explicit uncertainty mentions
to the first one, removing them from the second
one) while not affecting their meaning, as follows:
APK with explicit uncertainty:
Major Premise: Source a is (possibly) in a
position to know about things in a certain
subject domain S containing proposition A.
Minor Premise: a asserts that A (in domain S)
is (might be) true (false).
Conclusion: A is (might be) true (false).
ACE without explicit uncertainty:
Major Premise: If A occurs, then B will occur.
Minor Premise: In this case, A occurs.
Conclusion: Therefore, in this case, B will
occur.
The above-mentioned non-uniformity suggests
that a more systematic treatment of uncertainty in
argument schemes is needed in order to face the
challenges posed by the representation of natural
language arguments.
Indeed, a recent work (Tang et al., 2013) ad-
dresses the relationships between uncertainty and
argument schemes in a related but complemen-
tary research direction. While the work described
in the present paper aims at enriching argumenta-
tion schemes proposed in the literature with ex-
plicit uncertainty representation in a systematic
way, Tang et al. (2013) introduce several novel ar-
gument schemes concerning reasoning about un-
certainty. This is done using Dempster-Shafer the-
ory of evidence in the context of a formalism for
the representation of evidence arguments. Differ-
ent schemes basically differ in the choice of the
rule for (numerical) evidence combination among
the many alternative combination rules available
in the literature, and the critical questions in each
scheme refer to the applicability conditions of the
relevant rule (e.g. Is each piece of evidence in-
dependent?). Investigating the possible reuse of
some of the specific ideas presented by Tang et al.
(2013) in the context of our broader modelling ap-
proach is an interesting direction of future work.
4 Encompassing uncertainty in
argumentation schemes
Devising a systematic approach to encompass
natural language uncertainty in argumentation
schemes is a long term research goal, posing
many conceptual and technical questions and chal-
lenges, partly evidenced in the previous sections.
We suggest that such an approach should include
the following “ingredients”:
1) a classification of uncertainty types;
2) a characterization of the uncertainty types
relevant to each argumentation scheme;
3) a formalism for the representation of uncer-
tainty evaluations (of various types) in actual ar-
guments, i.e. in instances of argument schemes;
4) a mechanism to derive an uncertainty evalu-
ation for the conclusion of an argument from the
evaluations concerning the premises and the ap-
plied scheme.
While each of the items listed above is, by it-
self, a large and open research question, we pro-
vide here some preliminary examples of point 2,
using for point 1 the simple classification intro-
duced in Section 2. In particular we suggest that
the scheme specification should be accompanied
by an explicit account of the types of uncertainty
it may involve, while the use of linguistic un-
certainty expressions in the scheme (like in ACE
above) should be avoided within the natural lan-
guage description of the scheme itself. This ap-
proach prevents the non-uniformities pointed out
in Section 3 and enforces the adoption of clear
modelling choices about uncertainty at the mo-
ment of definition of the scheme. In particular, as
evidenced below, it may point out some ambigui-
ties in the definition of the scheme itself.
In the following examples, we explicitly asso-
ciate uncertainty types with the premises of the
considered schemes (that may affected by them)
and with the critical questions (that point out
the potential uncertainty affecting the premises).
Analysing the uncertainty possibly affecting the
scheme itself or its applicability (that may also
be expressed by some critical questions) is left to
future work (and requires a richer classification
of uncertainty types), while, according to point 4
above, the uncertainty about the conclusion is re-
garded as a derived notion and, for the sake of the
present analysis, is considered as derived uncer-
tainty, denoted as DU. The syntax we use to as-
sociate uncertainty types with parts of argument
schemes is as follows: {. . .}[Ux, . . .], where the
part of the scheme (possibly) affected by uncer-
tainty is enclosed in braces and is followed by the
relevant uncertainty type(s) enclosed in brackets.
First, let us consider the APK scheme. Here,
the major premise explicitly refers to a source a,
so it can be associated with U1 (as evidenced by
the critical questions CQ1 and CQ2). Further one
may consider that the inclusion of propositionA in
domain S and the propositionA itself can be spec-
ified with some linguistic uncertainty (U3). As to
the minor premise, since it refers explicitly to a
given assertion, it can be associated with uncer-
tainty about assertions (U2). Actually, the critical
question CQ3 refers to the minor premise and its
statement “Did a assert that A is true?” is, in fact,
ambiguous as far as the type of uncertainty is con-
cerned. On the one hand it might raise a doubt
about the fact that a did actually make any asser-
tion about A, on the other hand it might raise a
doubt about the contents of the assertion made by
a. For instance, a might have made a weaker as-
sertion, like “A is probably true”, or a completely
different assertion like “A is false”. The three
alternatives mentioned above are rather different
and involve different uncertainty types. The pos-
sibility that a made a weaker assertion is a case
of U2, while if a made a completely different as-
sertion (or no assertion at all) about A, the entire
minor premise is challenged, and this amounts to
be uncertain about the credibility of the (implicit)
source from which we learned that “a asserted that
A is true”, hence a case of U1. As this ambiguity
is present in the current formulation of the scheme,
we leave it unresolved and indicate both types of
uncertainty for the minor premise and CQ3.
This leads to reformulate APK as follows:
Major Premise: {Source a is in a position to
know about things in a certain subject
domain S}[U1] {containing proposition
A}[U3].
Minor Premise: {a asserts that A (in domain S)
is true (false)}[U1,U2].
Conclusion: {A is true (false)}[DU].
CQ1: {Is a in a position to know whether A is
true (false)?}[U1]
CQ2: {Is a an honest (trustworthy, reliable)
source?}[U1]
CQ3: {Did a assert that A is true?}[U2,U1].
Let us now consider the ACE scheme. Its first
premise is a causal generalization, which, as sug-
gested by the use of (might) in its original formu-
lation, is not always valid. In our simple classifi-
cation this can be regarded as a form of linguistic
uncertainty inside the statement (U3). This kind
of uncertainty may also affect the actual formu-
lation of the statements A and B in the instantia-
tions of the scheme. The major premise is chal-
lenged by CQ1 and CQ2. While their interpreta-
tion allows some overlap, CQ1 seems to concerns
the “strength” of the causal generalization as it is
formulated, while CQ2 refers to the implicit evi-
dential source of knowledge supporting the causal
generalization. Accordingly, CQ1 may be referred
to U3, while CQ2 to U1.
The minor premise concerns the observation of
a fact (the occurrence of A), that might involve lin-
guistic uncertainty U3. Indeed, also the observa-
tion of the occurrence of A might have a source,
so that, in principle, the second premise might
be affected by U1, and one might have an addi-
tional critical question CQ+ like “Does A actu-
ally occur?”, which would turn out very similar
in nature to CQ3 in the APK scheme. The fact
that a question like CQ+ is not considered in this
scheme, points out a further non-uniformity in the
formulation of argument schemes: one may won-
der why a sort of explicit confirmation of the mi-
nor premise is required by a critical question in the
APK scheme, while the same kind of confirma-
tion is not required in the ACE scheme. While one
might answer that similar questions may have a
different importance in different schemes, we sug-
gest that a further analysis is needed to address
these issues in a systematic way and that a clas-
sification of uncertainty types can be very useful
in this respect. To point out this, we add CQ+
in the revised version of the ACE scheme, with
the relevant uncertainty type U1 associated with
the minor premise. Finally, CQ3 raises the ques-
tion about possible other factors interfering with
the causal relation between A and B, i.e. suggests
the presence of possible exceptions in the applica-
tion of the scheme. This kind of uncertainty is not
encompassed in our simplistic preliminary classi-
fication, hence we let it unspecified (denoted as
[??]), as a pointer to future developments. This
leads to reformulate ACE as follows:
Major Premise:{If A occurs, then B will occur}
[U1,U3].
Minor Premise: {In this case, A occurs}
[U1,U3].
Conclusion:{Therefore, in this case, B will
occur} [DU ].
CQ1: {How strong is the causal
generalization?}[U3]
CQ2: {Is the evidence cited (if there is
any) strong enough to warrant the casual
generalization?}[U1]
CQ+: {Does A actually occur?}[U1]
CQ3: {Are there other causal factors that
could interfere with the production of the
effect in the given case?}[??]
5 Conclusions
In recent years, the issue of combining ex-
plicit uncertainty representation and argumenta-
tion has received increasing attention, with sev-
eral works dealing in particular with probabilistic
argumentation (Dung and Thang, 2010; Hunter,
2012; Hunter, 2013b; Li et al., 2011b). These
works are based on formal argumentation the-
ories like Dung’s abstract argumentation frame-
works (Dung, 1995) or logic-based argumenta-
tion (Hunter, 2013b). This paper suggests that
these investigations on the formal side should be
complemented by efforts on the conceptual and
semi-formal side, with particular reference to the
argumentation schemes model. Argumentation
schemes provide a very intuitive semi-formal rep-
resentation approach for natural arguments and are
indeed adopted in several works as a first level
modelling tool to identify and extract arguments
from natural language texts. However, as evi-
denced in this paper, argumentation schemes need
to be enriched and extended in order to capture
the various kinds of uncertainty typically present
in natural language arguments. The present work
provides a preliminary contribution to this re-
search line, by pointing out some problems and
providing some simple examples of how they
might be tackled. Future work directions are huge
and include an extensive review of the uncertainty
types considered in the literature, with special at-
tention to works in the area of argumentation min-
ing, and a systematic analysis of the various ways
argument schemes may be affected by different
uncertainty types.
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Abstract
It is time to develop a community research
agenda in argumentation mining. I suggest
some questions to drive a joint commu-
nity research agenda and then explain how
my research in argumentation, on support
tools and knowledge representations, ad-
vances argumentation mining.
1 Time for a community research agenda
This year, argumentation mining is receiving sig-
nificant attention. Five different events from April
to July 2014 focus on topics such as arguing on the
Web, argumentation theory and natural language
processing, and argumentation mining. A coor-
dinated research agenda could help advance this
work in a systematic way.
We have not yet agreed on the most fundamen-
tal issues:
Q1 What counts as ‘argumentation’, in the con-
text of the argumentation mining task?
Q2 How do we measure the success of an argu-
mentation mining task? (e.g. corpora & gold
standards)
“Argumentation mining, is a relatively
new challenge in corpus-based discourse
analysis that involves automatically iden-
tifying argumentative structures within a
document, e.g., the premises, conclusion,
and argumentation scheme of each argu-
ment, as well as argument-subargument
and argument-counterargument relation-
ships between pairs of arguments in the
document.”1 (Green et al., 2014)
⇤This work was carried out during the tenure of an
ERCIM “Alain Bensoussan” Fellowship Programme. The re-
search leading to these results has received funding from the
European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-
2013) under grant agreement no 246016.
An informatics perspective (i.e. concerned with
supporting human activity) could help us under-
standing how we will apply argumentation min-
ing; this should sharpen the definition of the argu-
mentation mining task(s). Given such an opera-
tionalization, we can then use the standard natural
language processing approach: define a corpus of
interest, make a gold standard annotation, test al-
gorithms, iterate...
For instance, to operationalize the definition of
argumentation mining (Q1), we need to know:
Q1a How do we plan to use the results of argu-
mentation mining?
Q1b What domain(s) and human tasks are to be
supported?
Q1c What is the appropriate level of granularity
of argument structures in a given context?
Which models of argumentation are most ap-
propriate?
This can be challenging because argumentation
has a variety of meanings and uses, in fields from
philosophy to rhetoric to law; some of the pur-
poses for using argumentation are shown in Fig-
ure 1.Understanding how we will use the results of
argumentation mining can help address important
questions related to Q2, such as measuring the suc-
cess of algorithms and support tools for identify-
ing arguments. In particular:
Q2a How accurate does argumentation mining
need to be?
Q2b In which applications are algorithms for auto-
matically extracting argumentation most ap-
propriate?
Q2c In which applications are support tools for
semi-automatically extracting argumentation
more appropriate?
In my work I have tried to bring applications of
argumentation mining to the forefront. My work
falls into three main areas: supporting human
argumentation with computer tools (CSCW), rep-
Figure 1: Argumentation can be used for many purposes.
Download an editable version of this figure from FigShare DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.1149925
resenting argumentation in ontologies (knowledge
representation), and mining arguments from so-
cial media (information extraction using argumen-
tation theory).
2 Computer-Supported Collaborative
Work
Arguing appears throughout human activity, to
support reasoning and decision-making. The ap-
plication area determines the particular genres
and subgenres of language that should be inves-
tigated (Q1b). The appropriate level of granular-
ity (Lawrence et al., 2014) depends on whether
we are in a literary work or a law case or a so-
cial media discussion (Q1c). The acceptable error
rate (Q2a) follows from human tolerances, which
we expect to depend on the area; this in turn de-
termines whether we completely automate argu-
mentation mining (Q2b) or merely provide semi-
automatic support (Q2c). This is why I emphasize
looking at application areas to determine which
problems to focus our attention on, for argument
mining.
My thesis described a general, informatics ap-
proach to supporting argumentation in collabora-
tive online decision-making (Schneider, 2014b):
1. Analyze requirements for argumentation sup-
port in a given situation, context, or commu-
nity.
2. Consider which argumentation models to
use; test their suitability, using features such
as the appropriate level of granularity and the
tasks to be supported.
3. Build a prototype support tool, using a model
of argumentation structures.
4. Evaluate and iterate.
In this approach, argumentation mining sup-
ports scalability, by providing automatic or semi-
automatic identification of the relevant arguments.
I have applied this methodology to Wikipedia
information quality debates, which are used to de-
termine whether to delete a given topic from the
encyclopedia (Schneider, 2014b). We tested two
argumentation models: Walton’s argumentation
schemes (Schneider et al., 2013) and the theory of
factors/dimensions (Schneider et al., 2012c), and
our annotated data is available online.2 Whereas
Walton’s argumentation schemes could have pro-
vided support for writing arguments, we instead
chose to use domain-specific decision factors to
filter the overall debate in the prototype support
tool we built. One difference is that Walton’s
argumentation schemes are at the micro-level—
structuring the premises and conclusions of a
given argument—whereas decision factors are at
the macro-level, identifying the topics important
to discuss; this distinction may be relevant for ar-
gumentation mining (Schneider, 2014a).
3 Knowledge Representation
Argumentation mining assumes a way to pack-
age arguments so that they can be exchanged and
shared. Structured representations of arguments
allow “evaluating, comparing and identifying the
relationships between arguments” (Rahwan et al.,
2011). And the knowledge representations most
commonly used for the Web are ontologies.
To investigate the existing ontologies for struc-
turing arguments on the social web, we wrote “A
Review of Argumentation for the Social Semantic
Web” (Schneider et al., 2012b).
2http://purl.org/jsphd
The review compares:
• 13 theoretical models for capturing argument
structure (Toulmin, IBIS, Walton, Dung,
Value-based Arg. Frameworks, Speech
Act Theory, Language/Action Perspective,
Pragma-dialectic, Metadiscourse, RST, Co-
herence, and Cognitive Coherence Rela-
tions).
• Applications of these theoretical models.
• Ontologies incorporating argumentation (in-
cluding AIF, LKIF, IBIS and many others).
• 37 collaborative Web-based tools with ar-
gumentative discussion components (drawn
from Social Web practice as well as from aca-
demic researchers).
Thus the argumentation community can choose
from a number of existing approaches for struc-
turing argumentation on the Web.
Still, new approaches continue to be suggested.
Peldszus and Stede have suggested a promising
proposal for annotating arguments using Free-
man’s argumentation macrostructure (Peldszus
and Stede, 2013). And for biomedical communi-
cations, Clark et al have proposed a micropublica-
tions ontology based on Toulmin’s model for pay-
as-you-go construction of claim-argument net-
works from scientific papers (Clark et al., 2014).
We are using this ontology—the micropublica-
tions ontology3—to model evidence about phar-
macokinetic drug interactions (Schneider et al.,
2014a) in a joint project organized by Richard
Boyce.
We have also developed two ontologies related
to argumentation. First, WD, the Wiki Discussion
ontology4 (Schneider, 2014b) was alluded to in
Section 2: WD is used for argumentation support
for decision-making discussions in ad-hoc online
collaboration, applying factors/dimensions theory.
Second, ORCA is an Ontology of Reasoning, Cer-
tainty and Attribution5 (de Waard and Schneider,
2012). Based on a taxonomy by de Waard, ORCA
is motivated by scientific argument. ORCA al-
lows distinguishing completely verified facts from
hypotheses: it records the certainty of knowledge
(lack of knowledge; hypothetical; dubitative; dox-
astic) as well as its basis (reasoning, data, uniden-
tified) and source (author or other, explicitly or im-
plicitly; or none).
3http://purl.org/mp/
4http://purl.org/wd/
5http://vocab.deri.ie/orca
4 Mining from Social Media
The third strand of our research is in mining argu-
ments from social media.
4.1 Characteristics of social media
To identify arguments in social media, we need
to know where to look. The intention of the au-
thor might be relevant, for instance we can ex-
pect different types of argument in messages, de-
pending on whether they are recreation, infor-
mation, instruction, discussion, and recommenda-
tion (Schneider et al., 2014b). In (Schneider et
al., 2012a), we suggested that relevant features
for argumentation in social media may include the
genre, metadata, properties of users, goals of a
particular dialogue, context and certainty, infor-
mal and indirect speech, implicit information, sen-
timent and subjectivity.
4.2 Information extraction based on
argumentation schemes
In a corpus of camera reviews, we examine the
argument that consumers give in reviews, focus-
ing on rationales about camera properties and con-
sumer values.
In collaboration with Liverpool researchers in-
cluding Adam Wyner (Wyner et al., 2012), we
describe the argumentation mining task in con-
sumer reviews as an information extraction task,
where we fill slots in a predetermined argumenta-
tion scheme, such as:
Consumer Argumentation Scheme:
Premise: Camera X has property P.
Premise:Property P promotes valueV for agentA.
Conclusion: Agent A should Action1 camera X.
Further details of the information extraction are
given in (Schneider and Wyner, 2012). In par-
ticular, we developed gazetteers for the camera
domain and user domain, and selected appropri-
ate discourse indicators and sentiment terminol-
ogy. These form part of an NLP pipeline in the
General Architecture for Text Engineering frame-
work. Resulting annotations can be viewed on a
document or searched with a corpus indexing and
querying tool, informing an argument analyst who
wishes to construct instances of the consumer ar-
gumentation scheme.
We have also presented additional argumenta-
tion schemes that model evaluative expressions in
reviews, focusing in (Wyner and Schneider, 2012)
on user models within a context of hotel reviews.
5 Conclusions
We have described our work related to argumen-
tation mining, which uses CSCW, knowledge rep-
resentation, argumentation theory and information
extraction. As we noted, different approaches
are appropriate for identifying and modeling ar-
guments in online debates (Schneider, 2014b) ver-
sus scientific papers (Schneider et al., 2014a), so
different application areas need to be considered.
We hope that our questions about argumentation
mining—starting with What counts as ‘argumen-
tation’, in the context of the argumentation mining
task? and How do we measure the success of an
argumentation mining task?—drive the commu-
nity towards establishing shared tasks. Shared cor-
pora and well-defined tasks are needed to propel
argumentation mining beyond a highly discussed
area into an agreed upon research challenge.
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Abstract
The paper discusses the architecture and
development of an Argument Workbench,
which supports an analyst in reconstruct-
ing arguments from across textual sources.
The workbench takes a semi-automated,
interactive approach searching in a corpus
for fine-grained argument elements, which
are concepts and conceptual patterns in
expressions that are associated with argu-
mentation schemes. The expressions can
then be extracted from a corpus and re-
constituted into instantiated argumentation
schemes for and against a given conclu-
sion. Such arguments can then be input
to an argument evaluation tool.
1 Introduction
We have large corpora of unstructured textual in-
formation such as in consumer websites (Ama-
zon), newspapers (BBC’s “Have Your Say”, or in
policy responses to public consultations. The in-
formation is complex, high volume, fragmentary,
and either linearly (Amazon or BBC) or alinearly
(policy responses) presented as a series of com-
ments or statements. Given the lack of structure of
the corpora, the cumulative argumentative mean-
ing of the texts is obscurely distributed across
texts. In order to make coherent sense of the infor-
mation, the content must be extracted, analysed,
and restructured into a form suitable for further
formal and automated reasoning (e.g. ASPAR-
TIX (Egly et al., 2008) that is grounded in Argu-
mentation Frameworks (Dung, 1995)). There re-
mains a significant knowledge acquisition bottle-
neck (Forsythe and Buchanan, 1993) between the
textual source and formal representation.
Argumentation text is rich, multi-dimensional,
and fine-grained, consisting of (among others): a
range of (explicit and implicit) discourse relations
between statements in the corpus, including indi-
cators for conclusions and a premises; speech acts
and propositional attitudes; contrasting sentiment
terminology; and domain terminology that is rep-
resented in the verbs, nouns, and modifiers of sen-
tences. Moreover, linguistic expression is various,
given alternative syntactic or lexical forms for re-
lated semantic meaning. It is difficult for people to
reconstruct argument from text, and even moreso
for a computer.
Yet, the presentation of argumentation in text is
not a random or arbitrary combination of such el-
ements, but is somewhat structured into reasoning
patterns, e.g. defeasible argumentation schemes
(Walton, 1996). Furthermore, the scope of linguis-
tic variation is not unlimited, nor unconstrained:
diathesis alternations (related syntactic forms) ap-
pear in systematic patterns (Levin, 1993); a the-
sarus is a finite compendium of lexical seman-
tic relationships (Fellbaum, 1998); discourse rela-
tions (Webber et al., 2011) and speech acts (Searle
and Vanderveken, 1985) (by and large) signal sys-
tematic semantic relations between sentences or
between sentences and contexts; and the expres-
sivity of contrast and sentiment is scoped (Horn,
2001; Pang and Lee, 2008). A more open-ended
aspect of argumentation in text is domain knowl-
edge that appears as terminology. Yet here too,
in a given corpus on a selected topic, discus-
sants demonstrate a high degree of topical co-
herence, signalling that similar or related concep-
tual domain models are being deployed. Though
argumentation text is complex and coherence is
obscured, taken together it is also underlyingly
highly organised; after all, people do argue, which
is meaningful only where there is some under-
standing about what is being argued about and
how the meaning of their arguments is linguis-
tically conveyed. Without such underlying or-
ganisation, we could not successfully reconstruc-
tion and evaluate arguments from source materi-
als, which is contrary to what is accomplished in
argument analysis.
The paper proposes that the elements and struc-
tures of the lexicon, syntax, discourse, argumen-
tation, and domain terminology can be deployed
to support the identification and extraction of rel-
evant fine-grained textual passages from across
complex, distributed texts. The passages can then
be reconstituted into instantiated argumentation
schemes. It discusses an argument workbench that
takes a semi-automated, interactive approach, us-
ing a text mining development environment, to
flexibly query for concepts (i.e. semantically an-
notated) and patterns of concepts within sentences,
where the concepts and patterns are associated
with argumentation schemes. The concepts and
patterns are based on the linguistic and domain
information. The results of the queries are ex-
tracted from a corpus and interactively reconsti-
tuted into instantiated argumentation schemes for
and against a given conclusion. Such arguments
can then be input to an argument evaluation tool.
From such an approach, a “grammar” for argu-
ments can be developed and resources (e.g. gold
corpora) provided.
The paper presents a sample use case, elements
and structures, tool components, and outputs of
queries. Broadly, the approach builds on (Wyner
et al., 2013; Wyner et al., 2014; Wyner et al.,
2012). The approach is contrasted against statis-
tical/machine learning, high level approaches that
specify a grammar, and tasks to annotate single
passages of argument.
2 Tool Development and Use
In this section, some of the main elements of the
tool and how it is used are briefly outlined.
2.1 Use Case and Materials
The sample use case is based on Amazon con-
sumer reviews about purchasing a camera. Con-
sumer reviews can be construed as presenting ar-
guments concerning a decision about what to buy
based on various factors. Consumers argue in such
reviews about what features a camera has, the rel-
ative advantages, experiences, and sources of mis-
information. These are qualitative, linguistically
expressed arguments.
2.2 Components of Analysis
The analysis has several subcomponents: a con-
sumer argumentation scheme, discourse indica-
tors, sentiment terminology, and a domain model.
The consumer argumentation scheme (CAS) is de-
rived from the value-based practical reasoning ar-
gumentation scheme (Atkinson and Bench-Capon,
2007); it represents the arguments for or against
buying the consumer item relative to preferences
and values. A range of explicit discourse indica-
tors (Webber et al., 2011) are automatically anno-
tated, such as those signalling premise, e.g. be-
cause, conclusion e.g. therefore, or contrast and
exception, e.g. not, except. Sentiment terminol-
ogy (Nielsen, 2011) is signalled by lexical seman-
tic contrast: The flash worked poorly is the se-
mantic negation of The flash worked flawlessly,
where poorly is a negative sentiment and flaw-
lessly is a positive sentiment. Contrast indicators
can similarly be used. Domain terminology spec-
ifies the objects and properties that are relevant to
the users. To some extent the terminology can be
automatically acquired (term frequency) or man-
ually derived and structured into an ontology, e.g
from consumer report magazines or available on-
tologies. Given the modular nature of the analy-
sis as well as the tool, auxilary components can
be added such as speech act verbs, propositional
attitude verbs, sentence conjunctions to split sen-
tences, etc. Each such component adds a further
dimension to the analysis of the corpus.
2.3 Components of the Tool
To recognise the textual elements of Section 2.2,
we use the GATE framework (Cunningham et al.,
2002) for language engineering applications. It is
an open source desktop application written in Java
that provides a user interface for professional lin-
guists and text engineers to bring together a wide
variety of natural language processing tools in a
pipeline and apply them to a set of documents.
Our approach to GATE tool development follows
(Wyner and Peters, 2011). Once a GATE pipeline
has been applied to a corpus, we can view the an-
notations of a text either in situ or extracted using
GATE’s ANNIC (ANNotations In Context) corpus
indexing and querying tool.
In GATE, the gazetteers associate textual pas-
sages in the corpus that match terms on the lists
with an annotation. The annotations introduced by
gazetteers are used by JAPE rules, creating anno-
Figure 1: Query and Sample Result
tations that are visible as highlighted text, can be
reused to construct higher level annotations, and
are easily searchable in ANNIC. Querying for an
annotation or a pattern of annotations, we retrieve
all the terms with the annotation.
2.4 Output and Queries
The ANNIC tool indexes the annotated text and
supports semantic querying. Searching in the cor-
pus for single or complex patterns of annotations
returns all those strings that are annotated with
pattern along with their context and source doc-
ument. Complex queries can also be formed. A
query and a sample result appear in Figure 1,
where the query finds all sequences where the
first string is annotated with PremiseIndicator, fol-
lowed some tokens, then a string annotated with
Positive sentiment, some tokens, and finally end-
ing with a string that is annotated as CameraProp-
erty. The search returned a range of candidate
structures that can be further scrutinised; the query
can be iteratively refined to zero on in other rele-
vant passages. The example can be taken as part
of a positive justification for buying the camera.
The query language (the language of the annota-
tions) facilitates complex search for any of the an-
notations in the corpus, enabling exploration of the
statements in the corpus.
2.5 Analysis of Arguments and their
Evaluation
The objective of the tool is to find specific pat-
terns of terminology in the text that can be used
to instantiate the CAS argumentation scheme both
for and against purchase of a particular model of
camera. We iteratively search the corpus for prop-
erties, instantiate the argumentation scheme, and
identify attacks. Once we have instantiated argu-
ments in attack relations, we may evaluate the ar-
gumentation framework. Our focus in this paper
is the identification of arguments and attacks from
the source material rather than evaluation. It is im-
portant to emphasise that we provide an analyst’s
support tool, so some degree of judgement is re-
quired.
From the results of queries on the corpus, we
have identified the following premises bearing on
image quality, where we paraphrase the source
and infer the values from context. Agents are also
left implicit, assuming that a single agent does not
make contradictory statements. The premises in-
stantiate the CAS in a positive form, where A1 is
an argument for buying the camera; similarly, we
can identify statements and instantiated argumen-
tation schemes against buying the camera.
A1. P1: The pictures are perfectly exposed.
P2: The pictures are well-focused.
V1: These properties promote image quality.
C1: Therefore, you (the reader) should by
the Canon SX220.
Searching in the corpus we can find statements
contrary to the premises in A1, constituting an at-
tack on A1. To defeat these attacks and maintain
A1, we would have to search further in the corpus
for contraries to the attacks. Searching for such
statements and counterstatements is facilitated by
the query tool.
3 Discussion
The paper presents an outline of an implemented,
semi-automatic, interactive rule-based text ana-
lytic tool to support analysts in identifying fine-
grained, relevant textual passages that can be re-
constructed into argumentation schemes and at-
tacks. As such, it is not evaluated with respect
to recall and precision (Mitkof, 2003) in com-
parison to a gold standard, but in comparison to
user facilitation (i.e. analysts qualitative evalu-
ation of using the tool or not), a work that re-
mains to be done. The tool is an advance over
graphically-based argument extraction tools that
rely on the analysts’ unstructured, implicit, non-
operationalised knowledge of discourse indicators
and content (van Gelder, 2007; Rowe and Reed,
2008; Liddo and Shum, 2010; Bex et al., 2014).
There are logic programming approaches that au-
tomatically annotate argumentative texts: (Pallotta
and Delmonte, 2011) classify statements accord-
ing to rhetorical roles using full sentence parsing
and semantic translation; (Saint-Dizier, 2012) pro-
vides a rule-oriented approach to process specific,
highly structured argumentative texts. (Moens et
al., 2007) manually annotates legal texts then con-
structs a grammar that is tailored to automatically
annotated the passages. Such rule-oriented ap-
proaches do not use argumentation schemes or do-
main models; they do not straightforwardly pro-
vide for complex annotation querying; and they
are stand-alone tools that are not integrated with
other NLP tools.
The interactive, incremental, semi-automatic
approach taken here is in contrast to statis-
tical/machine learning approaches. Such ap-
proaches rely on prior creation of gold standard
corpora that are annotated manually and adjudi-
cated (considering interannotator agreement). The
gold standard corpora are then used to induce a
model that (if succesful) annotates corpora com-
parably well to the human annotation. For exam-
ple, where sentences in a corpora are annotated as
premise or conclusion, the model ought also to an-
notate the sentences similarly; in effect, what a
person uses to classify a sentence as premise or
conclusion can be acquired by the computer. Sta-
tistical approaches yield a probability that some
element is classified one way or the other; the jus-
tification, such as found in a rule-based system,
for the classification cannot be given. Moreover,
refinement of results in statistical approaches rely
on enlarging the training data. Importantly, the
rule-based approach outlined here could be used
to support the creation of gold standard corpora
on which statistical models can be trained. Finally,
we are not aware of statistical models that support
the extraction of the fine-grained information that
appears to be required for extracting argument el-
ements.
We should emphasis an important aspect of this
tool in relation to the intended use on corpora.
The tool is designed to apply to reconstruct or
construct arguments that are identified in complex,
high volume, fragmentary, and alinearly presented
comments or statements. This is in contrast to
many approaches that, by and large, follow the
structure of arguments within a particular (large
and complex) document, e.g. the BBC’s Moral
Maze (Bex et al., 2014), manuals (Saint-Dizier,
2012), and legal texts (Moens et al., 2007). In
addition, the main focus of our tool is not just
the premise-claim relationship, but rich concep-
tual patterns that indicate the content of expres-
sions and are essential in instantiating argumenta-
tion schemes.
The development of the tool can proceed mod-
ularly, adding argumentation schemes, developing
more articulated domain models, disambiguating
discourse indicators (Webber et al., 2011), intro-
ducing auxilary linguistic indicators such as other
verb classes, and other parts of speech that distin-
guish sentence components. The tool will be ap-
plied to more extensive corpora and have output
that is associated with argument graphing tools.
More elaborate query patterns could be executed
to derive more specific results. In general, the
openness and lexibility of the tool provide a plat-
form for future, detailed solutions to a range of
argumentation related issues.
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Abstract
In this paper we explore the relationship
between the genre of a text and the types
of situations introduced by the clauses
of the text, working from the perspective
of the theory of discourse modes (Smith,
2003). The typology of situation types dis-
tinguishes between, for example, events,
states, generic statements, and speech acts.
We analyze texts of different genres from
two English text corpora, the Penn Dis-
course TreeBank (PDTB) and the Manu-
ally Annotated SubCorpus (MASC) of the
Open American National Corpus. Texts of
different types – genres in the PDTB and
subcorpora in MASC – are segmented into
clauses, and each clause is labeled with
the type of situation it introduces to the
discourse. We then compare the distri-
bution of situation types across different
text types, finding systematic differences
across genres. Our findings support pre-
dictions of the discourse modes theory and
offer new insights into the relationship be-
tween text types and situation type distri-
butions.
1 Introduction
Language is not a unitary phenomenon, and pat-
terns of language use change according to the type
of text under investigation. In natural language
processing, furthermore, it has been shown that
there are strong effects from both the domain and
the genre of texts on the performance of systems
performing automatic analysis. These effects are
relevant at nearly all levels of analysis, from part-
of-speech tagging to discourse parsing, yet they
are in some ways poorly understood. For exam-
ple, there is no single agreed-upon set of text types
that suits all levels of analysis, nor are we aware of
systematic guidelines for sorting texts into genre
categories; this process often relies on human in-
tuition and the claim that “I know [a document of
type X] when I see one.”
Rather than conceptualizing text type purely as
a document-level characteristic, in this study we
take inspiration from a theory which targets text
passages as an intermediate level of representa-
tion. The idea is that most texts are in fact a mix
of passages of different types. For example, a
news story may begin with a short narrative pas-
sage which focuses on one individual’s reaction
to the newsworthy event and then proceed with a
more informative discussion of the topic at hand.
Smith (2003) identifies five different types of text
passages, or discourse modes, each of which is
associated with certain linguistic characteristics of
the text passage. (See Sec. 2 for more on the
modes and the linguistic characteristics.) This
study investigates how closely the predicted lin-
guistic characteristics of certain text types are re-
flected in a body of naturally occurring texts.
We focus on genre differences at the level of
the clause, considering the types of situations in-
troduced to the discourse by clauses of text. Ac-
cording to Smith, the situation (or situation en-
tity) types presented in a text are an important
characteristic for distinguishing between the dif-
ferent types of text passages. Using two sets of
documents (see Sec. 3) with genre labels, we in-
vestigate the distributions of situation types (see
Sec. 2.1 for the inventory of situation types) for
the different text types. We find systematic differ-
ences between news/jokes texts on the one hand
and essay/persuasive texts on the other, as the the-
ory predicts. In the final section of the paper, we
briefly discuss potential applications of these find-
ings to argumentation mining.
Mode Distribution of SEs Progression
NARRATIVE mostly Event, State SEs relate to one another; dynamic events
advance narrative time
REPORT mostly Event, State, SEs related to Speech Time; time progresses
General Stative forward & backward from that time
DESCRIPTION mostly Event, State, Time is static; text progresses in spatial
ongoing Event terms through the scene described
INFORMATION mostly General Stative atemporal; progressing on a metaphoric path
through the domain of the text
ARGUMENT / mostly General Stative, atemporal; progressing on a metaphoric path
COMMENTARY Fact, Proposition through the domain of the text
Table 1: Discourse modes and their linguistic correlates according to Smith (2005).
2 Discourse modes: a theory of text
passages and their types
Smith (2003) proposes to analyze discourse at the
level of the text passage, viewing each individ-
ual text as a mixture of text passages. These
passages are contiguous regions of text, gen-
erally one or more paragraphs, with particular
discourse functions. Each passage belongs to
one of five discourse modes: NARRATIVE, RE-
PORT, DESCRIPTION, INFORMATION, ARGU-
MENT/COMMENTARY. Importantly, the modes
can be characterized according to two broad
classes of linguistic correlates: the mode of pro-
gression through the text passage (roughly tempo-
ral or atemporal), and the distribution of situation
entity types. The modes and their correlates ap-
pear in Table 1.
2.1 Situation entities
In this work we are directly concerned with the
second type of linguistic correlate: the situation
entities. A situation entity (SE) can be thought of
as the abstract object introduced to the discourse
by a clause of text. The type of the SE introduced
by a clause depends on, among other things, the
internal temporal properties of the verb and its ar-
guments. The interpretation of the verb constel-
lation may of course by influenced by adverbials
and other linguistic factors. We are primarily in-
terested in finite clauses, for the most part assum-
ing that each clause introduces one SE.1
The SE types fall into four broad categories.
1For a more detailed discussion of situation entities,
please see Friedrich and Palmer (2014b). For even more in-
formation, see our project page (http:\\sitent.coli.
uni-saarland.de) and the references cited there, includ-
ing a detailed annotation manual.
Eventualities describe particular situations such
as Events (1) or States (2).
(1) The tour guide pointed to the mosaic.
(EVENT)
(2) The view from the castle is spectacular.
(STATE)
The class of General Statives includes Gen-
eralizing Sentences (3), which report regularities,
and Generic Sentences (4), which make statements
about kinds or classes.
(3) Silke often feeds my cats.
(GENERALIZING SENTENCE)
(4) The male cardinal has a black beak.
(GENERIC SENTENCE)
The third class of SE types are Abstract Enti-
ties, which differ from the other SE types in how
they relate to the world: Eventualities and Gen-
eral Statives are located spatially and temporally
in the world, but Abstract Entities are not. Facts
(5) are objects of knowledge, and Propositions (6)
are objects of belief. In the following examples,
the underlined clauses introduce Abstract Entities
to the discourse.
(5) I know that his plane arrived at 11:00.
(FACT)
(6) I believe that his plane arrived at 11:00.
(PROPOSITION)
Finally, we introduce the category Speech Acts
for clauses whose main function is performative:
namely, Questions (7) and Imperatives (8).
(7) Why is it so? (QUESTION)
(8) Please sign and return to the sender.
(IMPERATIVE)
2.2 Linking situation types and discourse
modes: what does the theory predict?
The broad aim of this study is to compare
the predictions of the theory to evidence from
text corpora, in particular with respect to the
distributions of SEs across different text types.
We focus on two modes: REPORT and ARGU-
MENT/COMMENTARY. For the REPORT mode,
the expectation is that text passages should be
made up primarily of Eventualities (Events and
States) with some General Statives. The most fre-
quent SE types in the ARG/COMM mode, on the
other hand, should be primarily Abstract Entities
(Facts and Propositions) and General Statives.
To date there is no large body of data annotated
with discourse modes. Therefore, we instead look
directly at the distributions of SEs within text pas-
sages for which we have annotated data (Friedrich
and Palmer, 2014b), taking the genre category as-
signed within our text corpora as a proxy for dis-
course mode. We do this under the assumption
that some genres are associated with a certain pre-
dominant discourse mode. From that assumption,
we consider the average SE distributions per text
type to reflect the distributions expected from the
predominant mode. Specifically, we map texts
from the genres news and jokes to the REPORT
mode, and essays and fundraising letters to the
ARG/COMM mode.
3 Data for corpus study
We test the predictions of the theory on sets of
texts extracted from two different corpora, de-
scribed below. These corpora were chosen in large
part because they both group their texts according
to genre. Although the two corpora use a different
set of genre labels, both cover the two broad cate-
gories we are interested in. Annotation and analy-
sis of the two data sets are described in Sec. 4.
3.1 Penn Discourse TreeBank
The Penn Discourse TreeBank (PDTB) (Prasad et
al., 2008) provides annotations of discourse struc-
ture over a collection of texts from the Wall Street
Journal; these texts are from the Penn TreeBank
(Marcus et al., 1993), one of the most widely-
used annotated corpora in natural language pro-
cessing. In addition to discourse structure anno-
PDTB news 790
essays 1723
MASC news 2563
jokes 3453
essays 2404
letters 1850
Table 2: Number of SE-bearing clauses analyzed
per corpus, per genre.
tations, PDTB texts are hand-labeled with part-of-
speech tags, syntactic structure, and, as of rela-
tively recently, genre designations. Webber (2009)
found that the texts in PDTB belong to a number of
different categories and, further, that the discourse
relations marked in the texts pattern according to
the genre of the text. In fact, Webber (2009) in-
spired the current study, raising the question of
whether the SE type distributions found in texts
similarly reflect the genre of the text.
The PDTB texts are predominantly from the
news genre (roughly 1900 texts), with much
smaller numbers of texts from four other gen-
res: essays (roughly 170 texts), letters (roughly
60 texts), highlights (roughly 40 texts), and errata
(25 texts). From these, we extract 20 news texts
and 20 essay texts to be used in our study.
3.2 Manually Annotated Sub-Corpus
The second corpus used in this study is MASC
(Ide et al., 2008), the Manually Annotated Sub-
Corpus of the Open American National Cor-
pus.2 Overall, MASC contains roughly 500,000
words of text (both written text and transcribed
speech), balanced over 19 text types. In addition
to manually-checked annotations of sentence and
word boundaries, part-of-speech tags, named enti-
ties, and both shallow and deeper syntactic struc-
ture, some portions of MASC have been annotated
for a number of semantic and pragmatic phenom-
ena. For this study, though, we use only the genre
labels and our own SE annotations (see Sec. 4).
For our study, we extract texts from the writ-
ten part of MASC. We use the texts from four of
the genres: news, jokes, essays, and letters. The
letters fall into two sub-categories (philanthropic-
fundraising and solicitation-brochures), though all
of the letters have the same general goal of solicit-
ing donations, whether of money, time, or goods.
2http://www.anc.org/data/masc
4 Corpus study
In this section we describe the segmentation and
annotation of the data, the situation type invento-
ries reflected in the analysis, and the methodology
used for computing results. We then present and
discuss our findings.3
4.1 Segmentation and annotation
Having selected texts for analysis, we next seg-
mented them into clauses, again following the as-
sumption of one SE per clause (with a few excep-
tional cases). The PDTB texts were segmented
manually by the annotator, and the MASC texts
using SPADE (Soricut and Marcu, 2003) with
some heuristic post-processing. Each clause was
then manually labeled with its SE type.
The PDTB annotations were performed by one
paid annotator with extensive background in lin-
guistics, with ample training time but only a mini-
mal annotation manual.
The MASC annotations are part of a large on-
going annotation project with multiple paid anno-
tators, an extensive manual, and a structured train-
ing phase. In the latter, we take a feature-driven
approach to annotation which improves the qual-
ity of the annotations, leading to substantial inter-
annotator agreement (see Table 3). In addition to
the SE type label, annotators mark each clause
with three relevant linguistic features, which are
not used in the current study, but which guide
the annotators to find the best-fitting SE type la-
bel. These are inherent lexical aspect of the verb
(Friedrich and Palmer, 2014a), genericity of the
main referent, and habituality of the event de-
scribed. Details regarding the annotation scheme
and the benefits of feature-driven annotation ap-
pear in Friedrich and Palmer (2014b).
4.2 SE inventories
Each of the two analyses uses a slightly different
set of SE types. The main difference between the
two is that for the PDTB data annotations were
done mostly at a coarse-grained level, and the
MASC annotations are more fine-grained.
The PDTB analysis remains close to the inven-
tory of SE types presented in Sec. 2.1, with the
modification that three of the four coarse-grained
categories (i.e. General Statives, Abstract Entities,
3Results from the PDTB portion of the analysis were first
presented at the 2009 Texas Linguistics Society conference
in Austin, Texas.
genre clauses Kappa
news 2563 0.667
jokes 3453 0.756
essays 2404 0.493
letters 1850 0.612
Table 3: Number of clauses, inter-annotator agree-
ment (Cohen’s Kappa) for MASC subcorpora.
and Speech Acts) are treated as SE types. In other
words, for each of these categories, we conflate
its subtypes into a single higher-level type. States
and Events are treated as separate categories. The
coarse-grained analysis still captures the relevant
distinctions yet allows us to make useful general-
izations over the relatively small amount of data.
For MASC, we return to a fine-grained analy-
sis. General Statives and Speech Acts are counted
at the fine-grained level, and Abstract Entities do
not appear in the analysis at all. We add the RE-
PORT type of situation entity, which is a subtype
of EVENTS, designed to capture cases like (9).
(9) . . . , said the President of the Squash As-
sociation. (REPORT)
4.3 Method
For both data sets, we compute the distributions
of SE types per genre. For each genre, we collect
the counts of situation entity types assigned and
then compute the corresponding percentages. For
the PDTB data (Figure 2), this is a straightforward
analysis, as there was only one annotator.
For MASC (Figure 1), we use the annotations of
two annotators to compute the distributions. An-
notators are allowed to mark a segment with multi-
ple situation types; we simply use all markings of
types to compute the percentages. When annota-
tors disagree, we do not adjudicate but rather count
both annotations; when they do agree, we counts
two instance of the agreed-upon label. Hence, the
statistics presented in Figure 1 present an average
over the two annotator’s assignments. The distri-
butions shown in Figure 1 all differ significantly
(p < 0.01) from each other according to a χ2-
test, which means that the SE type distributions of
the genres are all significantly different from each
other: text types differ in their situation type dis-
tributions.
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Figure 1: Distributions of situation entity types in four MASC genres.
4.4 Findings
The broad finding is that General Statives play a
predominant role for texts associated with the AR-
GUMENT/COMMENTARY mode, and Events and
States for texts associated with the REPORT mode.
With these results, we begin to replace the vague
distributional statements in Table 1 with more pre-
cise characterizations of SE type distributions.
We first compare the two genres shared across
both data sets: news and essays. For both data
sets, we see that the proportion of Eventualities is
highest for the news genre, and that within Even-
tualities, Events are more frequent than States.4
This supports the theoretical claim that passages
in REPORT mode predominantly consist of Events
and States. Smith (2005) also predicts a significant
number of General Statives for REPORT passages;
in our study we observe these types in the news
texts, but less frequently than Eventualities.5
We see more General Statives in essays than in
news. The predominance of General Statives is
not surprising, given that arguments are frequently
built from generalizations and statements about
classes or kinds. An interesting result that is not
predicted by the theory is that in essays, States are
much more frequent than Events. Together with
the higher prevelance of General Statives, this sug-
gests that essays rely heavily on describing and
discussing states of affairs rather than particular
actions or events.
Now we turn to the two additional genres in
MASC: jokes and letters. First it should be noted
4For MASC this second result comes from conflating the
categories of Event and Report.
5It would be interesting to compare this distribution to
texts from another mode (e.g. NARRATIVE) for which Smith
(2005) does not predict many General Statives in order to de-
termine the relative importance of General Statives in the RE-
PORT mode.
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Figure 2: Distributions of situation entity types in
two PDTB genres.
that it’s not clear whether a distinction should be
made between (persuasive) essays and the persua-
sive letters that appear in MASC. Second, we can
see that the predominance of State-type SEs is
even stronger for letters than it is for essays. In
addition, we see that letters use more generalizing
statements and fewer generics, and a rather high
proportion of Imperatives. The expected distribu-
tion of Imperatives is not explicitly treated by the
theory, but one can easily imagine the sorts of Im-
perative statements that would appear in fundrais-
ing and solicitation letters: e.g. “Send a check
now! Don’t delay! Save the whales!”
Jokes are interesting in that they pattern quite
similarly to news texts, but with a higher propor-
tion of Speech Act types. The latter can be at-
tributed to the fact that jokes contain more direct
and reported speech than news.
5 Discussion and conclusion
The corpus study described above investigates,
across two different datasets of written English
text, the relationship between situation entities and
text type on the basis of the available data. In
both cases, and taking genre as a proxy for dis-
course mode, we find support for Smith’s theoreti-
cal prediction that different types of text show dif-
ferent characteristic distributions of the types of
SEs introduced by the clauses of the text. We
find this specifically for two broad text types:
news/jokes (mapped to the REPORT mode of dis-
course) and essays/persuasive texts (mapped to the
ARGUMENT/COMMENTARY mode of discourse).
The current study analyzes SE distributions over
collections of texts; a logical next step is to do
this analysis in a more fine-grained fashion, as-
sociating SE distributions with text passages la-
beled with discourse modes. This would remove
the need for the genre-as-proxy assumption and
move us even further toward a clearer understand-
ing of how discourse modes and situation entity
types pattern together.
In future work, we plan to create automatic
methods to label clauses with their SE type, which
could then be used to automatically identify the
types of text passages present in documents.
Relevance for argumentation mining
Some current research in argumentation mining
investigates the question of whether performance
for automatically extracting argument components
from text improves when a system can first nar-
row down the search space to the argumentative
regions of the document. (For example, see Stab
and Gurevych (2014) and Levy et al. (2014).) Our
finding that essays and persuasive texts show a dif-
ferent distribution of SE types than news texts sug-
gests one way to approach the challenge of finding
the argumentative portions of texts.
So far work in argumentation mining has fo-
cused predominantly on finding arguments in ar-
gumentative texts: opinion pieces, argumentative
essays, editorials, and the like. This is to some ex-
tent a limiting assumption, as texts from a wide
range of genres can in fact contain argumenta-
tive passages. A method for finding argumentative
passages could extend the range of texts available
for argumentation mining.
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Abstract
We describe the task of intention-based text
understanding for scientific argumentation.
The model of scientific argumentation pre-
sented here is based on the recognition of
28 concrete rhetorical moves in text. These
moves can in turn be associated with higher-
level intentions. The intentions we aim to
model operate in the limited domain of sci-
entific argumentation and justification; it is
the limitation of the domain which makes our
intentions predictable and enumerable, unlike
general intentions.
We explain how rhetorical moves relate to
higher-level intentions. We also discuss
work in progress towards a corpus annotated
with limited-domain intentions, and speculate
about the design of an automatic recognition
system, for which many components already
exist today.
1 Introduction
Automatically recognising the structure of an argu-
ment is an attractive and challenging task, which has
received interest for a long time from the AI as well
as the natural language processing community, and
recently from both communities together in a joint
effort. Because arguments are global text structur-
ing devices, argument recognition has the potential
to advance text understanding and the many real-life
tasks that could profit from it.
There are various definitions of what an argu-
ment is (Toulmin, 1958; Cohen, 1984; Dung, 1995;
Bru¨ninghaus and Ashley, 2005; Besnard and Hunter,
2008; Walton et al., 2008; Green, 2014). We are here
interested in a definition close to discourse structure,
and concentrate in particular on the recognition of
prototypical argumentation steps in scientific expo-
sition. We posit that these argumentation steps can
be defined at an abstract level so that world knowl-
edge is not required for their recognition.
There is a clear connection between our goal and
intention recognition. Fully understanding every as-
pect of an author’s argumentation requires the recog-
nition of all of their intentions, which in turn means
that we would have to model, generalise over, and
do inference with general world knowledge. This
is of course an AI-hard task fraught with many the-
oretical and practical problems; consider the sym-
bolic AI work on this and closely related problems
(e.g., Schank and Abelson, 1977; Pollack, 1986,
1990; Norvig, 1989; Cohen et al., 1990 and Car-
berry, 1990).
We will propose instead to reframe argumenta-
tion detection as a limited-domain intention recog-
nition task. The basic building blocks of our model
of an argument are instances of higher-level inten-
tions which the authors are likely to have had when
they were writing their paper. The representation we
suggest for intentions does not contain any proposi-
tional content based on arbitrary world knowledge.
Instead, our intentions are represented as generalised
propositions such as “Our solution is better than the
competition’s”. Such speech acts realise parts of the
author’s intention of persuading the reader that the
work described in the paper is novel and significant.
When during processing we encounter the sentence
To our knowledge, our system is the first one
aimed at building semantic lexicons from raw text
without using any additional semantic knowledge.
(9706013, S-171)
our representation only registers the author’s inten-
tion of staking a novelty claim for their new work.
The proposition is generalised in that the proposi-
tional content of the novelty, i.e., the fact that the
authors built the first lexicon from raw text without
any additional semantic knowledge, is not encoded.
This detail is not important at the level of abstraction
we have in mind.
The simplification of argument recognition into
a limited-domain intention recognition problem is
possible because of the high degree of convention-
alisation of scientific argumentation. Following
Swales (1990), we call explicit statements such as
the above novelty claim “rhetorical moves”. Rhetor-
ical moves are well-documented in various disci-
plines: they occur frequently, and they can be enu-
merated and classified, as applied linguists have
done in some detail for several disciplines (e.g., My-
ers, 1992; Hyland, 1998; Salager-Meyer, 1992).
Swales also coined the expression “research
space” – a cognitive construct consisting of scien-
tific problems, methods and research acts that au-
thors use when they locate their research with re-
spect to historical approaches and current trends.
When we faced the decision of which types
of semantic participants to encode in our repre-
sentation of rhetorical moves, we tried to achieve
as much generalisation as possible, in line with
the Knowledge Claim Discourse Model (KCDM,
Teufel, 2010). In fact, the core semantic participants
in rhetorical moves can be reduced to just two sets –
US (the paper’s authors) and THEM (everybody else
who has ever published).
When it comes to the states and events expressed
in rhetorical moves, we maximally generalise again
and end up with four classes of predicates, where
the classes are defined based on the number of par-
ticipants in the logical act expressed in the move.
We differentiate statements about the authors’ own
work (US); statements about others’ previous work
(THEM); statements about the connection between
the authors’ work with previous work (US and
THEM); and finally statements about the research
space and the authors’ position in it. Another rele-
vant observation is that rhetorical moves often con-
tain sentiment, in the form of “good” vs. “bad” situ-
ations, as well as successful vs. failed problem solv-
ing acts.
As far as the representation of time in the events
and states described in rhetorical moves is con-
cerned, another simplification is possible: it suffices
to model three points in time, the time before the
authors’ research activity begins (t0), and the times
during (t1) and after (t2) their research activity. Of
course, the real actions by the authors that gave rise
to the research in the paper are spread in time in far
more complex ways, but a scientific paper is a so-
cial construct (Bazerman, 1985). The telling of “the
story” follows the convention that all research acts
associated with the paper happen simultaneously,
and that they transform an earlier state of the world
into a new (better) one.
These simplifications allow us to define the
28 rhetorical moves in Figure 11. We also give some
examples of rhetorical moves from the chemistry,
computational linguistics and agriculture literature,
which were sourced from our annotated corpora.
The overall argumentation structure we propose
concerns the author’s argument that their research
was worthy of publication, and all of its subargu-
ments – which, at its heart, is always the same ar-
gument. Argument recognition then corresponds to
a guess as to which strategy the author pursued in
making this argument. This process will have to
be driven by a bottom-up recognition of rhetorical
moves, as these are the only explicitly expressed
parts of the argument. This will trigger a simple
form of inference as to which higher-level intention
might have been present during the writing of the
paper.
In previous work, we have used a robust classi-
fication model called Argumentative Zoning (AZ;
Teufel, 2000, 2010; Teufel et al. 2009, O’Seaghdha
and Teufel 2014), that turns some aspects of the
more general argumentation recognition model of
the KCDM into a simple sentence classification task.
In AZ, rhetorical moves with a similar function were
bundled together into 7 (in later versions 15 or 6)
flat classes or zones, and each sentence was classi-
fied into one of these on the basis of surface features,
1An earlier version of the list of moves appears in Teufel
(1998).
I. Properties of research space
R-1 Problem addressed is a problem
R-2 New goal/problem is new
R-3 New goal/problem is hard
R-4 New goal/problem is important/interesting
R-5 Solution to new problem is desirable
R-6 No solution to new problem exists
II. Properties of new solution (US)
R-7 New solution solves problem
R-8 New solution avoids problems
R-9 New solution necessary to achieve goal
R-10 New solution is advantageous
R-11 New solution has limitations
R-12 Future work follows from new solution
III. Properties of existing solution (THEM)
H-1 Existing solution is flawed
H-2 Existing solution does not solve problem
H-3 Existing solution introduces new problem
H-4 Existing solution solves problem
H-5 Existing solution is advantageous
IV. Relationships between existing
and new solutions (US and THEM)
H-6 New solution is better than existing solution
H-7 New solution avoids problems (when existing
does not)
H-8 New goal/problem/solution is different from
existing
H-9 New goal/problem is harder than existing
goal/problem
H-10 New result is different from existing result
H-11 New claim is different from/clashes with exist-
ing claim
H-12 Agreement/support between existing and new
claim
H-13 Existing solution provides basis for new solu-
tion
H-14 Existing solution provides part of new solution
H-15 Existing solution (adapted) provides part of
new solution
H-16 Existing solution is similar to new solution
Recently, R-4 the use of imines as starting materials
in the synthesis of nitrogen-containing compounds has
attracted a lot of interest from synthetic chemists.(1)
(b200198e)
H-4 This account makes reasonably good empirical
predictions, though H-2 it does fail for the following
examples: . . . (9503014, S-75)
H-12 Greater survival of tillers under irrigated con-
ditions agrees with other reports in barley [4,28] and
wheat [10,13,26]. (A027)
Figure 1: Rhetorical moves; some examples
including sequence information. This way of phras-
ing the problem allows for tractable recognition and
evaluation. AZ classification has been shown to lead
to stable and reliable annotation on several scientific
disciplines, and it is also demonstrably useful for a
set of applications such as the detection of new ideas
in a large scientific area, summarisation, search, and
writing assistance.
Nevertheless, AZ is only a flat approximation of
a larger argumentation model of scientific justifica-
tion. The work presented here is a departure from
AZ in that it aims to model the stages of scientific
argumentation in a more informative, finer-grained
way.
2 The role of citations in the argument
The reader may have noticed that the rhetorical
moves in parts III and IV of Fig. 1, which are con-
cerned with statements about THEM (i.e., other pub-
lished authors), are closely connected to citation
function2. In fact, we have in the past attempted
the recognition of some of the H-moves as an iso-
lated task, in the form of citation function classifica-
tion (CFC; Teufel et al., 2006); others (Garzone and
Mercer, 2000; Cohen et al., 2006) have used other
schemes for similar citation classification tasks.
Where, how often, and how authors cite previous
work is an important aspect of their overall scientific
argument. For instance, the authors might choose
one of the possible articles types (review, research
paper, pioneer work etc) to support a particular point
in their overall argument. The choice of a particu-
lar pioneer paper might signal their intellectual her-
itage. They might tell us who their rivals are, and
who uses similar methods for a different goal (i.e.,
not rivals), whose infrastructure they borrow, and
whose work supports theirs and vice versa. These
questions will crucially influence where in the text
(physically and logically in terms of the argumenta-
tion) a given citation will occur.
As a result of all this, it is often possible to de-
termine some citations as being particularly central
to the authors’ paper. This information, if it could
be automatically determined from text in a reliable
2These 16 moves also follow a different naming scheme,
where the move name starts with the letter “H” – historically,
such moves were called “hinge” moves, as opposed to the “R”
(“rhetorical”) moves in parts I and II of Fig 1.
way, would vastly improve bibliographic search. It
also has the potential to improve bibliometric assess-
ments of a piece of work’s impact, e.g. in the sense
of Borgman and Furner (2002), White (2004), and
Boyak and Klavans (2010).
3 Higher-level intentions
There are some rhetorical moves that at first glance
seem to make litte sense. Stating H-5, praise of other
people’s work, might comparatively weaken the au-
thor’s own knowledge claim. Similarly, stating H-9,
the fact that the author’s research goal is harder than
other people’s goal, might prompt the criticism that
the authors have simply chosen their goal badly –
had they chosen an easier goal, the solution might
have been easier, or achieved better results.
However, rhetorical moves must be interpreted as
part of the larger picture of the overall scientific ar-
gument. Scientific writing can be seen as one big
game where an author’s overall goal is to success-
fully manoeuvre their paper past the peer review, so
that it can be published.
According to the conventions of peer review, there
is a small set of criteria for acceptance – the authors
need to show that the problem they address is justi-
fied (High-Level-Goal 1 or HLG-1 for short), that
their knowledge claim is significant (HLG-2) and
novel (HLG-3), and that the research methodology
they use is sound (HLG-4). If valid evidence for the
fulfilment of these criteria is presented, the peer re-
view cannot justifiably reject the paper.
Fig. 2 spells out how the overall argument for
validity is put together from high- and medium-
level intentions and rhetorical moves3. Rhetorical
moves in Fig. 2 appear in shaded boxes (H- and R-
type moves in different shades of grey). Above the
rhetorical moves, we see a simple representation of
the intentions posited in the model. For simplic-
ity and readability, Fig. 3 repeats the same network
without rhetorical moves. The arrows in both figures
express the “supports” relationship in argumentation
theory. For instance, in order to argue for the novelty
of one’s work, a state-of-the-art comparison may or
may not be necessary – this depends on whether one
describes the research goal as new or not. For new
3An earlier version of this diagram appears as Fig.3.1.7 in
Teufel (2000, p.105).
research goals, one may simply show that no other
work is similar enough to one’s goal: new goals (cre-
ated at t1) cannot be compared to existing state-of-
the-art, which is frozen in time at t0. (Novelty is
a rare example of a high-level intention which can
be left to the reader to infer, or alternatively stated
explicitly as move R-2 or R-6.)
Note that each citation that has an H-type rhetor-
ical move associated with it automatically strength-
ens the claim that the authors are knowledgeable in
the field (one of the important subgoals of HLG-4,
soundness). Under our model, citations without any
associated H-move are not contributing to this goal,
as a knowledgeable author must be able to state the
relationship of the current work to earlier work. (A
simple statement of similarity with somebody else’s
work should barely count, but has been given a
“weak” move, H-16, because we encountered it so
frequently in our corpus studies.)
From Fig. 2 we can now see why stating H-5 can
be a good strategic move even though it praises other
people’s work – it supports HLG-4 (soundness of
methodology) via the sub-argument that by includ-
ing praise-worthy existing work, the authors make
sure they use the best methods currently available.
Similarly, the statement that one’s goal is harder
than somebody else’s motivates that the authors’
chosen problem is justified (HLG-1) and significant
(HLG-2), and additionally strengthens HLG-4 (via
the claim that the authors know their field well).
This illustrates that a rhetorical move can support
more than one high-level intention.
4 Knowledge representation of moves and
intentions
What has been said so far raises the question of
which knowledge representation is most suited for
modelling intentions and rhetorical moves. Design-
ing a propositional logic that expresses the full se-
mantics of rhetorical moves and of higher-level in-
tentions is a task that goes far beyond the current
paper; it requires a thorough design of the semantics
of objects and events/states in this limited domain,
as well as an appropriate type of inference. Nev-
ertheless, we will sketch some of the principles of
what might be usefully encoded.
The THEM entities would need to be grounded to
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Figure 3: Argumentation network (excluding rhetorical moves).
citations, possibly also to more general entities such
as “many linguists in the 1970s”. Entities would
need to be tracked throughout the paper, for in-
stance by performing co-reference. We would also
need to represent problems, solutions and goals as
atomic types, i.e., the fact that they are considered
problems, solutions and goals, rather than their con-
tent. (The system should keep pointers to the textual
strings that express this content, so that down-stream
processing or human users can gain access to this in-
formation.)
The exact representation of a proposition is open
to speculation at this point, but moves would likely
be decomposed into atomic clauses. Events and
properties in the limited domain (such as changing
a solution into another one, or the fact that one solu-
tion is better than another) would be associated with
a time; for instance all actions that logically happen
during the research act presented in the paper would
be associated with t1.
Inference could be performed by a theorem
prover, which could inhibit or further activate the
potentially possible “supports” relationships given
in Fig. 1, by taking the plausibility of a particular
inference into account, in the light of the textual ev-
idence encountered.
Axioms could directly encode some of the rules
of the scientific publication game, such that the ex-
istence of a problem is a bad state, that of a solution
is a good state, but that a solution needing something
else is a bad state again. Temporal inference could
require axioms such as things that persist at a cer-
tain time also persist in later times, unless they are
changed.
R-5 solution(s) ∧ solve(s, p, t1) ∧ good(a, t2) ∧
aspect(a, s) ∧ problem(p) ∧ address(US, p)
R-12 problem(p1) ∧ cause(s, p1, t1) ∧ solution(s) ∧
solve(s, p) ∧ problem(p) ∧ address(US, p
H-1 solution(s1) ∧ own(THEM, s1) ∧ bad(a, t0)
∧ aspect(a, s) ∧ solve(s1, p) ∧ problem(p) ∧
address(US, p
H-7 solution(s1) ∧ own(THEM, s1) ∧ solution(s)
∧ own(US, s) ∧ 6 solve(s1, p, t0) (∧
solves(s, p, t1)
H-15 own(THEM, s1) ∧ solution (s1) ∧ solution
(s2) ∧ change(US, s1, s2, t1) ∧ use(US, s2, t1)
Figure 4: Sketch of knowledge representation for se-
lected rhetorical moves
As an example of what the representation might
look like, Fig. 4 expresses five moves in a simple
prepositional logic. Here, ownership of solutions
(by US or THEM) is expressed directly, as are sim-
ple relationships between solutions, problems, re-
sults and claims. Consider move H-15, for instance
– adapting somebody else’s solution means taking
it, changing it into something else, and then using
the changed solution. Some moves, such as R-6
and R-9, look like they might require quantification,
which exceeds the expressivity of simple predicate
logic.
Several aspects of the moves’ semantics are not
explicitly expressed in text; they could even be mod-
elled as presuppositions. For instance, R-7 states
that a rival’s solution does not solve one’s problem,
which presupposes that the author’s solution does,
otherwise it would not be a relevant statement. R-7
thereby implicitly invokes a comparison between the
author’s approach and the rivals’, which is won by
the authors. Crucially, whether or not the authors’
successful problem-solving is explicitly mentioned
in the text or not is optional. Another example is the
need to know whether a problem mentioned in a cer-
tain rhetorical move is actually the problem that the
authors address in the current paper. This is often
decisive, because the knowledge claim of the paper
is connected exclusively to this particular problem.
In some part of the paper, the authors give us the in-
formation which problem it is that they address, but
they will typically not repeat this elsewhere.
It is the discourse model’s job to accumulate the
information about the identity of important prob-
lems in its knowledge representation. This can be
done either via coreference or via some other mech-
anism that infers that the discourse is still concerned
with the same problem. This may seem a very hard
task, but at least it is not doomed in principle: in
earlier work we managed to train non-experts in per-
forming similar inferences and judgements during
AZ annotation, using no world knowledge, only dis-
course cues.
5 Design of a recogniser
How could all this be recognised in unlimited text?
The recognition of rhetorical moves would drive
recognition with this model; as the only visible parts
of the argument, rhetorical moves correspond to the
bottom-up element. In contrast, high-level inten-
tions form the top-down, a priori expectations. They
can only ever be inferred, because the authors typi-
cally leave them implicit, so their recognition will
never be made with absolute certainty.
A hybrid statistical-symbolic recogniser of scien-
tific argumentation could instantiate the network in
Fig. 2 on the fly for each new incoming paper, and
keep a knowledge base of propositions derived dur-
ing recognition. Whenever one of the moves is de-
tected, the activation of its associated box is trig-
gered. Statistically trained recognisers based on su-
perficial features and evidence from tens of thou-
sands of analysed papers provide a confidence value
for the recognition of each move, which is translated
into the strength of activation.The symbolic part of
the recogniser keeps track of the logic representation
accumulated up to that point in processing, and per-
forms inference as to which higher-level intention is
supported by currently activated rhetorical moves.
The output of such an analysis would be a par-
tially activated network expressing the overall ar-
gument likely to be followed in the paper, where
each node in the network is annotated with a
more or less instantiated knowledge representation.
The activated network can be considered as an
automatically-derived explanation for the place in
the research space where the authors situate them-
selves.
Newly-derived, intermediate levels of informa-
tion should be additionally available from such an
analysis, as a side-effect of this hybrid style of
recognition. For instance, coreference resolution is
an important aspect of analysis and contributes to the
superficial features. It could also feed into a mech-
anism that determines which of the cited previous
approaches is central to the argumentation in the pa-
per, which of these the authors present as their main
rivals or collaborators, and which aspects of existing
work they criticise or praise.
It is quite obvious that a solution to this task
would be immediately useful for a host of appli-
cations in search, summarisation and the teaching
of scientific writing. As the system would be able
to associate textual statements with the correspond-
ing likely intentions it recognised, it could produce a
justification for its overall analysis of the argument.
Operating as a text critiquer, such a system could
point out badly-expressed instances of well-known
argumentation patterns, e.g. missing or weak evi-
dence for particular high-level intentions.
Appealing though such applications are, the main
point of the analysis laid out here is the development
of a theory of text understanding of naturally occur-
ring arguments in scientific text. Given the state of
current NLP technology, some of the intermediate
levels of recognition necessary for this seem to us to
be within reach in the near future.
6 Conclusions
This paper promotes robust text understanding of
scientific articles in a deeper manner than is cur-
rently practiced, as this would lead to more infor-
mative, symbolic representations of argument struc-
turing. Mature technologies exist for determining
specific scientific entities such as gene names (cf.
the review by Campos et al., 2014) and specific
events such as protein–gene interactions (e.g., Reb-
holz et al., 2005). In contrast to our work, such ap-
proaches are domain-specific and only recognise a
small part of the entities or relationships modelled
here. A different line of research associates text
pieces with the research phase or information struc-
ture a given statement belongs to, where information
structure is defined in terms of methods, results, con-
clusions etc, as in the work of Liakata et al. (2010),
Guo et al (2013) and Hirohata et al. (2008). A re-
lated task, hedge detection in science, has been es-
tablished and competitively evaluated (see Farkas et
al. (2010) for an overview of the respective CoNLL
shared task). While these two approaches (informa-
tion structuring and hedge recognition) are domain-
independent like ours, the analysis presented here
aims at a deeper, more informative representation of
relationships between general entities in the research
space.
At the other end of the spectrum, we are aware
of at least one deeper analysis of argument struc-
ture in science than ours, which is manual and
takes world-knowledge into account, namely Green
(2014); our approach differs from hers in that we opt
to model argumentation in a domain- and discipline-
independent manner, which is automatic but neces-
sarily at a far shallower level.
Our claims in this paper include that a logical sci-
entific argument structure exists and can be inter-
preted by a human reader, even in light of ambiguity
and although only some steps of the argumentation
are explicitly stated. We have also claimed that this
type of analysis holds for all disciplines in principle,
but certainly for all empirical sciences. We further
claim that a substantial part of the argumentation in a
well-written paper is recognisable to a reader even if
they do not have any domain knowledge. These are
rather strong claims: It is not even clear whether hu-
mans can recognise the explicit argumentation parts,
let alone the inferred ones. We therefore need to sub-
stantiate the claims with annotation experiments.
In our work to date, we have made empirical
observations about argumentation structure in syn-
thetic chemistry, computer science, computational
linguistics, and agriculture, but many of these are
confined to the level of AZ or CFC. We are now
in the process of corroborating the argumentation-
level observations by corpus annotation of rhetori-
cal moves. This initially takes the form of adding
information to already existing AZ- and CFC-level
annotation, with the aim of constructing a full-scale
rhetorical move annotation. Higher-level goals will
then be annotated as a second step.
Practical work also concerns building the recog-
nisers of rhetorical moves. Several such recognis-
ers already exist and will be refined in future work.
It will be interesting to study exactly when infer-
ence about higher-level intentions becomes neces-
sary, and which kinds of constraints can be derived
from the argumentation network and the knowledge
representation so as to usefully guide the inference
mechanism.
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